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INTRODUCTION 
 
I 
The nineteenth-century history of the Teton Sioux is a study of contradictions. For 
instance, while fur-trade scholar Hiram Martin Chittenden notes that “the Sioux were 
exceedingly troublesome in the early years of the fur trade and . . . came to be known as 
the pirates of the Missouri,” he subsequently concludes that they eventually “dropped 
their hostile attitude . . . and in later years gave the traders little or no trouble.”1  And 
while Oglala Sioux historian Vine Deloria, Jr. claims that “[t]he Sioux, my own people, 
have a great tradition of conflict [and] were the only nation ever to annihilate the United 
States Cavalry three times in succession [,]”2 Western historian Richard White observes 
that  
the Sioux found the Americans to be useful, if dangerous, allies during their 
third period of expansion.  For over three decades . . . the ambitions of the 
Sioux and the Americans proved generally complimentary, and as late as 1838 
Joshua Pilcher, the American agent for the upper Missouri would write that 
‘no Indians ever manifested a greater degree of friendship for the whites in 
general, or more respect for our Government, than the Sioux.’3  
The “over three decades” referred to by White were the years from 1809 to 1854; in fact, 
for most of the American fur trade’s active years on the northern and central plains, the 
Teton Sioux maintained peaceful relations with American traders, officials, and settlers.  
                                                             
1 Hiram Martin Chittenden, The American Fur Trade of the Far West, 2 vols., with introduction and notes 
by Stallo Vinton and foreword by James P. Ronda (New York:  Press of the Pioneers, 1935; reprint, 
Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1986), 2: 851 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 
2 Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins:  An Indian Manifesto (New York:  The Macmillan Co., 
1969), 22. 
3 Richard White, “The Winning of the West:  The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries,” The Journal of American History 65 (September 1978):  328. 
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Although this perceptual anomaly—i.e., the Sioux alternating between either 
accommodation or hostility—broadly informs this research, the larger significance of the 
Tetons’ flexible foreign relations with American traders, trappers, government officials, 
and settlers lies in how those relations affected Teton occupation of the Platte River 
valley adjacent to the Oregon Trail throughout the 1830s and 1840s, an occupation which 
firmly established their military dominance of the north-central plains.   
One of the purposes of this dissertation is to explain this phenomenon. Toward that 
end, three possibilities present themselves: (1) did the Western Sioux—primarily the 
Brules and Oglalas—follow American traders to the Platte; or (2) did those traders extend 
their operations west of the Missouri River to secure lucrative trade relations with the 
westward-expanding Sioux; or (3) was their simultaneous presence in the region, at least 
initially, largely unrelated to each group’s discrete motivations, circumstances, and 
activities? This third possibility sustains a more sophisticated and intellectually- 
satisfying explanation for the simultaneous presence of the Teton Sioux and American fur 
traders in the Platte River valley from 1834 to 1854 and supports the central thesis of this 
dissertation. 
The history of the Teton, or Western, Sioux in the first half of the nineteenth century is 
one of continuous expansion from the middle Missouri River westward to the headwaters 
of the Yellowstone River and south by southeast to below the South Platte and 
Republican rivers. Significantly, all seven divisions of the Tetons took part in the armed 
conquest of the northern and central plains. These divisions include: (1) Sitcangou 
(Brules), (2) Oglala, (3) Minneconjou, (4) Sihasapa (Blackfoot Sioux), (5) Ohenonpa 
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(Two Kettles), (6) Itaziptco (Without Bows or Sans Arcs), and, (7) Hunkpapa.
4
  Scholars 
have failed to answer satisfactorily whether the conquest of this enormous area 
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century by the mounted Tetons occurred prior 
to, simultaneously with, or as a consequence of the westward-expanding American fur 
trade in the years from 1804 to 1854.  A second argument presented here is that the 
Tetons’ occupation of the north-central plains from the Missouri to the Platte River valley 
was one of the unintended consequences of the activities of American fur traders 
throughout this region—activities largely unrelated to Teton migrations westward from 
the Missouri. 
Although its etymology is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the term Sioux 
requires a brief explanation.  As a collective label, it encompasses the seven traditional 
“council fires” or “bands” of the Dakota:  (1) Bdewakanton, (2) Wahpekute, (3) Sisseton, 
(4) Wahpeton, (5) Yankton, (6) Yanktonai, (7) Teton.  The first four of these bands speak 
the “D” dialect of the Dakota language and are known as the Eastern or Santee Sioux; the 
next two bands are the Middle Sioux, speaking the “N” dialect of that language; while the 
last band, also known as the Western Sioux, speak the “L” dialect of the same language.  
As derived from these three dialects, the Eastern, Middle, and Western Sioux are also 
known as Dakota, Nakota, and Lakota, respectively.
5
  As the subject of this dissertation 
focuses almost exclusively on the Teton band of the Dakota, the following conventions 
apply throughout:  Tetons, Teton Sioux, Western Sioux, Lakota, and Sioux appear 
                                                             
4 Garrick Mallery, Fourth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, “The Dakota Winter 
Counts,” 89-146; “Pictographs of the North American Indians, plates VI-LI, Smithsonian Institution, 
Washington, D C, 1886; reprint, Garrick Mallery, The Dakota and Corbusier Winter Counts, Reprints in 
Anthropology, 36 vols. (Lincoln, NE:  J&L Reprint Company, 1987), 97-98, (hereafter, Dakota Winter 
Counts). 
5 James H. Howard, Yanktonai Ethnohistory and the John K. Bear Winter Count (Lincoln, NE: Augstums 
Printing Service, 1976), 4. 
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interchangeably in the text, unless specifically noted otherwise. To avoid confusion, the 
names of the seven divisions of the Tetons—Brules, Oglalas, Minneconjous, Blackfoot 
Sioux, Two Kettles, Sans Arcs, and Hunkpapas—appear in these, their most common 
forms; all seven of these divisions receive the designation of “tribes” rather than “bands,” 
the latter term being reserved for the smaller groups that, in the aggregate, comprised the 
tribes. Plural names denote nouns—e.g., the Brules—while singular names become 
adjectives—e.g., the Brule Sioux. Despite the intellectual controversy surrounding the 
term Indians, that word appears throughout the text in recognition of its general 
acceptance as a label for North America’s indigenous peoples.6 Finally, Indian names 
will generally appear in the form of their English translation.   
A second purpose of this dissertation is to fill, at least partially, the need for a more 
complete history of the relationship between the Teton Sioux and the American fur trade 
from 1804 to 1854. Even though a number of excellent studies of the nineteenth-century 
Sioux exist, the authors of those works invariably favor the years from 1855 to 1890 at 
the expense of the earlier period. Two well-known examples are George E. Hyde’s 
Spotted Tail’s Folk: A History of the Brule Sioux (1961) and Red Cloud’s Folk: A History 
of the Oglala Sioux Indians (1937). Although Hyde briefly covers the Tetons’ eighteenth-
century migration west across the Missouri River and their history during the first half of 
the nineteenth century, his studies primarily focus on the years from 1855 to 1881, and 
from 1855 to 1878, respectively. For instance, in Spotted Tail’s Folk, Hyde devotes a 
                                                             
6 For the reasoning behind these grammatical conventions, see George E. Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk:  A 
History of the Oglala Sioux Indians, with a foreword by Royal B. Hassrick (Norman:  University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1937; reprint, Norman:  University of Oklahoma Press, 1975), x (page citations are to the 
reprint edition), in which Hyde explains that he too uses “the English plural in writing tribal and band 
names: Oglalas, Tetons, Kiyuksas. The custom followed by many writers of using what may be termed the 
Indian plural and writing ‘one Oglala,’ ‘seven Oglala,’ is supposed for some reason to be scholarly; but 
surely this Indian grammatical form has no place in the writing of English prose. There is no more sense in 
writing ‘seven Oglala’ than in writing ‘seven Spaniard’ or ‘seven western state.’”  
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mere 62 pages out of 310 to the period from 1804 to 1854, and in Red Cloud’s Folk, only 
47 pages out of 303.
7
 A more recent—and jarring—illustration of this tendency to gloss 
over this critical half-century in the history of the Teton Sioux is Jeffrey Ostler’s The 
Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee (2004). In it 
the author allots only a single chapter of 39 pages to the eventful period from 1804 to the 
mid-1850s; conversely, the 40 years from 1851 to 1890 receive 331 pages of text.
8
 
Current historiographical trends suggest a renewed appreciation for the importance of 
the American fur trade during this earlier period to the histories of the Plains tribes. 
Historical geographer David J. Wishart, in his award-winning account of the nineteenth-
century dispossession of Nebraska’s agricultural tribes, dedicates 100 of 244 pages to the 
critical years from 1800 to 1854.
9
 Fur trade historian Barton H. Barbour recently offered 
his valuable study of Fort Union “as a lens for examining several aspects of the western 
fur trade . . . [and] as a vehicle for testing the validity of some historical interpretations of 
the trade.
10
 And, a collaboration by anthropologist W. Raymond Wood, Joseph C. Porter, 
chief curator of the North Carolina Museum of History, and David C. Hunt, director of 
                                                             
7 George E. Hyde, Spotted Tail’s Folk: A History of the Brule Sioux, 2 ed. (Norman: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1974), 1-62; Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 33-80. 
8 Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and U. S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1-39. Some scholars have, however, recognized this tendency to 
marginalize early nineteenth-century Plains Indian history. For example, in a 1982 article in the Journal of 
American Studies, Colin Calloway notes: “Older, white-oriented studies of Indian history tend to 
concentrate on the years when this [Plains Indian] culture was in decline and to neglect earlier periods and 
developments. Such an approach is understandable, and to some extent inevitable, given the historical 
sources available, but it conveys an inaccurate impression of the situation on the Great Plains prior to white 
settlement.” But where this dissertation focuses on the Teton Sioux and the American fur trade from 1804 
to 1854, Calloway’s “paper considers the Plains Indians in their heyday and examines intertribal trade [my 
italics] and warfare at a time when the spread of horses and guns was causing great upheavals in native 
power structures;” in Colin G. Calloway, “The Inter-tribal Balance of Power on the Great Plains, 1760-
1850,” Journal of American Studies 16 (April 1982): 25. 
9 David J. Wishart, An Unspeakable Sadness: The Dispossession of the Nebraska Indians (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 1-100. 
10 Barton H. Barbour, Fort Union and the Upper Missouri Fur Trade (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2000), xi. For another analysis of Fort Union and its impact on the upper Missouri fur trade see 
Erwin N. Thompson, Fort Union Trading Post: Fur Trade Empire on the Upper Missouri (Medora, ND: 
Theodore Roosevelt Nature and History Association, 1986). 
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the Stark Museum of Art, jointly published a volume entitled Karl Bodmer’s Studio Art 
that, despite its title, includes a detailed narrative of the 1833-1834 journey of Prince 
Maximilian of Wied-Neuwied and his party up the Missouri River as guests of the 
American Fur Company.
11
 As part of this general trend toward interdisciplinary research 
into the relationship between the American fur trade and the Indian tribes west of the 
Mississippi River, research for this dissertation draws freely upon the following primary 
sources: (1) Indian winter counts and recorded oral testimonies of the indigenous 
participants; (2) journals of the trappers and traders; (3) government documents; and (4) 
period newspapers. Secondary sources include an abundance of scholarly literature from 
the disciplines of history, ethnohistory, historical geography, anthropology, archaeology, 
political economy, economic history, gender studies, foreign relations, public history, and 
material culture.  
The fifty-year period selected for the topic of this dissertation is not an arbitrary 
choice; two pivotal events of profound historical significance to both the Teton Sioux and 
the American fur trade circumscribe this half century of Western history.  In the spring of 
1804, Thomas Jefferson’s Corp of Discovery—more popularly known as the Lewis and 
                                                             
11 W. Raymond Wood, Joseph C. Porter, and David C. Hunt, Karl Bodmer’s Studio Art (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 2002), passim. For a sampling of the wide range of interdisciplinary studies 
that have enriched either American Indian history or American fur trade history or both from the fields of 
ethnohistoy, archaeology, anthropology, economics, political economy, gender studies, public history, and 
material culture see John C. Ewers, Indian Life on the Upper Missouri (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1968); Richard E. Jensen, The Fontenelle and Cabanne Trading Posts: The History and Archaeology 
of Two Missouri River Sites, 1822-1838, Publications in Anthropology, Number 11 (Lincoln: Nebraska 
State Historical Society, 1998);  Francis Jennings, “A Growing Partnership: Historians, Anthropologists 
and American Indian History,” Ethnohistory 29 (Winter 1982): 21-34; W. Raymond Wood, “Integrating 
Ethnohistory and Archaeology at Fort Clark State Historic Site, North Dakota,” American Antiquity 58 
(July 1993): 544-559; James L. Clayton, “The Growth and Economic Significance of the American Fur 
Trade, 1790-1890,” Minnesota History 40 (1966): 210-220; Patricia Albers and Beatrice Medicine, eds., 
The Hidden Half: Studies of Plains Indian Women (Washington, D C: University Press of America, 1983); 
James Austin Hanson, Metal Weapons, Tools, and Ornaments of the Teton Dakota Indians (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1975); and Carl P. Russell, Firearms, Traps, & Tools of the Mountain Men 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1967). 
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Clark expedition—departed St. Louis to begin its ascent of the Missouri River to explore 
the newly-acquired Louisiana Purchase. One important result of this expedition was that 
representatives of the United States encountered the Teton Sioux west of that river for the 
first time. And, in the summer of 1854, on the plains surrounding Fort Laramie, an 
encampment of Brules awaiting the distribution of annuities guaranteed them by the Fort 
Laramie Treaty of 1851 annihilated a detachment of the United States army in a tragic 
misunderstanding that initiated more than two decades of nearly continuous warfare 
between the Western Sioux and Americans.
12
 Additionally, two unique and valuable 
primary sources bracket this period: Lewis and Clark’s meticulously-kept journals of 
their 1804-1806 expedition and American Fur Company trader Edwin Denig’s mid-
nineteenth-century assessment of the Teton Sioux and four neighboring Indian tribes of 
the upper Missouri region.
13
 
II 
Four syntheses examining various aspects of the American fur trade provide the 
historical context for this dissertation—a context necessarily constructed from the 
cultural vantage point of Euro-American fur traders. Of these, the most important is 
                                                             
12 A large body of literature partially or wholly devoted to the Plains Indian wars of the second half of the 
nineteenth century exists, in particular the work of Western historian Robert M. Utley who has managed to 
distill the subject to its essence and set the standard for outstanding scholarship for this sub-field in the 
following five volumes: The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890 (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1984); Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865 (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967); Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-
1891 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973); The Last Days of the Sioux Nation (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1963); and The Lance and the Shield: The Life and Times of Sitting Bull (New York: 
Henry Holt, 1993). 
13 See Reuben G. Thwaites, ed., The Original Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, 8 vols. (New 
York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1904-1905; Edwin Thompson Denig, Five Indian Tribes of the Upper 
Missouri: Sioux, Arickaras, Assiniboines, Crees, Crows, edited and with an introduction by John C. Ewers 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961). For an assessment of Lewis and Clark’s extensive 
ethnographic contributions see James P. Ronda, Lewis and Clark among the Indians (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1984), 113-132. For an appraisal of Denig’s unique ethnological achievement see John 
C. Ewers, “Literate Fur Trader Edwin Thompson Denig,” The Montana Magazine of History 4 (Spring 
1954): 1-12. 
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Hiram Martin Chittenden’s The American Fur Trade of the Far West (1902), a work that 
inaugurated modern upper Missouri and Rocky Mountain fur trade historiography. 
Chittenden was the first scholar to recognize that the American fur trade during the years 
from 1807 to 1843 represented a distinct period in the history of an industry that had 
existed since the early 1500s. He fashioned a chronological narrative of the American fur 
trade—with St. Louis as the business center for the rival companies, their employees, and 
the free trappers, and with the Rocky Mountains and the Missouri River watershed as the 
fields of action—and provided an organizing structure for its history that had not 
previously existed.
14
 
Chittenden systemized his unique and monumental two-volume effort into five major 
sections; it remains the only historical synthesis of the American fur trade confined to the 
years from 1807 to 1843. The first section examines certain features of the fur trade such 
as its business character, the effects of competition, the liquor traffic, trading posts, 
trapping, life in the wilderness, and the traders’ relations with the Indians. The second, 
and by far the largest, section includes the following discussions: trans-Mississippi 
geography and St. Louis; a chronological narrative history of the Pryor expedition of 
1807; the activities of Manuel Lisa and the Missouri Fur Company; the Astorians; the 
Rocky Mountain Fur Company; Captain Bonneville and Nathaniel J. Wyeth; and 
accounts of both the Oregon Trail and the Santa Fe Trade. The third and fourth sections 
illustrate contemporary events connected with but discrete from the fur trade as well as 
colorful incidents and characters associated with it. The final section provides a natural 
history of the trans-Mississippi West, including its nineteenth-century Indian tribes. The 
                                                             
14 Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: xiii-xiv.  
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breadth of Chittenden’s scholarship provides both an inspiration and a conceptual 
framework for researchers investigating the American fur trade. 
The original structure of The American Fur Trade “united a blizzard of facts and 
events [and] for two generations of historians after 1902, [Chittenden’s] perspective 
remained the agenda for fur trade scholarship.”15 He was the first historian to place the 
seemingly disconnected events on the upper Missouri and in the lands west of St. Louis 
into a larger historical context. Although he struggled at first to construct that context, 
Chittenden finally settled on the fortunes of the rival fur companies and the lively 
exploits of the mountain men between 1807 and 1843 as the story that mattered.
16
 Two of 
his later studies address trans-Mississippi history from 1844 to 1854.
17
 
Chittenden anticipated the focus of much of Western history through the 1960s. He 
wrote a clear narrative that captured the courage and resourcefulness of the mountain 
men that, nevertheless, romanticized neither them nor their time. Unlike many later fur 
trade historians, he understood that the fur trade was an Indian trade. And, by exploring 
material culture such as food, tools, and weapons, he established a foundation from which 
to examine further the cultural and ecological consequences of the American fur trade on 
its Indian consumers.
18
 
Far less influential to American fur trade scholarship than Chittenden’s The American 
Fur Trade is Paul Chrisler Phillips’s two-volume, posthumously-published synthesis 
entitled The Fur Trade (1961). A sweeping study of the North American fur trade from 
                                                             
15 Ibid., 1: xiv. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See Hiram Martin Chittenden, History of Early Steamboat Navigation on the Missouri River, 2 vols. 
(New York: Francis P. Harper, 1903); and Hiram Martin Chittenden and Alfred T. Richardson, eds., Life, 
Letters, and Travels of Father Pierre-Jean DeSmet, 1801-1873 (New York: Francis P. Harper, 1905). 
18 Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: xv. 
10 
 
the sixteenth century to the 1840s, Phillips’s single-minded effort led him to archives all 
over the world and consumed nearly the last thirty years of his life. Unfortunately, the 
work contains so many errors of fact and unsupported generalizations, particularly those 
sections that deal with the Canadian fur trade, that many fur trade scholars have found 
little in it to praise.
19
 Unlike Chittenden, Phillips devotes little space to the exploits and 
personalities of the men in field; rather, The Fur Trade takes as its primary theme the 
centuries-long imperialistic struggle between the European powers and, later, the United 
States for possession of the North American continent. Although Phillips’s approach 
generally focuses on the political, economic, and diplomatic aspects of the fur trade in 
contrast to this dissertation’s ethnohistorical orientation, portions of Phillips’s work 
remain a useful supplement to Chittenden’s The American Fur Trade. 
Historical-geographer David J. Wishart presents an interdisciplinary overview of 
American fur trade operations in The Fur Trade of the American West, 1807-1840: A 
Geographical Synthesis (1979). Wishart’s study opens, naturally enough, with a 
geographical overview of the trans-Mississippi West. The enormous area over which the 
fur companies operated included the northern Glaciated and southern Unglaciated 
Missouri Plateaus, the Northern, Middle, and Southern Rocky Mountains, the Wyoming 
Basin, the Colorado Plateaus, the Columbia Basin, and the Great Basin and Range.
20
 
Wishart makes no claim for environmental determinism, but does concede that “the 
traders and trappers, limited in technology and therefore in practical options, formulated 
                                                             
19 Several of the more pointed critiques appear in the following reviews: W. J. Eccles, review of The Fur 
Trade, by Paul Chrisler Phillips, The Journal of Southern History (February 1962): 98-99; LeRoy R. Hafen, 
review of The Fur Trade, by Paul Chrisler Phillips, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review (March 
1962): 689-690; and A. P. Nasatir, review of The Fur Trade, by Paul Chrisler Phillips, Pacific Historical 
Review (February 1962): 67-69. 
20 David J. Wishart, The Fur Trade of the American West, 1807-1840: A Geographical Synthesis (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1979, reprint, Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1994), 24 (page citations are to the 
reprint edition). 
11 
 
their strategies within a rather rigidly-defined [geographical] context.”21 And, he 
correctly maintains that while the sedentary village life of the horticultural Arikaras, 
Mandans, and Hidatsas suffered progressive deterioration during the period, the 
“nomadic peoples, on the other hand, were able to adopt a more independent stance 
toward the fur trade and they experienced a flowering of their power and culture during 
the first half of the nineteenth century.”22 
Wishart’s Fur Trade of the American West contains an economic examination of its 
subject in which he describes the production strategy and annual cycle of operations of 
the upper Missouri fur trade. According to the author’s perceptive analysis, the Missouri 
Fur Company under the leadership of Manuel Lisa sought to monopolize the Indian trade 
on the lower Missouri while simultaneously sending trapping parties upriver and into the 
Rockies in the years from 1807 to 1826. The American Fur Company (AFC) then 
dominated the upper Missouri fur trade from 1826 to 1840 and beyond, although an 
outbreak of smallpox among the Indians in 1837-1838, changes in the ecosystem, and 
outside competition eventually forced the AFC to concentrate its operations on the 
upriver bison robe trade. Under the American Fur Company, “the system was a tightly 
controlled unit, carefully supervised and organized, united by a continuous movement of 
furs, goods, and people, and regulated by information feedback which focused on St. 
Louis, the main decision-making centre.”23 
Wishart also investigates both the production strategy and annual cycle of operations 
of the Rocky Mountain trapping system. The author observes that the activities of John 
Jacob Astor’s Pacific Fur Company in the years from 1810 to 1813 foreshadowed the 
                                                             
21 Ibid., 27. 
22 Ibid., 21. 
23 Ibid., 79-80. 
12 
 
later Rocky Mountain trapping system of William H. Ashley in much the same way that 
the Missouri Fur Company had pioneered trapping and trading operations on the upper 
Missouri. From 1823 to 1826, Ashley and Andrew Henry established the Rocky 
Mountain trapping system, distinguished by American trappers who remained in the 
mountains year-round and then exchanged their furs for supplies at the annual rendezvous 
initiated by Ashley in 1825. And as Wishart explains: “the Upper Missouri Fur Trade, 
[like] the Rocky Mountain Trapping System may be visualized as a production network, 
characterized by a distinctive infrastructure and linked through St. Louis . . . [to] the 
sources of supplies and equipment in the eastern United States and Europe.”24 The central 
thesis of this dissertation argues that the Teton Sioux became dependent upon this unseen 
and, by the Indians, unimagined global economy for the Euro-American goods that, 
beginning in the 1830s, provided them with their “illusions of independence.” 
The final synthesis considered here is John E. Sunder’s The Fur Trade on the Upper 
Missouri, 1840-1865 (1965). Sunder’s narrative begins in 1840, precisely where 
Wishart’s chronology ends, and focuses primarily on Pierre Chouteau, Jr.’s. upper 
Missouri fur trade empire. As scholar Paul L. Hedren observes in his foreword to 
Sunder’s study: “Wishart’s and Sunder’s works have become indispensable companions, 
providing a tandem start-to-finish look at the broadest aspects of the business, places and 
people of the Upper Missouri fur trade. [A]s a mate to the Wishart volume . . . [it] serves 
history exceedingly well.”25 
 
                                                             
24 Ibid., 175-177. 
25 John E. Sunder, The Fur Trade on the Upper Missouri, 1840-1865, with a foreword by Paul L. Hedren 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965; reprint, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), x-
xi (page citations are to the reprint edition).  
13 
 
III 
The research methods and narrative style of this dissertation follow closely the 
ethnohistorical scholarship of western historian James P. Ronda in Lewis and Clark 
among the Indians (1984). In this well-received study, Ronda offers “exploration 
ethnohistory, a deliberate effort to probe the complexity of Indian-white encounters in 
North America by examining a memorable venture that has come to represent the 
westward movement.”26 By his ethnohistorical method, the author seeks to redress 
Bernard DeVoto’s lament that “a dismaying amount of our history has been written 
without regard to the Indians.”27 Thus, Ronda moves beyond William Goetzmann’s one-
dimensional label of Lewis and Clark as “diplomats in buckskin” by recognizing that 
their expedition was “a human community living in the midst of other human 
communities.”28 The word among in the book’s title illustrates the depth of Ronda’s 
ethnohistorical narrative as the full range of daily interactions between the explorers and 
the Indians they encountered emerges—“from high policy to personal liaisons, from 
careful collection of ethnographic data to the sharing of food and songs around a blazing 
fire.”29 
Ronda’s ethnohistorical approach is clearly interdisciplinary. He first examined the 
rich documentary evidence left behind by several of the expedition’s members. Lewis, 
Clark, Sergeants John Ordway, Charles Floyd, and Patrick Gass, and Private Joseph 
Whitehouse all contributed lengthy and insightful commentaries about the Indians they 
                                                             
26 James P. Ronda, Lewis and Clark among the Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984; 
reprint, with a new introduction by the author, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), xviii-xix 
(page citations are to the reprint edition).  
27 Ibid., xviii. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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met along the way. The author correctly insists that, despite the cultural biases of the 
Lewis and Clark expedition records, collectively they represent an invaluable store of 
ethnographic data for cautious scholars.
30
 Ronda then blended written records with the 
findings of anthropologists and archaeologists such as site reports and culture element 
distributions—combining the explorers’ perceptions with the Indians’ sensibilities—to 
provide the fullest possible context for the human interactions he describes.
31
 
In his influential article entitled “The Winning of the West:  The Expansion of the 
Western Sioux in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,”32 Richard White argues that 
the history of the northern and central American Great Plains in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries is far more complicated than the tragic retreat of the 
Indians in the face of an inexorable white advance.  From the perspective of 
most northern and central plains tribes the crucial invasion during this period 
was not necessarily that of the whites at all.  These tribes had few illusions 
about American whites and the danger they represented, but the Sioux 
remained their most feared enemy.
33
   
                                                             
30 The debate over the intrinsic value of the written records left by Euro-American observers of nineteenth-
century Indian cultures continues. At one extreme is ethnohistorian Raymond J. DeMallie who, in referring 
specifically to the Sioux, marginalizes contemporary Euro-American records because the “authors of these 
documents—travelers, traders, colonial administrators, military officers, missionaries, Indian agents—
represented a cultural tradition very different from that of the Sioux. Even when these observers were 
sympathetic to Indians, they usually failed to understand enough of native culture to empathize with Sioux 
perspectives.” Completely ignoring the voluminous records and journals kept by American fur traders, 
DeMallie claims inaccurately “that the literature on Sioux history largely centers on warfare and 
diplomacy, the two modes in which Euro-Americans dealt with Plains Indians from the late-eighteenth 
through the nineteenth century;” see Raymond J. DeMallie, “‘ These Have No Ears:’ Narrative and the 
Ethnohistorical Method,” Ethnohistory 40 (Autumn 1993): 515-516. At the opposite extreme is fur trade 
scholar Barton H. Barbour who maintains that the fur traders faithfully recorded what they observed of 
Indian culture and, in a subtle reference to the New Western historians, claims to avoid looking for “ulterior 
motives, hidden agendas, and other strange extractions visible—and comprehensible—mainly to readers 
with an avant-garde approach to historical scholarship;” see Barbour, Fort Union and the Upper Missouri 
Fur Trade, xiii. While not endorsing Barbour’s uncritical acceptance of the written record, James Ronda 
also contends that, regarding “the kinds of obvious cultural biases” contained in the written record 
“scholars have long since learned to deal with [them] in documentary analysis;” see Ronda, Lewis and 
Clark among the Indians, xviii. Ronda’s moderate, thoughtfully-reasoned position toward documentary 
evidence is the one accepted for this study.  
31 Ronda, Lewis and Clark among the Indians, xviii-xix. 
32 Just how influential is evident in Clyde A. Milner II, Walter Nugent, Elliott West, Karen R. Merrill, 
Philip J. Deloria, and Richard White, “A Historian Who Has Changed Our Thinking:  A Roundtable on the 
Work of Richard White,” The Western Historical Quarterly 33 (Summer 2002): 139-140. 
33 White, “The Winning of the West,” 320-321. 
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White identifies three distinct waves of Teton expansion:  “initially a movement during 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries onto the prairies east of the Missouri, 
then a conquest of the Middle Missouri during the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and finally, a sweep west and south from the Missouri during the early and 
mid-nineteenth century.”34  He then lists a number of biological, cultural, and ecological 
advantages that favored the Western Sioux in their advance:  (1) a high birth-rate; (2) an 
in-migration of Santee, Yankton, and Yanktonai Sioux into Teton bands; (3) a nomadic 
lifestyle; (4) a loose political organization; (5) a secure resource base; and, (6) consistent 
access to Euro-American goods.
35
  White also argues that the conquest of the northern 
and central plains by the mounted Tetons occurred simultaneously with the expansion of 
the St. Louis-based, American fur trade in the opening decades of the nineteenth century.  
Both the American traders and the Sioux set out to “win the West” during this third 
period of Teton expansion as each group gradually achieved its aim through mutual trade 
and accommodation.  
In “The Winning of the West,” White dismisses those historians who “have attributed 
the movement of the Sioux beyond the Black Hills into the Platte River drainage to 
manipulations of the Rocky Mountain Fur Company” as purveyors of a “myth.”36  He 
states unequivocally that “in fact, traders followed the Sioux; the Sioux did not follow the 
traders.”37  White then briefly traces the historiographical development of this “myth” 
and claims that the only evidence to support it is a single letter from Lucien Fontenelle to 
                                                             
34 Ibid., 321. 
35 Ibid., passim. 
36 White, “The Winning of the West,” 334. 
37 Ibid.  
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Pierre Chouteau, Jr. written several months after William Sublette ordered the 
construction of Fort Laramie (Fort William).
38
  
More than two decades after White published his thesis of Teton migrations, English 
scholar Kingsley M. Bray, using previously unexplored primary sources, claimed to have 
“refined” White’s thesis by demonstrating that the Oglala presence on the North Platte 
prior to 1834 had been seasonal (i.e., summer); and only after the establishment of Fort 
Laramie did the Oglalas occupy that region year-round.  Bray achieved his “nuanced 
understanding of these events” by uncovering the “seasonal pulse of band and tribal 
movements.”39  Ironically, by “refining” White’s thesis, Bray also reestablished the 
historical validity of the “myth” so disparaged by White. Therefore, when Vine Deloria, 
Jr. notes in his introduction to a new edition of Mari Sandoz’s Crazy Horse:  The Strange 
Man of the Oglalas (2004) that the “trading posts and forts along [the Platte River valley] 
attracted the Indian fur and hide trade away from the Missouri [emphasis added], where 
there were few whites, to the southern plains, where thousands of immigrants crossed the 
plains every year,”40 this most recent iteration of earlier scholars’ accounts of the 
                                                             
38 Ibid.  For the specific works cited by White, see Chittenden, American Fur Trade, I, 308-309; Hyde, Red 
Cloud’s Folk, 43-46; Bernard DeVoto, Across the Wide Missouri (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947), 
224; Robert H. Trennert, Jr., Alternative to Extinction:  Federal Indian Policy and the Beginnings of the 
Reservation System, 1846-51 (Philadelphia:  Temple University Press, 1975), 161; Lucien Fontenelle to 
Pierre Chouteau, Jr., September 17, 1834; quoted in Chittenden, American Fur Trade, I: 309.  John C. 
Ewers also contends that “[a]fter the establishment of Fort Laramie on the North Platte in 1834, the Oglalas 
moved southwestward and traded at that post,” in Edwin Thompson Denig, Five Indian Tribes of the Upper 
Missouri, ed. and with an introduction by John C. Ewers (Norman:  University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 
20. Beginning with its initial construction in 1834 at the behest of William Sublette and lasting until its 
abandonment in the late nineteenth century, the fort was popularly known as “Fort Laramie;” this despite 
its other “official” designations at various times as either “Fort William” or “Fort John.” To avoid 
unnecessary confusion, the name “Fort Laramie” appears consistently throughout this study; often, but not 
always, followed by the “official” name in (parentheses) for clarification.  
39 Kingsley M. Bray, “The Oglala Lakota and the Establishment of Fort Laramie,” Museum of the Fur 
Trade Quarterly 36 (Winter 2000): 3-18. 
40 Mari Sandoz, Crazy Horse:  The Strange Man of the Oglalas, with an introduction by Vine Deloria Jr. 
(New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1942; reprint, Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 2004), viii-ix (page citations are to 
the reprint edition). 
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Oglalas’ 1830s migration from the Missouri to the Platte appears entirely consistent with 
Bray’s conclusions.  Sandoz herself wrote of the time when “the Oglalas followed Bull 
Bear southward from the Black Hills country to his traders [emphasis added] twenty 
years before (i.e., 1834).”41  Although Sandoz published Crazy Horse without footnotes, 
upon rereading it nearly fifty years after he first “rush[ed] through it on my way to 
learning all there was to know about the Sioux Indians,”42 a skeptical Deloria found 
himself “stunned at the wealth of detail contained in each line of text—material that must 
have come from her conversations over time with a large number of elders . . . and later 
skillfully woven into a chronicle of the times that overflows with authenticity.”43  
Nevertheless, despite the superior scholarship that characterizes this long-standing debate 
over whether the traders followed the Sioux or the Sioux followed the traders to the Platte 
River valley, analyzing the historical significance of the relationship between the Western 
Sioux and the American fur trade from 1834 to 1854 requires a much broader perspective 
than this debate’s narrow focus on fur trade activities and Teton migrations limited to the 
Fort Laramie region.  
That broader perspective emerged from the literature as early as 1854.  It was in that 
year that a twenty-one year veteran of the upper Missouri fur trade by the name of Edwin 
Thompson Denig completed his manuscript entitled Indian Tribes of the Upper Missouri, 
a manuscript that remained unpublished until its inclusion in the Forty-sixth Annual 
Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology in 1930.  In it, Denig accurately describes 
the “very extensive” territory claimed by the Teton Sioux west and southwest of the 
                                                             
41 Ibid., 45.    
42 Ibid., v. 
43 Ibid., vi. 
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Missouri River in the mid-1850s.
44
  Significantly, that territory encompassed both Fort 
Pierre at the confluence of the Bad (Teton) and Missouri rivers and Fort Laramie near the 
junction of Laramie’s Fork and the North Platte.    
Of even greater significance to the relationship between the Teton Sioux and the 
American fur trade was the trail connecting Fort Pierre with Fort Laramie and first 
surveyed by Lieutenant Gouverneur Kemble Warren of the United States Army in 
1855.
45
 This trail followed the northern portion of a much older trade route that began in 
New Mexico, followed the foothills of the Rocky Mountains to the mouth of Laramie’s 
Fork on the North Platte, and then paralleled first White River and then Bad (Teton) 
River to the Missouri.  The Kiowas and Kiowa-Apaches had originally used it to drive 
horse herds obtained in the Spanish Southwest to the Arikaras living along the upper 
Missouri—and even in 1855 it still retained the name “the old Spanish trail.”46  It was 
during the years from 1837 to 1849 that this trail—better known as the Fort Pierre-Fort 
Laramie Trail—connected the Teton Sioux to a global, market economy, supplied them 
with a multitude of Euro-American trade goods, goods for which they ultimately came to 
depend, first for their successful conquest of the central plains, and ultimately for their 
continued existence as free-ranging, nomadic hunters, and created for them merely 
“illusions of independence.”   
 
                                                             
44 Denig, Five Indian Tribes, 3. 
45 “Report of Lieutenant G. K. Warren, Topographical Engineer of the ‘Sioux Expedition,’ Of Explorations 
in the Dacota Country, 1855, Plot of the Route from Fort Laramie to Fort Pierre, August 1849,” P & R File, 
Map 31, Records Group 92, National Archives and Records Administration, “Journal 1855,”Box 5, Warren 
Papers; quoted in Charles E. Hanson, Jr., “The Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail,” Museum of the Fur Trade 
Quarterly 1 (Summer 1965): 5. Warren served as General William S. Harney’s topographical engineer on 
his expedition to punish the Sioux for their annihilation of Second lieutenant J. L. Grattan’s command at 
Fort Laramie in the summer of 1854. 
46 Charles E. Hanson, Jr., “Fur Trade Activities in the Fort Laramie Region,” Journal of the West 26 
(1987): 13; James A. Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail,” Nebraska History 68 (January 1987): 3.  
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IV 
Chapter One, “Prelude: Turmoil on the Upper Missouri, 1804-1815,” opens with the 
last years of the eighteenth century during which French and Spanish traders regularly 
ascended the Missouri from St. Louis, eventually securing for themselves the Teton trade 
in furs at the expense of their British rivals in the North West Company.  That trade, 
however, was no longer in beaver pelts, but was instead in buffalo robes and hides and 
dried meat.
47
  Because, by this time, they had become mounted nomads pursuing the 
enormous herds of buffalo ranging along the Missouri, the Western Sioux avoided 
trapping and were, therefore, only infrequent suppliers of fine furs such as beaver and 
otter.  And, as they preferred to use their short heavy bows rather than trade guns for 
hunting buffalo, they simply exchanged a small number of deerskins and buffalo robes 
for basic items they could not produce themselves such as metal knives and pots and 
wool blankets.
48
 This late eighteenth-century trade with St. Louis-based European traders 
had two important consequences: it conditioned the Western Sioux to the concept that 
high-quality trade goods moving by keelboat up the Missouri could be as dependable a 
source of such products as those brought by the British overland from Canada; and, it 
                                                             
47 Examples abound in the literature of the use of both “buffalo” and “bison” to name that magnificent and 
irascible animal: for instance, Western historian Frank Gilbert Roe and zoologist Tom McHugh freely 
employ the popular term, “buffalo,” in their 1951 and 1972 studies, respectively, of the animal, even 
including that name in their titles; see Frank Gilbert Roe, The North American Buffalo: A Critical Study of 
the Species in its Wild Habitat (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951); Tom McHugh, The Time of 
the Buffalo (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972); conversely, more recent studies of the species tend to use 
the proper scientific term, “bison,” more or less exclusively; see Dan Flores, “Bison Ecology and Bison 
Diplomacy: The Southern Plains from 1800 to 1850,” Journal of American History 78 (September 1991): 
465-485; Andrew C. Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison: An Environmental History, 1750-1920 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). In recognition of the popular acceptance of the term, “buffalo,” 
and the more correct scientific label, “bison,” both names appear indiscriminately throughout this 
dissertation in wanton disregard of either convention. 
48 Annie Heloise Abel, ed., Tabeau’s Narrative of Loisel’s Expedition to the Upper Missouri (Norman:  
University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), 123, 168-169.; Charles E. Hanson, Jr., “The Early Fur Trade in 
Northwestern Nebraska,” Nebraska History 57 (January 1976): 296; White, “The Winning of the West,” 
324-325. 
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eventually freed the Tetons from the necessity of making their annual pilgrimage to the 
Dakota Rendezvous, that heretofore indispensible source of European trade goods held 
well east of the Missouri River and hosted by their Yanktonai kinsmen. 
Chapter One then studies the Lewis and Clark expedition’s 1804 clash with the 
Brules.  The expedition’s members were the first Americans to encounter the Tetons—
several villages of Brules—in the fall of 1804 camped below the confluence of the Bad 
(Teton) and Missouri rivers—an area later known as the Fort Pierre Plain.  Although 
expedition leaders Meriwether Lewis and William Clark clearly understood the necessity 
to open negotiations in accordance with their instructions from President Thomas 
Jefferson, the intelligence they received from French traders in St. Louis warning of the 
Tetons’ aggressive behavior toward whites on the Missouri added elements of uncertainty 
to those discussions.
49
  But, despite the expedition’s high expectations for Lewis and 
Clark’s initial talks with the Sioux, the captains’ encounters with the Brules ended badly, 
                                                             
49 The source of Sioux hostility to American traders venturing up the Missouri River was the precarious 
nature of the Tetons’ trade relations with the horticultural Mandans, Hidatsas, and, in particular, the 
Arikaras. As James Ronda, in Lewis and Clark among the Indians, 48-49, observes: “Arikara farmers were 
part of the Missouri Trade System. Their towns were the locale’s focal point for the system while the 
Mandan and Hidatsa villages on the Knife River served as the upper exchange centers. The villagers were 
engaged in supplying the agricultural needs of the nomads. They grew corn, raised horses, and processed 
hides in return for a wide variety of merchandise and foodstuffs . . . . The often troubled relationship 
between the Arikara villages and Teton Sioux bands was an uneasy symbiosis. From a Teton perspective, 
some sort of control had to be maintained over the Arikaras. As Teton population expanded west of the 
Missouri, reliable sources of food had to be found. The overriding Sioux need was for the Arikaras’ food 
products and horses. [E]very . . . late summer and early fall, Sioux bands flocked to the Arikara towns 
bringing meat, fat, and hides from the plains and European-manufactured goods from the Dakota 
Rendezvous.” The Sioux quite naturally felt that they could not tolerate competition from St. Louis-based 
American traders. For more on the intertribal Missouri Trade System, see John C. Ewers, “The Indian 
Trade of the Upper Missouri before Lewis and Clark,” in Indian Life on the Upper Missouri (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), 14-33; William R. Swagerty, “Protohistoric Trade in Western North 
America: Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Considerations,” in Columbian Consequences, Volume 3: The 
Spanish Borderlands in Pan-American Perspective, ed. David Hurst Thomas (Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 471-499; W. Raymond Wood, “Plains Trade in Prehistoric and 
Protohistorical Intertribal Relations,” in Anthropology on the Great Plains, eds. W. Raymond Wood and 
Margot Liberty (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), 98-109; and William R. Swagerty, “Indian 
Trade in the Trans-Mississippi West to 1870,” in The Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 4, History 
of Indian-White Relations, ed. Wilcomb E. Washburn (Washington DC, 1988), 351-374. 
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prompting Clark’s bitter evaluation of the Tetons as “the vilest miscreants of the savage 
race [who] must ever remain the pirates of the Missouri.”50 Teton depredations against 
traders along the upper Missouri in the years immediately following the Lewis and Clark 
expedition’s return to St. Louis in 1806 seemed to fulfill Clark’s dire predictions.   
Chapter One continues with a discussion of the Oglalas, who, although they were 
becoming firmly established in the Black Hills country, also began trading and hunting 
on the North Platte, as well as continuing to follow the Bad (Teton) River down to the 
Missouri each spring where, along with their Brule and Saone kinsmen, they harassed 
and robbed American traders heading upriver to the Arlikaras, Mandans, and Hidatsas.
51
   
For instance, in 1810, a trapper named Carson shot and killed the Sioux chief Blue 
Blanket across the river from an Arikara village.  The Tetons retaliated by killing three 
white men later that same year.  It was more than just revenge that motivated them; their 
desire to dominate trade on the upper Missouri was equally important.  And, some 
months later, in the summer of 1811, those same Tetons intercepted a sizeable party of 
Astorians—employees of New York entrepreneur John Jacob Astor’s Pacific Fur 
Company—that included the killer of Blue Blanket.  Carson’s presence greatly agitated 
the Sioux, who announced they would not let the traders proceed upriver with their 
goods. to the Arikaras, Mandans, and Hidatsas.  The Astorians escaped only through the 
timely intervention of a combined force of three hundred warriors from the Arikaras, 
Mandans, and Hidatsas.
52
 The chapter then continues with a narrative account of the brief 
                                                             
50 Thwaites, Journals of Lewis and Clark, 1: 62-63, 4: 98; Ronda, Lewis and Clark among the Indians, 28, 
40. 
51 Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 33-34. 
52 John Bradbury, Travels in the Interior of America in the years 1809, 1810, and 1811[1817], 2d ed., with 
a foreword by Donald Jackson (London:  Sherwood, Neely, and Jones, 1819; reprint, Lincoln, NE: Bison 
Books, 1986), 103-114 (page citations are to the reprint edition); Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 35-36. 
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association between Pacific Fur and Manuel Lisa’s Missouri Fur Company resulting from 
their confrontations with the Sioux. 
Beginning with his first trading expedition up the Missouri in 1807, the Spaniard 
Manuel Lisa gradually transformed Teton relations with American fur traders.  The 
ambitious field operations of Lisa’s Missouri Fur Company reflected his vision of an 
upper Missouri trading empire, and by 1814 no American exercised a stronger influence 
with the western Indians except the Blackfoot.  Appointed agent for those Indians 
residing along the Missouri above the Kansas River by William Clark, during the War of 
1812, Lisa secured the loyalty of the Tetons at a council held at the mouth of the James 
River in the fall of 1814. Despite Lisa’s diplomatic triumph, however, the war disrupted 
the western fur trade to such an extent that Lisa restricted his operations to the lower 
Missouri until 1819.
53
 
Chapter Two, “Establishing a Foothold: Recovery, Retreat, and a Shift to the West, 
1815-1824,” explores the demise of the Missouri Fur Company, explores the postwar 
recovery of the St. Louis-based American fur trade, and examines the gradual occupation 
of the upper Missouri region by rival fur companies. Immediately following the end of 
the War of 1812, French merchants in St. Louis pursued the Teton trade until 1817. Sioux 
winter counts recount part of that story:  in 1809, Registre Loisel’s post on Cedar Island 
opposite the mouth of Bad (Teton) River burned to the ground killing a trader the Indians 
called Little Beaver; in 1815-16, the Sans Arcs built dirt lodges (trading posts) and lived 
in them all winter; and, in 1817-18, trading posts appeared at the future sites of Ft. Pierre 
                                                             
53 Wishart, Fur Trade of the American West, 42-45; Richard Oglesby, Manuel Lisa and the Opening of the 
Missouri Fur Trade (Norman:  University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 151-156; Chittenden, American Fur 
Trade, 1: 146-147; Julius W. Pratt, “Fur Trade Strategy and the American Left Flank in the War of 1812,” 
The American Historical Review 40 (January 1935): 262-266. 
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and Ft. Thompson.  The latter post, built by Joseph LaFramboise, a trader the Sioux 
called Choze, became the first trading installation on the Fort Pierre Plain and operated 
continuously thereafter until the Columbia Fur Company raised Fort Tecumseh a short 
distance upriver in 1822.
54
 
Sioux winter counts for the year 1823-24 record the event that ushered in a new era in 
the American fur trade: the Arikara campaign of 1823. This campaign—which marked 
the first time the United States army entered combat west of the Mississippi River—
hastened the continued expansion of both the Tetons and American traders into the north-
central plains west of the Missouri, reinforced the good relations that had developed 
between them, and implanted a feeling of contempt for the United States government 
among the Western Sioux that persisted for decades. The circumstances leading up to the 
campaign began with the arrival at the Arikara villages of a trapping and trading 
expedition commanded by St. Louis entrepreneur and militia general, William H. Ashley. 
Attacked by the Arikaras without warning, the traders suffered twenty-three casualties. 
Reinforced by traders from the Missouri Fur Company under sub-agent for the Sioux, 
Joshua Pilcher, Colonel Henry Leavenworth’s Missouri Legion, and hundreds of Yankton 
and Teton Sioux warriors, Ashley carried the fight to the Arikaras, who nevertheless 
managed to negotiate a treaty that required only the return of his property and recognition 
of American sovereignty on the Missouri. Ashley subsequently abandoned all thoughts of 
proceeding upriver and, instead, turned westward for the Rocky Mountains.  That 
decision ultimately led to the American fur trade’s most colorful and celebrated feature: 
the mountain rendezvous. 
                                                             
54 Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 106, 109; Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 35-6; Harold H. Schuler, Fort Pierre 
Chouteau (Vermillion:  University of South Dakota Press, 1990), 9. 
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Chapter Three, “Competition, Consolidation, and Expansion: Lure of the Central 
Rockies and the Rise of the Company, 1824-1832,” recounts the formation of the 
illustrious fur-trade partnership between Andrew Henry and William H. Ashley, two men 
whose business strategies created conditions that brought bands of Teton Sioux to the 
Platte River valley permanently The chapter includes discussions of the government-
sponsored Atkinson-O’Fallon of 1825, the establishment of the Upper Missouri Outfit, 
and the last days of Fort Tecumseh, the centerpiece of the Columbia Fur Company and 
the headquarters of its president, Kenneth McKenzie, from 1822 to 1829.  Under 
McKenzie’s able management, the fort became the major trading center for the Yankton, 
Yanktonai, and Teton Sioux and the hub of a fur trade domain that eventually included 
seven major trading posts and a number of smaller winter trading places.  In 1827, John 
Jacob Astor’s American Fur Company (AFC)—known simply as “The Company” in 
recognition of its dominance of the American fur trade—purchased the Columbia Fur 
Company, renamed it the Upper Missouri Outfit (UMO) and retained McKenzie as its 
chief agent, and made it accountable to the AFC’s Western Department headquarters in 
St. Louis.  Also in that year, the American Fur Company engaged Bernard Pratte & 
Company to manage its Western Department, with Pierre Chouteau, Jr., one of the 
company’s partners, as chief agent. 55 
The chapter continues with the founding of Fort Pierre and a critical evaluation of the 
career of one of its most celebrated visitors, the artist George Catlin. An unusually high 
Missouri River threatened Fort Tecumseh in the spring of 1831 and forced Chouteau to 
order the construction of a new fort on higher ground on the Fort Pierre Plain.  Christened 
Fort Pierre in his honor, its builders located it two miles north of old Fort Tecumseh with 
                                                             
55 Schuler, Fort Pierre, 12-13. 
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ready access to wood, water, pasture, and, most importantly, the Missouri River 
waterway.  As they had at both Forts LaFramboise and Tecumseh, the Sioux became the 
foremost trading partners at Fort Pierre.
56
 And, it was there that Catlin both exposed the 
illicit traffic in liquor on the upper Missouri and captured a number of prominent Sioux 
on canvas.   
Chapter Four, “Transitions: The Rise of Fort Laramie and the Teton Occupation of 
the Platte River Valley, 1832-1837,” examines a number of critical developments in the 
upper Missouri fur trade during this period: the absorption of the Columbia Fur Company 
into the American Fur Company; the early career of Pierre Chouteau, Jr.; the 1832 
voyage of the steamboat, Yellow Stone; artists and royalty in the upper Missouri country; 
the founding of Fort Laramie and the year-round occupation of the Platte River valley by 
bands of Teton Sioux; and the impact of the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail on the 
westernmost Tetons and their conquest of the north-central plains. 
The establishment of Fort Laramie in 1834 proved to be a highly favorable 
development for the Teton Sioux—particularly for certain bands of Oglalas and Brules—
as the sizeable concentrations of Indians trading at the succession of posts located on the 
Fort Pierre Plain had significantly reduced the buffalo herds in that region.  As a 
consequence of this reduction in their resource base, the Oglalas and the Brules continued 
their westward migration in pursuit of more substantial herds and, as a result, forced 
many of the traders at Fort Pierre to follow them.  In response to these traders’ 
complaints, the American Fur Company eventually divided the trade territory between 
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the two forts at a point along the White River, a move that both increased Fort Laramie’s 
relative importance and further encouraged the westernmost Sioux to trade there.
57
  
Eighteen thirty-four marked a turning point in the history of both the Teton Sioux and 
the American fur trade for several reasons.  First, Congress completely restructured 
federal Indian policy by reorganizing the Indian Office, clarifying the duties of Indian 
agents, and passing legislation to regulate the Indian trade in the lands west of the 
Mississippi River.
58
  Second, John Jacob Astor retired from the fur trade, and the 
American Fur Company sold its Western Department to Pratte, Chouteau and Company 
with the stipulations that the AFC furnish the trade goods and market the furs of the 
Western Department’s new owners.59  Third, the Rocky Mountain fur trade began to 
decline due to lack of demand for beaver pelts.  This highly significant development 
occurred simultaneously with the decision by William Sublette and Robert Campbell—
partners in the St. Louis Fur Company, which they had formed during the winter of 1832-
33—to construct a trading fort at the junction of Laramie’s Fork and the North Platte 
River.  That decision had everything to do with the mountain trade and virtually nothing 
to do with Teton Sioux migrations to the plains surrounding the Platte River valley.  
Throughout the spring, summer, and fall of 1833, the St. Louis Fur Company, under 
the direction of Sublette and Campbell, challenged the American Fur Company for 
control of the upper Missouri fur trade by constructing nearly a dozen trading posts in the 
immediate vicinity of AFC posts along the river; the most important of these was Fort 
William, located three miles below Fort Union.  But, by virtue of its considerable 
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financial reserves, the American Fur Company, still under the direction of Kenneth 
McKenzie, forced Sublette and Campbell to offer their Missouri River posts for sale to 
the AFC.  Nevertheless, Sublette was able to extract a concession from McKenzie that the 
American Fur Company abandon the Rocky Mountain trade and restrict its future 
operations to the Missouri River.  Sublette and Campbell were thus left free to 
concentrate on the fur trade in the mountains; only Nathaniel Wyatt remained a threat to 
their business plans to supply the mountain outfits with trade goods and then transport 
their furs to St. Louis.
60
 
Subsequent developments induced Sublette and Campbell to sell Fort William to 
Fontenelle, Fitzpatrick and Company in 1835.  Ownership of the fort changed hands 
again a year later when Pratte, Chouteau and Company purchased it.  And although that 
firm would eventually rebuild the fort of adobe brick in 1841 and rechristen the new 
structure Fort John, the traders had, almost from the beginning, called it Fort Laramie.  
With the acquisition of the fort in 1836 by Pratte, Chouteau and Company—generally 
known as the American Fur Company—the AFC had positioned itself to extend the 
Teton Sioux trade into the Platte River valley by utilizing a portion of “the old Spanish 
trail”—the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail.61 
The American Fur Company trader generally recognized as the originator of the Fort 
Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail was a hard-driving, often violent man by the name of Frederick 
LaBoue—“Grey Eyes” to the Sioux.  Although Sublette and Campbell had supplied Fort 
William [Fort Laramie] by way of the five hundred mile-long Platte River road, that route 
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proved too costly and was, therefore, a primary reason for their decision to sell out to 
Fontenelle, Fitzpatrick and Company, which experienced similar financial difficulties 
using the same route.  LaBoue, on the other hand, conceived the complementary ideas of 
utilizing Fort Pierre as both the main supply depot and fur storehouse for Fort Laramie—
an option not available to the previous owners of the fort—and of transporting those 
supplies and furs over the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail.   The overland route between 
the two posts was two hundred miles shorter than the Platte River road; Fort Pierre 
possessed critical supplies, skilled labor, food stocks, and warehousing facilities needed 
by the traders at Fort Laramie. The American Fur Company already absorbed water 
transportation costs to and from Fort Pierre as part of its larger operation supplying the 
Upper Missouri Outfit’s numerous posts along the Missouri.   
Chapter Five, “The Golden Years: The Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail and The Teton 
Ascendency, 1837-1846,” investigates the impact of the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail on 
the Western Sioux; the devastation caused by and the geo-political ramifications of the 
upper Missouri smallpox epidemic of 1837; the intertribal warfare between the Western 
Sioux and their numerous enemies; the winter-count record of Teton expansion into the 
rich buffalo hunting grounds to the south and west of Fort Laramie; aspects of the buffalo 
robe and hide trade and its nineteenth-century transformation of Teton political economy; 
and continuing efforts to eliminate the illicit trafficking in alcoholic spirits in Indian 
country.  
As an integral feature of the American Fur Company’s trade with the westernmost 
Teton Sioux, the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail remained in year-round use from 1837 to 
1849. And, although it connected the Teton Sioux to a global market economy that 
29 
 
provided them with what had become indispensable Euro-American trade goods, their 
continuing reliance on those goods made the Sioux willing participants in a Western-style 
cycle of surplus production for exchange that left them with only illusions of 
independence.  Indeed, as early as 1829, United States government officials had observed 
that “since the introduction of these articles among the Indians, a corresponding change 
has taken place in their modes of life, and many of the tribes could not subsist, were they 
deprived of their accustomed supplies.” 62 
The establishment of Fort Laramie in 1834, followed by the inauguration of the Fort 
Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail in 1837, positioned the Teton Sioux for their conquest of the 
north-central plains; by 1840, throughout their entire domain, they would never be more 
than a short distance from a trader and his supply of goods.  Fort Pierre remained the 
Tetons’ principal trade outlet, but Fort Laramie steadily gained importance throughout 
the 1840s.  Additionally, many bands of the northernmost Tetons had ready access to Fort 
Union—yet another major trade depot founded in 1829 by Kenneth McKenzie at the 
mouth of the Yellowstone.  Therefore, at all three forts, at a number of smaller posts, and 
at numerous wintering places, American fur traders were able to conduct an extremely 
profitable business with the Tetons, who received an astonishing variety of trade goods in 
exchange for their average annual output of tens of thousands of buffalo robes. A partial 
list of the Tetons’ favorite trade goods includes the following:  Northwest trade guns, 
gunpowder, powder horns, flints, knives, battle axes, tomahawks, lances, colored 
blankets, tobacco, coffee, sugar, salt, pepper, metal awls and scrapers, metal arrow points, 
                                                             
62 Ibid., 5; Wishart, Fur Trade of the American West, 80; Senate Journal, 20th Cong., 2nd sess. 9 February, 
1829, 5; quoted in Schuler, Fort Pierre, 112. 
30 
 
cloth and ready-made clothing, needles, beads, buttons, combs, mirrors, vermillion, and, 
of course, liquor.
63
  
Chapter Six, “A Collision of Cultures: Emigrants in the Platte River Valley, the Sale 
of Fort Laramie, ‘the Great Treaty Council of 1851,’ and the Grattan Affair, 1846-1854,” 
investigates the Tetons’ ever-increasing apprehension as first a trickle and later a flood of 
white emigrants along the Oregon Trail ravaged the fragile ecosystem of the Platte River 
valley and surrounding plains. Despite the mounting friction between Indians and 
emigrants, however, business between the Tetons and American fur traders peaked 
throughout the 1840s, providing the Sioux with enormous quantities of trade goods that 
both eased their daily lives and made possible the maximum extension of their range and 
military power by the 1850s.  At the height of that power, they controlled the north-
central plains from the Rocky Mountain Front to the Missouri and from the Platte River 
valley to the Yellowstone.  Strategically located, the Tetons’ domain provided access to 
the Southwest, Great Lakes, and Canadian plains’ trading networks; and, beginning in the 
1840s, it also straddled the most important road used by non-trading white emigrants, the 
Oregon Trail.
64
 
By the time of the Fort Laramie Peace Conference of 1851, the Teton Sioux had 
reached the peak of their military, political, and economic power. In 1848, the United 
States government, in tacit recognition of that power and seeking to safeguard white 
emigrants traveling through Sioux lands, had built Fort Kearney in what would become 
the state of Nebraska, and then purchased Fort Laramie the next year from Pierre 
Chouteau, Jr. and Company—the name to which Chouteau had changed Pratte, Chouteau 
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and Company after Pratte died.  For five years following the sale of Fort Laramie to the 
United States Army, veteran fur trader James Bordeaux occupied an unstockaded trading 
post at a site roughly eight miles downriver from the fort along the Oregon Trail that a 
succession of traders had used since 1837.  As an independent entrepreneur, Bordeaux 
conducted a lively and profitable business with the same bands of Brules and Oglalas that 
had frequented the Platte River valley since the mid-1830s, thus normalizing Teton Sioux 
trade relations in that region that might otherwise have rapidly deteriorated.
65
   
 Chapter Six ends with the tragic confrontation in the summer of 1854 between a 
group of Mormon emigrants and the bands of Sioux camped along the Oregon Trail 
adjacent to Fort Laramie that initiated more than two decades of intermittent warfare. As 
a wagon train of emigrants passed the Sioux camped along the Oregon Trail, a cow 
bolted from its Mormon owner who, afraid to enter the Indian camps, left the animal 
behind, there to be shot by a Minneconjou visitor to the Oglalas.  After the aggrieved 
owner complained, Fort Laramie’s commander somewhat reluctantly detailed twenty-
nine men under Second-Lieutenant J. L. Grattan to the Sioux camps.  Unwisely, Grattan 
tried to arrest the Minneconjou, and, in the ensuing struggle, Brule chief Brave Bear and 
all of the troopers perished. 
An Afterword outlines the general disruption of the Sioux trade caused by General 
William S. Harney’s 1855 campaign to punish the Sioux and force the southern Tetons 
away from the Oregon Trail. The outbreak of open warfare persuaded Pierre Chouteau, 
Jr. and Company to sell Fort Pierre to the Army that same year.
66
  Although Army 
freighters would continue to use the Fort-Pierre—Fort Laramie Trail, by 1855 the Tetons 
                                                             
65 White, “The Winning of the West,” 340; Schuler, Fort Pierre, 132; Charles E. Hanson, Jr., “James 
Bordeaux, Museum of the Fur Trade Quarterly 2 (Spring 1966):  6. 
66 Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 72-78; Schuler, Fort Pierre, 133; Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail,” 8.  
32 
 
had lost the services of their two most important trading establishments and finally 
confronted the consequences of their fifty-year submersion in the Euro-American market 
economy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 “PRELUDE: 
 
 TURMOIL ON THE UPPER MISSOURI,  
 1804-1815” 
 
I  
Prior to the mid-seventeenth century, all seven of the greater Sioux “council fires” 
roamed the southern two-thirds of the present state of Minnesota. Then, toward the latter 
part of that century, the westernmost Sioux—Yanktons, Yanktonais, and Tetons—began 
a migration westward onto the prairies east of the Missouri River. The Tetons seemingly 
led the way as, even at that early date, they had acquired the name “gens des Prairies” 
(Prairie people) from the French.
67
  
Throughout the eighteenth century, these western Sioux trapped beaver in the winter 
to trade for Northwest guns and other goods obtained from British traders at the annual 
spring trade fairs held by their eastern Santee relatives. As late as 1796, trader Jean 
Baptiste Truteau observed that “the Sioux are those who hunt for the beaver and other 
good peltries of the Upper Missouri . . . which they exchange for merchandise with the 
other [Santee] Sioux situated on the St. Peter’s and Des Moines Rivers.”68  
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Truteau was a member of the Company of Explorers of the Upper Missouri to which 
the Spanish government, as part of its concerted effort in the years after 1763 to capture 
the Missouri River Indian trade, had licensed to raise a trading post on that river in what 
would become northeastern Nebraska.
69
 Other French and Spanish traders, Auguste 
Chouteau among them, likewise received licenses from Spanish officials in St. Louis, 
eventually securing for themselves a portion of the Teton trade in furs at the expense of 
their British rivals in the North West Company. That trade, however, was no longer in 
beaver pelts, but rather in buffalo robes and hides and pemmican. Thus, even before the 
arrival of Lewis and Clark on the upper Missouri in 1804, the altered nature of the fur 
trade had precipitated a new wave of Teton expansion toward the buffalo ranges west and 
southwest of the Missouri.
70
 The Yanktonais did not follow them because they assumed a 
middleman role in the late eighteenth century. Their villages along the James River 
hosted an annual grand trade fair known as the Dakota Rendezvous that lasted well into 
the nineteenth century. There, the Tetons continued to trade horses, deerskins, buffalo 
robes, and dried meat for basic necessities such as metal knives and kettles and cloth 
blankets.
71
   
In addition to their goods, the French and Spanish traders also brought with them 
European pathogens—particularly smallpox—that permanently upset the balance of 
power along the upper Missouri. First, a series of epidemics in 1779-80, 1780-81, and 
1801-1802 reduced the Arikaras from thirty-two villages to two and from four thousand 
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warriors to five hundred. Subsequently, the Mandans and Hidatsas suffered devastating 
losses as well. On the lower Missouri, disease broke the power of the once-powerful 
Omahas by reducing them from seven hundred to three hundred warriors with their 
notorious chief Blackbird being one of the casualties. But in contrast to these tribes of 
sedentary village farmers, the nomadic Tetons escaped the epidemics. Dispersed in their 
small, wandering bands, they generally avoided the outbreaks. And, with their way no 
longer barred by the horticulturalists, the Western Sioux crossed the Missouri and began 
to penetrate the high plains just west of that river. The Brules pushed into the lands along 
White River; the Oglalas hunted between the Bad (Teton) and Cheyenne rivers; and, the 
Saones occupied an area bounded by the Cheyenne and Heart rivers.
72
 Coinciding with 
the end of this period of Sioux expansion, the United States government dispatched a 
major expedition to explore the upper reaches of the Missouri River watershed, of which 
the new buffalo range of the Tetons was a part. 
II 
On 23 September 1804, the Lewis and Clark expedition first encountered the Western 
Sioux—several villages of Brules—camped below the confluence of the Bad (Teton) and 
Missouri Rivers. Although Captains William Clark and Meriwether Lewis clearly 
understood the necessity of opening negotiations in accordance with their instructions, 
the intelligence they had received in St. Louis from French traders warning of the Tetons’ 
aggressive behavior toward whites on the Missouri added an element of uncertainty to the 
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talks. The tension felt by the two captains only increased the next day when hunter and 
expedition member John Colter reported that the Brules had stolen one of the 
expedition’s horses. Subsequently, Lewis and Clark prepared for the council by 
assembling a generous supply of trade goods as gifts and by readying their weapons for 
action.
73
  
The stakes each side brought to the negotiations were high. Although Jefferson had 
directed Lewis and Clark to promote intertribal peace and to forge trade contacts with all 
of the Indians along the expedition’s route, the president had assigned the highest priority 
to conferences with the Sioux in recognition of their military power and economic 
promise. For example, his instructions to Lewis regarding Indians in general had 
admonished him “to be neighborly, friendly & useful to them & of our disposition to a 
commercial intercourse with them; confer with them on the points most convenient as 
mutual emporiums, and the articles of most desirable interchange for them & us.”74 But, 
using language that specified the forging of good relations with the Sioux as the 
expedition’s main diplomatic objective, Jefferson had written: “On that nation we wish 
most particularly [emphasis added] to make a friendly impression, because of their 
immense power, and because we learn they are very desirous of being on most friendly 
terms with us.”75 
Throughout the negotiations, Lewis and Clark faced three daunting challenges: first, 
to command the respect of shrewd tribal statesmen backed by superior military force; 
second, to assure them that the St. Louis-based American fur trade did not threaten the 
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status quo of upper Missouri geo-politics; and, third, to persuade them to abandon all 
trade with British North West Company traders at their posts on the Des Moines and St. 
Peter’s rivers. The Brule chiefs—Black Buffalo, the Partisan, and Buffalo Medicine—
likewise stood poised to defend their peoples’ interests: the right to trade for British 
goods with their Sisseton and Yankton kinsmen at the annual Dakota Rendezvous on the 
James River, the maintenance of Teton control of the upper Missouri trade, thus ensuring 
a steady supply of agricultural products from the village farmers, particularly the 
Arikaras, and, the freedom to conduct foreign policy without American interference. A 
fourth, subtler interest also motivated the chiefs: each man’s determination to enhance his 
own standing as a statesman and leader within the Brules at the expense of the others.
76
 
On Tuesday, 25 September, the council opened hopefully enough on a small sand bar 
in the Bad (Teton) River with a ritual exchange of food. But as the talks commenced, 
Lewis and Clark quickly realized that their interpreter, Pierre Cruzatte, did not possess 
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the language skills to translate the chiefs’ subtle oratory accurately. Nevertheless, after 
the ritual smoking of the pipe, the explorers pressed on with a short speech delivered by 
Lewis, followed by a parade of uniformed members of the expedition and a round of 
generous gift-giving, all calculated to evoke American military and economic power. 
When they offered their finest gifts to only one of the Indians, however, Lewis and Clark 
made their first serious diplomatic error. In the best tradition of Euro-American Indian 
diplomacy, the two captains appointed a single leader—in this case, Black Buffalo—as a 
client chief with the sole authority to represent and command the tribe. The concept of 
executive power concentrated in a single individual was incompatible with Brule politics, 
however, and, thus, the explorers badly miscalculated a second time by inadvertently 
slighting the other headmen, particularly the Partisan.
77
 
The council then rapidly dissolved into a chaotic series of blunders and near-violence. 
First, the Brules demanded that either the expedition return downstream or purchase its 
continued passage with additional presents. Next, after transferring the proceedings to 
one of the pirogues, Lewis and Clark opened a bottle of whiskey from which the chiefs 
drank liberally. As they began to feel the effects of the alcohol, the Partisan became 
extremely belligerent; meanwhile, Clark, fearing serious trouble, quickly returned the 
Indians to shore. Once there, the chief immediately justified Clark’s fears by seizing the 
boat with several heavily-armed warriors and repeating his demand that the expedition go 
no further upriver. Black Buffalo’s timely intervention may have prevented a fight; but, 
even he exchanged heated words with Clark before the danger subsided. More likely, it 
was the two scatterguns that the explorers had taken the precaution to mount on the 
keelboat, loaded with buckshot, and trained on the Indians huddled on the pirogue that 
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ultimately convinced the Brules to restrain themselves.
78
 In the end, Clark flatly 
terminated the negotiations after the chiefs refused to shake his hand.
79
 
The Brules apparently resolved to salvage the situation with a feast and dance in one 
of their villages on the night of 26 September. The evening featured culinary delights 
such as roasted buffalo and dog, the solemn smoking of the pipe, Indian oratory, and 
mixed dancing. The Sioux also presented Lewis and Clark with young women, an offer 
the latter evidently declined.
80
 Despite this apparent snub, however, Black Buffalo and 
the Partisan accompanied the captains back to their boat to spend the night, the tensions 
of the previous day seemingly forgotten.
81
 
If Lewis and Clark felt relief the next morning, they also understood that the Brules 
had no intention of letting the expedition continue upriver unmolested. Pierre Cruzatte 
related a warning from some Omaha prisoners in the Sioux villages that their captors 
intended to stop the Americans from trading directly with the Arikaras, Mandans, and 
Hidatsas in their earth-lodge villages further upstream. Failing that, both Black Buffalo 
and the Partisan planned to reassert their dignity and authority with their own people by 
forcing the explorers to distribute more gifts. But, even though all of the Brules waited 
menacingly at the riverbank the next morning in a final attempt to induce the Americans 
to stay, Lewis and Clark refused to back down before this blatant display of power. The 
standoff ended only after Black Buffalo, apparently unwilling to risk casualties among 
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the women and children, accepted additional gifts of tobacco as a parting gesture of the 
Americans’ goodwill.82 
As representatives of the United States government charged with negotiating 
concessions from the Teton Sioux, Lewis and Clark had failed utterly. For instance, the 
Brules refused outright to send a delegation to meet with Jefferson, a cherished goal of 
the president. An even more ominous development concerned the treatment that the 
Tetons would accord American fur traders in the future. While the Brules had decided 
against carrying their bluff to the point of open hostilities with the numerous and heavily-
armed Corps of Discovery, smaller parties of traders with fewer guns hauling their goods 
up the Missouri could expect nothing from the Tetons but continued harassment and 
extortion.
83
 Clark’s subsequent evaluation of them as “the vilest miscreants of the savage 
race [who] must ever remain the pirates of the Missouri” both reflected the futility of his 
and Lewis’s efforts and accurately predicted the nature of Teton-American relations until 
1815.
84
 
III 
In the years following the Brules’ first encounter with Americans west of the 
Missouri River, the Oglalas expanded westward and reestablished themselves on the 
plains east of the Black Hills, hunting buffalo there in the summer and wintering near 
Bear Butte. Saones from Cheyenne River and their Cheyenne allies followed closely 
behind the Oglalas. In a continuation of the intertribal warfare between the Tetons and 
the Uto-Aztecan Kiowas, this combined Sioux-Cheyenne advance drove the Kiowas 
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permanently from the Black Hills country. They continued, however, to trade Spanish 
goods and horses from the Southwest with the Cheyennes along the North Platte River at 
the mouth of Horse Creek.
85
  
By 1815, these annual trade fairs had attracted the Western Sioux to the upper Platte 
country for the first time. But, despite the best efforts of the Cheyennes to broker a peace 
among the Kiowas and the Sioux, a clash between a Brule and a Kiowa ended in the 
latter’s death and ignited a general war that forced the Kiowas to move far south. The 
Kiowas, joined by some friendly Cheyennes and Arapahos, eventually retreated all the 
way to the Red River.
86
 
As the Oglalas became firmly established in the Black Hills country in the first two 
decades of the nineteenth century—as well as trading and hunting on the North Platte—
they nevertheless continued to follow the Bad (Teton) River down to the Missouri each 
spring. There, with their Brule and Saone kinsmen, they freely harassed and robbed 
American traders heading upriver to the Arikaras, Mandans, and Hidatsas. And although 
the Oglalas generally held their annual Sun Dance either out near the Black Hills or on 
the Missouri, depending on their mood, their general orientation was to the west, because 
it was during these years that they began sending large war parties against the Crows—
campaigns that presaged the Tetons’ conquest of the Powder River country in the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century.
87
 
In 1807, Teton warriors participated as allies of the Arikaras in the fight that 
prevented Ensign Nathaniel Pryor from returning the Mandan chief Sheheke to his village 
upriver from the Arikaras. The chief had accompanied Lewis and Clark to St. Louis on 
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the return leg of their journey for the purpose of eventually meeting with President 
Jefferson; as a condition of the trip, however, the government had promised Sheheke a 
military escort home. Therefore, on 18 May 1807, a mixed contingent of fourteen soldiers 
commanded by Pryor, a former sergeant in the Corps of Discovery, and twenty-three 
traders led by Pierre Chouteau, Jr. departed St. Louis intent upon returning Sheheke 
safely to his people. The party proceeded upriver unmolested until it reached an Arikara 
village, where the Arikaras and their Sioux allies fired on the Americans, killing three 
men and wounding several others. A Hunkpapa warrior named Red Shirt also died in the 
deadly exchange; Sioux winter counts attribute his death to the Arikaras. In the wake of 
this disaster, the joint expedition returned to St. Louis, its mission unfulfilled.
88
 
The death of Red Shirt so angered the Oglalas that six hundred warriors stopped and 
tried to rob a water-borne party of eighty men led by Ramsay Crooks and Robert 
McClellan in the summer of 1807. The two men had recently become partners and that 
same year made their first attempt to trade on the upper Missouri. But, after meeting 
Pryor on his retreat to St. Louis and listening to his dire warning of the Tetons’ hostile 
attitude toward American traders, the partners returned to their trading post at Council 
Bluffs and remained there until 1809.
89
 Emboldened by the successful ascent of the 
Missouri the next year by a party of Missouri Fur Company traders, Crooks and 
McClellan set out again only to suffer the indignity of being forced to turn back by a 
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band of hostile Oglalas; they did, however, return to Council Bluffs with most of their 
merchandise.
90
  
IV 
In the preface to his landmark survey of the American fur trade, Hiram Martin 
Chittenden proclaims:   
There are few more impressive incidents in the history of the West than the 
meeting, by Lewis and Clark, when nearly home from their journey across the 
continent, of numerous parties of traders wending their way to the heart of the 
wilderness which these explorers had just left. There could be no doubt in this 
manifestation of a common purpose which way the course of empire was 
tending.
91
 
 
With that brief phrase—“the course of empire”—Chittenden captured the essence of the 
stakes that confronted fur traders as they headed west in the wake of Lewis and Clark. So 
central is this idea to understanding the history of the American fur trade that one 
historian even appropriated the phrase for the title of his own work on the subject.
92
 
The hidden significance of that struggle for empire lies buried within the corporate 
strategies developed by the fur companies themselves. The traders engaged in business 
practices characterized by cutthroat field tactics that often proved counterproductive for 
all parties involved. Men died by the score, fortunes literally vanished overnight, and 
national boundaries solidified or evaporated because of the success or failure of traders in 
the field charged with executing ruthless strategies. Surprisingly, considering the vastness 
of the geographical setting—virtually the entire western half of the then largely-
unexplored North American continent—and the financial constraints that led to chronic 
shortages of men and equipment, cooperation between fur-trading enterprises remained 
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elusive. For example, the murderous rivalry that existed between the Hudson’s Bay 
Company and the North West Company throughout the first two decades of the 
nineteenth century climaxed in 1821 with the murder of several Hudson’s Bay men by 
employees of the North West Company—an incident that led the British crown to order 
their merger. And, in the 1830s, the bitter duel for control of the Central Rockies waged 
by the American Fur Company and the Rocky Mountain Fur Company ended only after 
the latter abandoned the field entirely.
93
 
Yet collaboration between rival fur trade companies did infrequently occur. One such 
episode took place on the upper Missouri in the late spring and early summer of 1811 and 
involved large numbers of Teton Sioux. For a brief time in June and July of that year, 
John Jacob Astor’s Pacific Fur Company, commanded in the field by Wilson Price Hunt 
and Donald McKenzie, found themselves reluctantly allied with the St. Louis-based 
Missouri Fur Company captained by the notorious Spaniard, Manuel Lisa. Although 
James P. Ronda summarized the predominant scholarly consensus when he concluded 
that their informal collaboration “had no lasting consequences for either [company],” the 
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alliance did succeed in neutralizing the hostility of hundreds of Teton Sioux attempting to 
deny both companies access to the upper Missouri and in securing a joint diplomatic 
victory over the horticultural Arikaras.
94
 That victory owed much to command decisions 
made by both Hunt and Lisa, decisions which served to allay mutual suspicions, combine 
their limited resources, and coordinate each of their expedition’s objectives. On 8 March 
1809, the Missouri Gazette reported:  
The Missouri Fur Company, lately formed here, has every prospect of 
becoming a force of incalculable advantage, not only to the individuals 
engaged in the enterprise, but the community at large. Their extensive 
preparations, and the respectable force they intend to ascend the Missouri 
with, may bid defiance to any hostile band they meet with. The streams which 
descend from the Rocky Mountains afford the finest hunting, and here we 
learn they intend to build their fort.
95
                          
 
Only days earlier, and with “great expectations,” the partners of the newly-created St. 
Louis Missouri Fur Company—later popularly shortened simply to the Missouri Fur 
Company—had signed their Articles of Agreement on 3 March 1809. The partners 
represented many of the ablest traders in the West. The group included Pierre Chouteau, 
Sr., Auguste Chouteau, Jr., Manuel Lisa, Pierre Menard, Reuben Lewis (Meriwether’s 
brother), Sylvester Labadie, William Clark, Andrew Henry, Benjamin Wilkinson (brother 
of the former governor), William Morrison, and Dennis Fitzhugh.
96
 And, significantly, 
the history of the Missouri Fur Company is inseparable from any study of Lisa’s long and 
eventful career in the American fur trade. 
Manuel Lisa was born of Spanish heritage in New Orleans on 8 September 1772.  His 
father, Christopher Lisa, had come to Louisiana as a Spanish government official in 1763. 
                                                             
94 Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: xvii. 
95 Missouri Gazette (St. Louis) 8 March 1809; quoted in Oglesby, Manuel Lisa, 74. 
96 Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 138. 
46 
 
By 1790 at the latest, the young Manuel had established himself in St. Louis as a fur 
trader of some note. Indeed, Lisa’s acquisition of the exclusive rights to trade with the 
Osage Indians at the expense of Pierre Chouteau, Sr.—a veteran St. Louis trader who had 
exploited that select concession for the two preceding decades—provides evidence of 
both Lisa’s growing entrepreneurial abilities and rising reputation.97 
Lisa’s experiences with the Osages contributed to his later strategy of accommodating 
all of the tribes along the Missouri, thus keeping the river route open and allowing access 
to the Three Forks of the Missouri. Thomas Biddle captured the essence of that strategy 
in a letter to Colonel Henry Atkinson: “The objectives of this [Missouri Fur C]ompany 
appear to have been to monopolize the trade among the lower tribes of the Missouri, who 
understand the art of trapping, and to send a large party to the headwaters of the Missouri 
capable of defending and trapping beaver themselves.”98 Unfortunately for American 
traders and trappers of this period, however, the powerful Blackfoot
99
 considered the 
Three Forks region their exclusive domain. Although the British had managed to retain 
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the tribe’s goodwill by fervently avoiding that country and instead encouraging the 
Blackfoot to travel to British posts on the Saskatchewan River to trade, the Americans, 
inflamed by Lewis and Clark’s reports concerning the great quantity of beaver at the 
Three Forks, found the lure irresistible and the risks acceptable.
100
  
Therefore, in the spring of 1810, Major Andrew Henry and thirty-two employees of 
the Missouri Fur Company built a post between the Jefferson and Madison rivers with the 
intention of harvesting the Three Fork’s wealth in beaver. The Blackfoot quickly 
retaliated and soon forced Henry and his men to retreat to the other side of the 
Continental Divide to trap and spend the winter of 1810-11 hopefully free from 
harassment by those Indians. Although the trappers had already accumulated thirty packs 
of beaver,
101
 they had done so only at the staggering cost of twenty men killed.
102
 
Manuel Lisa responded to this setback the following spring by organizing a relief 
expedition to resupply Henry and his men and bring their packs of beaver to St. Louis; 
also, as the partners had scheduled the company for either reorganization or dissolution in 
1812, Lisa hoped to show a profit before that day arrived. In the midst of the 
reorganization, Charles Gratiot (acting as agent for Sylvester Labadie) wrote to John 
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Jacob Astor in New York. The letter reveals that the Missouri Fur Company partners at 
least discussed including Astor in their venture: 
I have been engaged for some time past in the settlement and dissolution of 
the Missouri Fur Company . . . . At the request of all the parties I was chosen 
to draw the articles for a new act of association . . . . The capital of the present 
company with a moderate valuation is estimated at thirty thousand dollars 
divided in ten equal shares. I have proposed to extend the ten shares to fifteen 
. . . that an offer should be made to you of the five shares with proposition that 
you should contract to furnish on commission the equipments necessary for 
the trade of the Upper Missouri, and to make the sales of furs which would be 
received in return. This proposition has met with the approbation of some of 
the members, but I fear will be opposed by others. When I made this 
proposition I contemplated that you wished to draw the fur trade into your 
hands. In this view I considered that you would be of great service to each 
other [emphasis added] or likewise the measure might facilitate the operations 
of Mr. Hunt, as you could by that means have a communication open again 
from his place to the Columbia.
103
 
 
Manuel Lisa did not record his thoughts regarding Gratiot’s proposition. 
 
Washington Irving, the Pacific Fur Company’s most celebrated historian, awarded to 
Lewis and Clark the honor of having inspired John Jacob Astor’s dream of a fur-trading 
empire centered at the mouth of the Columbia River. As Irving explained it, Astor’s 
vision included a series of trading posts strung along both the Missouri and Columbia to 
collect the furs of the interior. After depositing the furs at the main establishment, it 
would resupply the subsidiary posts. A ship sent annually to the main establishment from 
New York would deliver supplies, reinforcements, and trade goods for the Indians. Laden 
with the finest furs, the ship would then sail to Canton, after which it would return to 
New York on the final leg of the round trip loaded with merchandise from China and the 
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proceeds from the sale of the furs.
104
 And, although Irving only briefly mentioned the 
explorer Alexander Mackenzie, modern scholars now trace Astoria’s origins at least as 
far back as the publication of Mackenzie’s book, Voyages from Montreal, a copy of 
which Thomas Jefferson had ordered in 1802. In it, Mackenzie implores the British 
government to construct a line of fortified posts all the way from Lake Winnipeg to the 
Pacific Ocean. Jefferson became only too aware that without swift action on his part, the 
British crown would soon preemptively seize all of western North America and, by 1803, 
the president had moved quickly to organize the Lewis and Clark expedition.
105
 
Despite the fact that scholars have alternately traced Astoria’s origins to the 
explorations of Peter Pond, David Thompson, Alexander Mackenzie, and Lewis and 
Clark, John Jacob Astor did, in fact, create his Pacific Fur Company following the 
successful conclusion of the Lewis and Clark expedition, though he never recorded the 
exact date.
106
 It may have been in March 1810, when he and a group of Canadian 
investors signed the preliminary articles establishing the Pacific Fur Company as the 
western affiliate of Astor’s American Fur Company. Regardless of the precise date, by 
the spring of 1810, the Pacific Fur Company set out to make Astoria a reality.
107
 
As described by Irving, Astor’s plan included a line of trading posts from the upper 
Missouri to the mouth of the Columbia, where his employees would raise the main 
establishment. To that end, the Tonquin sailed from New York on 8 September 1810 
destined for the Pacific. The ship arrived at the mouth of the Columbia on 22 March 1811 
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and construction of the post—christened “Astoria”—commenced on 18 May. Shortly 
after the Tonquin set sail, a Pacific Fur Company expedition began its ascent of the 
Missouri. Led by Wilson Price Hunt and the ex-Nor’Wester Donald McKenzie, the party 
departed St. Louis on 21 October 1810. Hunt planned to follow Lewis and Clark’s route 
to the Pacific while making contact with the Indian tribes along the way and selecting 
suitable sites for Astor’s proposed chain of trading posts. The expedition would then 
rendezvous with the traders already established on the Pacific.
108
 
Astor clearly understood the benefits of commercial alliances, and throughout his 
long career he strove to minimize the negative effects of competition on his business 
interests. In 1809, he offered the North West Company a one-third interest in the Pacific 
Fur Company in return for a one-half interest in the Michilimackinac Company.
109
 And, 
on 20 December 1812, Astor signed a trade agreement linking the Pacific Fur Company 
to the Russian-American Company.
110
 Predating both of these efforts is a letter he sent to 
Auguste Chouteau early in 1800. In it, Astor suggested a commercial relationship with 
the St. Louis fur traders.
111
 Astor biographer Kenneth W. Porter recognized the 
importance of the letter in connecting Astor’s methods to his ambitions: 
This letter reveals Astor as making collections at St. Louis as the agent of a 
London firm and as offering his services in purchasing merchandise and 
disposing of furs for the St. Louis traders. It is one of the earliest evidences of 
that expansionist policy which a few years later resulted in the founding of 
Astoria. Auguste Chouteau and Charles Gratiot were leading figures in the St. 
Louis fur trade.
112
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Porter is referring to Chouteau having become a partner in the St. Louis Missouri Fur 
Company in 1809. 
The most perceptive analysis of the demise of the Missouri Fur Company in 1814 
appears in Chittenden’s Fur Trade of the American West: 
Looking back from this distance [1902] at the history of the St. Louis 
Missouri Fur Company, it is apparent that the primary cause of its failure was 
the top-heavy character of its organization. Capitalized at less than fifty 
thousand dollars, it embraced every trader of distinction in St. Louis, all of 
whom bore an active part in the administration of affairs either at home or in 
the field. It was not to be expected that such an arrangement could be as 
effective as if a single individual had controlled its management. Another 
error on the part of the St. Louis traders was their unwillingness to permit Mr. 
Astor to have any share in their business. They excluded the very man who 
would have been able to carry them through their initial misfortunes to 
ultimate success.
113
  
 
The company’s shortage of capital crippled it throughout the period of its reorganization 
in the winter of 1811-12.
114
 Additionally, the company’s Articles of Agreement contained 
numerous restrictions designed to keep the partners honest. These almost paranoid 
restrictions had the unfortunate result of preventing the Missouri Fur Company from 
capitalizing on its many relative advantages.
115
 Contractual restrictions aside, it is 
difficult to overlook the fact that Astor—“the first business man in America to attain 
colossal wealth”116—unquestionably possessed the resources that might have prevented 
the Missouri Fur Company’s breakup in 1814.  
In contrast to the factors that led to the dissolution of the Missouri Fur Company, 
those responsible for the end of the Pacific Fur Company do not emerge in such a neat 
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and orderly pattern. Irving never laid the blame for Astoria’s failure on Astor. Instead, the 
author pointed to Astor’s subordinates and claimed that they disobeyed his orders, 
neglected his instructions, and lacked his dynamic spirit. Irving also took into account the 
loss of the Tonquin, the voyage of the Beaver—which effectively removed Hunt from 
command precisely when Astor most required his leadership—and the War of 1812.117 
And, finally, the fact that so many Canadians comprised Astoria’s rank and file casts 
doubt about their allegiance both to the United States and Astoria after war broke out 
with Great Britain. Then again, however, perhaps no group of men could have borne the 
hardships created by the war.
118
 An extract from the post’s Abandonment Resolution 
dated 1 July 1813 is revealing: 
We are now destitute of the necessary supplies to carry on Trade, and we have 
no hopes of receiving more. We are yet entirely ignorant of the coast, on 
which we always had great dependence. The interior parts of the country turn 
out far short of our expectations. Its yearly produce in furs is very far from 
being equal to the expenses the trade incurs; much less will it be able to 
recover the losses already sustained, or stand against a powerful opposition 
and support itself. In fine, circumstances are against us on every hand and 
nothing operates to lead us into a conclusion that we can succeed.
119
 
 
Complementing Chittenden’s discussion of the end of the Missouri Fur Company, an 
analysis of Astoria’s collapse also appears in his American Fur Trade of the Far West. 
Here, the author maintains that the preeminent—and wholly preventable—reason for the 
loss of Astoria centered on the absence of a meaningful St. Louis connection. Of course, 
any St. Louis connection Astor might have cultivated meant at least a business alliance 
and at most an outright partnership with the Missouri Fur Company. The chief benefits 
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that Astor and Hunt might have realized by working with Lisa and his other partners 
included a secure land-line of operations—safe from the depredations of Great Britain’s 
navy—and a stiffening infusion of loyal Americans into Astoria’s complement of 
questionable Canadians.
120
 As he addresses the importance of an overland route, David J. 
Wishart considers the problem of resupply from a historical geographer’s perspective: 
The key to [Astoria’s] entire [resupply] system, particularly when the sea 
route proved to be unreliable, was the discovery of an effective overland 
routeway that would allow ‘rapid’ communication between Astoria and St. 
Louis (and thence to New York). This was accomplished by Robert Stuart on 
an eastward journey from Astoria to St. Louis, beginning on 29 June 1812 and 
ending on 30 April 1813. Stuart was probably the first Euro-American to use 
South Pass and the Platte overland trail, but it was not an effective discovery, 
and South Pass had to be rediscovered by Ashley’s men in 1824.121  
 
Of course, by then, it was more than ten years too late for the Astorians. 
 
V 
Despite the absence of a formal, enduring association between the Missouri and 
Pacific Fur Companies, a temporary and somewhat reluctant partnership arranged by 
their respective captains, Manuel Lisa and Wilson Price Hunt, emerged as one result of a 
keelboat race that began in St. Louis and ended on the upper Missouri in the spring of 
1811. The story of that race is one of the more colorful episodes in the history of the 
American fur trade. It is especially noteworthy for the fur traders’ encounters with bands 
of Teton Sioux determined to prevent the Americans from proceeding upriver and trading 
with the Arikaras.  
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Although Lisa and Hunt left no surviving record of those events, two educated men 
with literary ability and the patience to apply it accompanied the expeditions. Hunt’s 
Astorians included English naturalist John Bradbury. Earlier, he had so impressed 
Thomas Jefferson that the president wrote a letter of introduction to Meriwether Lewis in 
St. Louis.
122
 And, when an American traveler named Henry Marie Brackenridge met Lisa 
prior to that trader’s departure from St. Louis, Brackenridge suddenly found himself 
employed by the audacious Spaniard as a hunter.
123
 Brackenridge later published the 
account of his adventures in two works entitled Views of Louisiana and the later Journal 
of a Voyage Up the Missouri River, in 1811. Irving relied heavily on both of these works 
as well as on Bradbury’s Travels in the Interior of America, in the Years 1809, 1810, and 
1811 for his own account of the keelboat race in Astoria.
124
 
On 3 September 1810, Hunt, McKenzie, and the remainder of the Astorians—
including Ramsay Crooks and Robert McClellan—arrived in St. Louis fresh from 
recruiting ventures at Montreal and Michilimackinac. By the first week of October, they 
had completed most of the preparations for their ascent upriver. Unfortunately for Hunt 
and the others, however, travel up the Missouri became increasingly difficult due to the 
onset of winter. After departing St. Louis on 21 October, they struggled upriver for three 
weeks until they reached the mouth of the Nodaway River on 16 November. Hunt then 
wisely chose to settle into winter quarters there and proceed upriver in the spring.
125
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Manuel Lisa and his partners in the Missouri Fur Company made the decision on 12 
September 1810 to send a relief expedition to Andrew Henry and his men trapping in the 
Rockies in response to the perceived threat posed by the Astorians.
126
 That winter, Lisa 
procured a small, well-built keelboat armed with a swivel and two brass blunderbusses. 
The boat also contained a false cabin to hide the Missouri Fur Company’s limited supply 
of trade goods from any roving bands of Sioux.
127
 Lisa commanded a crew of twenty-
two; Baptiste Charbonneau and Charbonneau’s wife, Sacagawea, both of whom had 
recently accompanied the Lewis and Clark expedition, and Brackenridge completed the 
party’s complement.128  
The expedition departed St. Charles on 2 April 1811 under clear skies.
129
 Lisa 
resolved to overtake the Astorians if at all possible to combine their forces for the 
hazardous trip through Sioux territory. He also feared that Hunt, prodded by Crooks and 
McClellan, might divert the hostility of the Sioux onto the much smaller Missouri Fur 
Company expedition. Crooks and McClellan had been complaining bitterly for two years 
that Lisa had persuaded the Sioux to prevent the two partners and their men from 
ascending the  
Missouri in 1809.
130
 As he passed the mouth of the Osage River on 11 April, Lisa had 
already gained two days on Hunt.
131
  
                                                             
126 Ronda, Astoria and Empire, 132. 
127 Henry Marie Brackenridge, Views of Louisiana, Together with a Journal of a Voyage up the Missouri 
River in 1811 (Pittsburgh: Cramer, Spear, and Eichbaum, 1814; reprint, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1962), 201 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 
128 Ibid., 200-201.  
129 Ibid., 200. 
130 Oglesby, Manuel Lisa, 109. In Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 162, the author describes how 
“Crooks and McClellan always claimed that this miscarriage of their plans was due to the machinations of 
the St. Louis Fur Company, whose active agent in accomplishing it was Manuel Lisa. They asserted that 
Lisa, in order to facilitate his own passage through this hostile country, had told the Sioux that another 
expedition was on its way with the express purpose of trading with them, and that they must not permit it to 
56 
 
Hunt, Crooks, and the men they had recruited during the winter in St. Louis returned 
to their winter camp on 17 April 1811. Four days later, sixty men, interpreter Pierre 
Dorion’s wife, and the Dorions’ two children left the Nodaway and set sail up the 
Missouri.
132
 Nevertheless, the gap between the two parties had narrowed as Lisa’s crew 
camped just below Fort Osage on 21 April. They were now only some ten or twelve days 
behind the Astorians.
133
 
Six days later, Lisa met some traders who had recently passed through Sioux country. 
They informed him that the Indians appeared “peaceably disposed.” The traders had also 
seen Hunt and estimated that Lisa would catch up with the former either at or just above 
the Platte River.
134
 
The Astorians sailed by the Omahas on 15 May. Lisa passed them four days later and 
decided to send two men overland with a letter for Hunt urging him to remain at the 
Ponca village until the two parties could combine their forces for the remainder of the 
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ascent.
135
 Intercepted at the Ponca village on 24 May by Lisa’s emissaries, Hunt 
concocted a ruse to put some distance between himself and the Spaniard. He convinced 
Lisa’s men that he would wait and then cleverly decided to inform the Sioux that the boat 
downriver contained their trade goods. Lisa arrived at the Ponca village expecting to see 
the Astorians, but they had long since departed; he then pressed on with renewed 
determination.
136
 
If Lisa’s objective had been to unite with Hunt and the Astorians before both 
expeditions reached the Sioux villages, the Spaniard missed catching Hunt by a single 
day. On 31 May, the Astorians narrowly escaped a tense confrontation with 
approximately six hundred Sioux warriors due primarily to Hunt’s resolute leadership, 
skill at negotiating, and, perhaps most importantly, his willingness to distribute gifts.
137
 A 
second encounter with chiefs of the “Okanandans” (Oglalas) and “Sahonies” (Saones) 
two days later, although it thoroughly alarmed Hunt, elicited no further exchange of 
presents because, as he put it, “he had given all he intended to give, and would give no 
more [and] that he was much displeased by their importunity, and if they or any of their 
nation again followed us with similar demands, he would consider them as enemies and 
treat them as such.”138 Circumstances thus forced Lisa to make his way past the Sioux 
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unaided. He just barely managed to do so by admitting to the Indians that, although he 
was indeed their trader, his company had recently become impoverished; but, if the Sioux 
would allow him passage upriver to trade, he would return in three months and rebuild 
their trading post. After concluding these negotiations by passing out a few presents, Lisa 
realized with relief that the Sioux had relented and his party was free to continue 
upriver.
139
 
Although Lewis and Clark had managed to maintain amicable relations with the 
Arikaras during the “Mandan Winter” of 1804-1805, those relations had deteriorated 
badly following the failure of the 1807 expedition commanded by Ensign Nathaniel Pryor 
to return the Mandan chief, Sheheke, to his people.
140
 Indeed, after his rather dispirited 
return to St. Louis, Pryor had estimated that he would need at least four hundred men to 
force his way past the Arikaras.
141
 The state of American-Arikara relations had changed 
little since then as Lisa and Hunt initiated a somewhat reluctant Missouri River 
partnership. 
On 2 June 1811, Lisa and his Missouri Fur Company traders at last affected a 
rendezvous with the Astorians commanded by Hunt near Cedar Island, twelve hundred 
miles above the mouth of the Missouri.
142
 Ever suspicious of Lisa’s intentions, Hunt 
initially removed his party five or six miles upriver from Lisa’s approaching boat. 
Eventually, the two parties met, although Brackenridge later recorded: “It was with real 
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pleasure I took my friend Bradbury by the hand; I have reason to believe our meeting was 
much more cordial than that of the two commanders.”143 Later too, Bradbury 
remembered: 
On my return to the boats, I found that some of the leaders of our party [i.e., 
Crook and McClellan] were extremely apprehensive of treachery on the part 
of Mr. Lisa, who being now no longer in fear of the Sioux, they suspected had 
an intention of quitting us shortly, and of doing us an injury with the Aricaras. 
Independent of this feeling, it had required all the address of Mr. Hunt to 
prevent Mr. M’Clellan or Mr. Crooks from calling him to account for 
instigating the Sioux to treat them ill the preceding year.
144
 
 
On 5 June, the situation turned violent. After Pierre Dorion struck Lisa over a 
questionable debt incurred earlier by Dorion at Fort Mandan, the volatile Spaniard and 
the interpreter attempted to kill one another with knives and pistols. Crooks and 
McClellan prepared to enter the fray in Dorion’s behalf. Hunt prevented them from 
intervening; but it remained for Bradbury and Brackenridge finally to convince the 
temperamental Lisa to forgive the insult and return to his boat unavenged.
145
 
By 1811 at the latest, the horticultural Arikaras, Mandans, and Hidatsas had formed at 
least a temporary military alliance for their mutual defense.
146
 The sudden arrival of the 
Astorians at the horticulturalists’ villages, however, threw the coalition into disarray. 
While the Mandans desired closer ties to St. Louis-based traders, the Hidatsas wished to 
remain loyal to the British North West Company—and the Arikaras suddenly found 
themselves uncomfortably suspended between these two incompatible positions. As a 
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gesture of solidarity with their British traders, the Hidatsas seemed to be preparing with 
hundreds of warriors for an assault on Hunt’s party; subsequently, Hunt and Lisa decided 
to enlist the aid of the Arikaras as arbitrators.
147
 
Negotiations to determine the traders’ fate opened on 12 June in the lodge of 
LeGauche, an Arikara chief. Despite the misgivings of Crooks and McClellan, Lisa 
performed admirably. Somewhat out of character, he calmly explained to LeGauche and 
roughly twenty Arikara headmen that the Astorians were his friends and that if the 
Indians attacked either party, they would face the combined firepower of both companies. 
Pleased with Lisa’s demonstration of solidarity, Hunt added that the Astorians had not 
come to trade but only wished to join their friends “at the great salt lake in the west” and 
would need to purchase horses for an overland journey.
148
 The exchange continued 
smoothly as the Arikaras agreed to sell the required number of horses. The negotiations 
then concluded successfully with the Americans distributing gifts of tobacco followed by 
the ritual smoking of the pipe. In light of future Arikara depredations, Lisa and Hunt’s 
brief association had accomplished much, if only temporarily.
149
 
Of more lasting significance, however, were the many ways that the two companies 
captained by Lisa and Hunt foreshadowed so many features of the later American fur 
trade. For example, Lisa consistently supplied the lower Missouri tribes with quality 
goods distributed from permanent trading houses and, by doing so, ensured his access to 
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the fur riches of the Three Forks area. Lisa also recognized the value of the Teton buffalo 
robe and hide trade and always—even after his fortunes declined following the War of 
1812—maintained a post among them. And, finally, having penetrated all the way to the 
Blackfoot country, Missouri Fur Company trappers under Andrew Henry built a fort at 
the Three Forks. Although grievous losses inflicted by that tribe eventually forced 
Henry’s men to abandon that post, one party returned to Fort Raymond, located at the 
confluence of the Bighorn and Yellowstone rivers, while the others crossed over the 
Continental Divide, built the first American trading fort on the Pacific slope, and spent 
the winter there in relative safety. The next spring, some of these men met Hunt as they 
were returning to St. Louis by way of the Missouri and informed him of routes across the 
Continental Divide superior to those pioneered by Lewis and Clark, routes that lay south 
of Blackfoot lands. On the basis of that new information, Hunt, anticipating the Henry-
Ashley partnership by nearly fifteen years, stopped his ascent of the Missouri at the 
Arikara villages, purchased horses from them, and headed overland toward the Rockies 
and then across the Continental Divide by one of these new routes. Later, Pacific Fur 
Company employees under the direction of Robert Stuart headed east in the summer and 
fall of 1812 following the loss of Astoria to the British, and became the first whites to 
traverse South Pass. Their achievement, however, went largely unheralded, as the credit 
for “discovering” South Pass later went to one of Henry and Ashley’s men, Jedediah 
Smith, the first white to cross it from east to west.
150
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VI 
Of more enduring significance to United States foreign relations, however, was Lisa’s 
successful diplomacy during the War of 1812 with those same Tetons who had tried to 
bar his passage upriver in 1811. Lisa’s encounters with the Sioux in the spring and 
summer of 1812 established his claim to be their Missouri River trader and fostered an 
atmosphere of mutual economic cooperation that later induced the Tetons to ally 
themselves with the United States more or less continuously from 1814 to 1854. This 
foreign relations triumph had its origins in the far-sighted statesmanship of William 
Clark, newly-appointed Governor of Missouri Territory. 
By 1814, no American exercised a stronger influence with the western Indians, 
excepting the Blackfoot, than Manuel Lisa. Therefore, in the summer of that year, 
Governor Clark drew on his authority as Indian agent to appoint Auguste Chouteau sub-
agent for the Osages and Lisa agent for the tribes on the Missouri above the Kansas 
River.
151
 Clark made the appointments for the express purpose of bolstering those tribes’ 
allegiance to the United States for the duration of the conflict with Great Britain.
152
 To 
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that end, Lisa departed St. Louis that fall with $1,335 in trade goods and Tamaha, a one-
eyed chief of the Tetons. At a council the following spring held at the mouth of James 
River and attended by large numbers of Yanktons and Tetons, Lisa convinced the Indians 
both of British deceit and American integrity. The results of that council had national 
implications: despite British trader Robert Dickson’s strenuous efforts to incite the 
Santees and other Mississippi River tribes to attack American settlements, including St. 
Louis, the Tetons’ new-found allegiance to the United States was simply too powerful a 
deterrent to hostility on the part of Great Britain’s Indian allies.  
In the wake of this diplomatic success, Lisa returned triumphantly to St. Louis in June 
1815 accompanied by several Teton chiefs, including Clark’s old nemesis of 1804, the 
Partisan. Undoubtedly because of the disruptions along the Missouri resulting from the 
war, Lisa thereafter restricted his operations to his post at Council Bluffs until 1819.
153
 
But for the Tetons, an almost symbolic act on the part of Governor Clark seemed to 
presage the nature of Teton-American relations for the next four decades: for Tamaha’s 
services to the United States throughout the recent conflict, Clark expressed the nation’s 
gratitude by bestowing upon the chief a splendid officer’s uniform, a medal, an official 
written citation, and a United States government commission as a chief of the greater 
Sioux nation.
154
  
From 1812 to 1819, the limited success of Lisa’s constricted fur trade operations 
contrasted sharply with his diplomatic triumphs. Following the outbreak of hostilities and 
due in large measure to British agitation of the upper Missouri tribes, Lisa realistically 
abandoned all thoughts of trapping in the Blackfoot country or anywhere else on the other 
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side of the Continental Divide and had even withdrawn his traders from the territories of 
the Crows and the upper Missouri villagers. Finally reaching the nadir of his career in the 
spring of 1813, Lisa maintained only two trading houses: a single post below the Grand 
Detour managed by Louis Bissonette for the Sioux, and another at Council Bluffs under 
the direction of Michael Immel for the Omahas.
155
   
VII 
The members of the first government-sponsored expedition into the newly-acquired 
territory of the Louisiana Purchase optimistically opened negotiations with several Teton 
Sioux bands camped along the Missouri River in compliance with their instructions from 
President Thomas Jefferson. Appointed by the president to lead his “Corps for 
Northwestern Discovery,” Captains Meriwether Lewis and William Clark dutifully 
engaged several bands of Brule Sioux in talks that not only failed to establish American 
sovereignty over the area, but undoubtedly encouraged Teton aggression toward all 
Americans following Jefferson’s expedition.   
In the years during which the Teton Sioux and American fur traders first interacted in 
the upper Missouri country, mutual caution, suspicion, and distrust, combined with the 
region’s fluid geopolitics, created conditions that both preserved the Tetons’ control of 
boat traffic headed upriver from St. Louis and eventually forced the Americans to restrict 
their efforts, for a time at least, to the lower Missouri. Throughout the eighteenth century, 
as the leading bands of Tetons migrated westward from their ancestral lands, they 
retained close trade relations with their eastern kinsmen that allowed the westernmost 
Tetons to distance themselves, at least initially, from St. Louis-based sources of Euro-
American trade goods. 
                                                             
155 Morgan, The West of William H. Ashley, xli. 
65 
 
 
Before the upheavals resulting from the War of 1812 forced American fur traders to 
abandon the upper Missouri fur trade to French traders from St. Louis, Manuel Lisa’s 
Missouri Fur Company and John Jacob Astor’s Pacific Fur Company prefigured many of 
the production, distribution, and field strategies that enabled later firms to exploit the 
trans-Mississippi West’s wealth in furs so successfully. And, despite initial misgivings, 
the two companies cooperated briefly in the spring of 1811 to overcome successive 
challenges to their upriver passage from the Indians along the Missouri. Nevertheless, by 
1814, the Pacific Fur Company had dissolved after the forced sale of its trading 
establishment on the Pacific Coast to the North West Company, while Lisa had retreated 
to his few remaining posts on the lower Missouri. 
Manuel Lisa’s most lasting contribution to the security of American settlements in 
Louisiana, as well as to the eventual recovery of the region’s American fur trade, was his 
war-time diplomacy among the Teton Sioux. Commissioned by Governor William Clark 
to serve as Indian agent for tribes residing above the Kansas River, Lisa simultaneously 
convinced the Sioux of British treachery and American veracity. The Sioux subsequently 
pledged their loyalty to the United States in a treaty concluded at Potages de Sioux in the 
summer of 1815. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
 “ESTABLISHING A FOOTHOLD:  
 
 RECOVERY, RETREAT AND A SHIFT TO THE WEST, 
  1815-1824” 
 
I  
 Long before the War of 1812, French merchants from St. Louis vigorously 
pursued the Teton trade along the Missouri River. Although they had been doing so since 
the last years of the eighteenth century, the abandonment of the upper Missouri country 
by the Americans following the outbreak of hostilities with Great Britain in 1812 opened 
up expansive new opportunities for St. Louis-based French traders to monopolize that 
trade—particularly with the Brules and Oglalas. Ever since the Lewis and Clark 
expedition, the only whites the Western Sioux had tolerated along the Missouri were the 
French. A prime reason for this tolerance was their Gallic forbearance for the Teton habit 
of stopping white traders’ keelboats heading upriver and simply stealing the trade goods 
outright or of setting a rate of exchange which greatly favored the Indians.
156
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The situation for American traders proceeding upriver from St. Louis eased somewhat 
in the wake of Manuel Lisa’s successful wartime diplomacy with the Sioux but, at least 
until the early 1820s, French traders predominated.  
Perhaps the earliest Missouri River trading establishment devoted exclusively to the 
Teton trade was that built by Registre Loisel—a French trader called “Little Beaver” by 
the Sioux—near the mouth of Bad (Teton) River on Cedar Island. No Ears records the 
year of its construction in 1802 in his winter count.
157
 Chittenden describes the post as 
having been “about thirty-five miles below Fort Pierre” and “65 to 70 feet square, with 
the usual bastions. The pickets were about 14 feet high. There was a building inside 45 x 
32 feet divided into four equal rooms.”158 According to several Teton winter counts, 
Loisel had arrived among them sometime between 1794 and 1797 and judging by the 
name by which they first knew him—“The Good White Man”—he must have earned 
both their trust and friendship.
159
 Then, in the summer of 1809, several disgruntled bands 
of Tetons stopped a Missouri Fur Company expedition on its way to relieve the firm’s 
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trappers at Fort Raymond, a trading post built at the confluence of the Yellowstone and 
Bighorn Rivers in the spring of 1807 and meant to capture the Crow trade. To the 
Missouri Fur Company men, the Sioux conveyed their disappointment that an earlier 
American promise to send a trader to live among them had not been kept. As a visible 
expression of their dissatisfaction with the Americans, those bands now flew British flags 
over their camps. Both to regain the Tetons’ goodwill and to ease his way upriver, Lisa 
sent some of his employees to occupy Loisel’s Cedar Island location and reestablish 
American trade there with the Sioux.
160
 
Numerous Sioux winter counts record Little Beaver’s death in the destruction by fire 
of Loisel’s old log post on Cedar Island sometime between 1808 and 1810. They include 
those of the following winter count keepers: The Flame (or The Blaze), born a Two 
Kettles, he usually lived with the Sans Arcs; Lone Dog, a Yanktonai Sioux; The Swan (or 
The Little Swan), a Minneconjou chief; Battiste [alternately, Baptiste] Good, a Brule; 
White Cow Killer; American Horse; Cloud Shield; No Ears; and Iron Crow, all Oglalas. 
The Louisiana Gazette of 10 May 1810 also reported that fire had consumed that 
important trading post along with anywhere from $12,000 to $15,000 worth of furs.
161
 
Nevertheless, there is some confusion over whether Loisel, a.k.a. “Little Beaver,” was 
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edge of each bowl to identify its contents, James hastily removed himself from the festivities. 
161 Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 93-94, 106, 129-130, 135; James R. Walker, Lakota Society, ed. 
Raymond J. DeMallie (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 132; Louisiana Gazette, St. Louis, 10 
May 1810 (also known as the Missouri Gazette, among still other names); Morgan, The West of William H. 
Ashley, xli. 
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first called “The Good White Man” by the Sioux and whether he died in 1804, 1808, or 
1809. Battiste Good even claimed that Little Beaver was an Englishmen. But as all of the 
Sioux chroniclers except Battiste Good agree that Little Beaver was a French trader who 
died in 1808-1809 or 1809-1810—and Hyde makes the very reasonable argument that 
Loisel may have stayed on as Lisa’s factor after the Missouri Fur Company men took 
over the Frenchman’s post—Loisel is probably the “Little Beaver” who died in the fire 
on Cedar Island in 1809. Chittenden corroborates both Hyde and the winter count keepers 
with the statement that “[Loisel’s post] was probably the real Fort aux Cedres which is so 
known in the narratives of the times. Several authorities speak of it as an old Missouri 
Fur Company trading post, but if so it was possibly the one which burned in the spring of 
1810, for no such post is mentioned by Bradbury or Breckinridge in 1811 or by 
Leavenworth in 1823.” 162 
 Sioux chroniclers also recorded the building by the Sans Arcs of “dirt lodges” in 
which they lived throughout the winter of 1815-1816. These “dirt lodges” were 
undoubtedly trading posts managed by St. Louis-based, French merchants as the 
Americans had yet to return to the upper Missouri country. Hyde, however, recommends 
accepting the veracity of these records with caution because, as he says, there is “very 
little information on the Tetons at this period, and the winter-count outline is not as useful 
as it might be, for by the time these counts were interpreted, soon after the year 1877, the 
count-keepers themselves were very hazy as to the meaning of many of the 
pictographs.”163 Nevertheless, there seems to be no other reasonable explanation for the 
                                                             
162 Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 93-94, Walker, Lakota Society, 132; Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 35; 
Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 2: 929. In Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark, 2: 736, Nasatir claims that 
Little Beaver died in October 1804. 
163 Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 35; Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 89-100; Walker, Lakota Society,111-122. 
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Sans Arcs’ “dirt lodges” other than that they were log structures similar in design to the 
post described above by Chittenden and built to accommodate French entrepreneurs 
coming upriver from St. Louis and their Sioux trading partners. 
Many of the westernmost Teton bands were in considerable flux during this period. 
For instance, the Kiyuksas first became associated with the Oglalas at this time. This 
move coincided with the successful effort by Bull Bear, one of that band’s leading 
warriors, to become head-chief of the entire tribe. In this endeavor, he received the aid of 
Red Water and his band of Brules who likewise joined the Oglalas. Lone Man’s Brules 
also merged with the Oglalas. Lone Man was the father of Red Cloud, one of the more 
famous of the later Oglala chiefs.
164
 One of this band’s more renowned men was the elder 
Man-Afraid-of His-Horse, the chief whose son of the same name played such a 
prominent role among the Tetons in the decades following the Grattan disaster of 1854. 
The most probable year of his birth was 1814-1815.
165
     
Although a great deal of information is missing regarding the erection of two forts 
along the Missouri River in the years 1817-1818 and 1819-1820, it is almost certain that 
French fur traders Joseph LaFramboise and Louis La Conte were instrumental in the 
construction of one of them ten miles above the future site of Fort Thompson, as well as 
of another on the Fort Pierre Plain near the subsequent location of Fort Pierre. Confusion 
arises from the fact that Battiste Good credits LaFramboise, the French-Ottawa trader he 
calls “Choze,” with being responsible for building both forts, though not in the same 
                                                             
164 Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 34; Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 111, 136-137; Walker, Lakota Society, 
135. Corroborated by many of the Sioux winter counts, Hyde here maintains that the year of Red Cloud’s 
birth is indisputable as a flaming meteorite fell out of the sky from the east, making a great noise and 
turning the sky red, hence the derivation of the chief’s name. 
165 Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 34. For additional information on Lakota divisions and Oglala bands, see 
Walker, Lakota Society, 18-21; Sandoz, Crazy Horse, passim. 
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year. Alternatively, Lone Dog ascribes the raising of the latter post—referred to hereafter 
as Fort LaFramboise—in 1819-1820 to La Conte; other surviving winter counts do 
nothing to clear up the discrepancy. Fur trade historians, too, have failed to establish 
definitively the early history of the two forts; the written record is simply too slim. What 
is certain, however, is that Fort LaFramboise became the first important trading 
installation on the Fort Pierre Plain and operated continuously thereafter until the 
Columbia Fur Company raised Fort Tecumseh a short distance upriver in 1822.
166
 
II 
Manuel Lisa reorganized the Missouri Fur Company one final time in 1819 with a 
new set of partners who planned eventually to return to the upper Missouri country. Not 
even Lisa’s death in 1820 deterred them from sending a trapping expedition to the 
mountains. In its wake, one of the ablest of the partners, the energetic Joshua Pilcher, 
assumed leadership of the company.
167
 
Beginning with his arrival in St. Louis in the fall of 1814, Joshua Pilcher’s first years 
in Missouri Territory were interesting. Pilcher initially entered into a short-lived business 
partnership with one N. S. Anderson. Following his death in the summer of 1816, Pilcher 
                                                             
166 Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 106, 109; Walker, Lakota Society, 134; Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 35-36; 
Schuler, Fort Pierre, 8-9; Chittenden, American Fur Trade, II: 930.  
167 Oglesby, Manuel Lisa, 151-156; Chittenden, American Fur Trade, I: 147; Phillips, The Fur Trade, II: 
393; Wishart, Fur Trade of the American West, 46-48. In Morgan, The West of William H. Ashley, xlix, the 
author neatly summarizes Lisa’s various partnerships and reorganizations involving his corporate fur-
trading ventures: “The original [1808-1809] St. Louis Missouri Fur Company gave way in March, 1812, to 
a new Missouri Fur Company, which was to have continued until December, 1818. Steps were taken to 
dissolve the successor firm in the latter part of 1813, and action became final in January, 1814. The 
following June Lisa entered into partnership with Theodore Hunt (a firm variously called ‘Manuel Lisa & 
Co.,’ ‘Lisa & Hunt,’ and ‘Missouri Fur Company’), and this partnership continued until it expired by 
limitation in June, 1817. Lisa next entered into a more broadly based partnership with John P. Cabanne 
including such associates as Bernard Pratte, John O’Fallon, Theodore Hunt, Bartholomew Berthold, and 
Pierre Chouteau, Jr. Cabanne & Co. broke up in turn, and in 1819 a new Missouri Fur Company was 
organized. A copy of its articles of association and co-partnership was furnished the government by 
Thomas Hempstead under cover of a letter to John C. Calhoun, April 7, 1822 (National Archives, Records 
of the War Department, Office of the Secretary, H-288 (15) 1822).”  
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went into business with veteran St. Louis banker, politician, and merchant, Thomas F. 
Riddick. In the autumn of 1816, the two friends entered into the auction business, an 
endeavor that evidently brought them considerable financial success. During the next 
three years Pilcher’s business interests varied from lead mining to banking to land 
speculation, none of which brought him either satisfaction or financial security. Pilcher 
helped organize the first permanent Masonic Lodge in Missouri as its First or Charter 
Master, although one of his Masonic associations nearly resulted in a duel over a young 
woman with fellow Mason Stephen F. Austin, at the time a Missouri Territorial 
Assemblyman and later founder of the first Anglo-American colony in Texas. Pilcher 
also at this time became a trusted friend and loyal political supporter of Thomas Hart 
Benton. Then, in 1819 Pilcher “crossed the great divide in his [life and] career—from 
merchandising and banking to the fur trade.”168 
In 1819, a combination of favorable developments at last convinced Lisa once again 
to hazard his fortunes in the upper Missouri fur trade: the Convention of 1818, which 
solidified the border between Canada and the United States to the Continental Divide, 
congressional prohibitions against British trade south of that border, the Yellowstone 
Expedition of 1819-20,
169
 and a postwar economic boom that helped to swell global fur 
markets. Lisa therefore reorganized the Missouri Fur Company as a four-year association 
between himself as the older and more experienced director of field operations—as well 
as the holder of six of the company’s thirty shares—and several younger partners. 170  
                                                             
168 John E. Sunder, Joshua Pilcher: Fur Trader and Indian Agent (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1968), 18-27. 
169 Chittenden devotes an entire chapter to this ill-fated expedition; see Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 2: 
560-583. 
170 Lisa was the only one of the original 1807 Missouri Fur Company stockholders involved in the 1819 
reorganization. His new partners included Lisa’s brother-in-law Thomas Hempstead, Andrew Woods, 
Masonic brothers, Joseph Perkins and Pilcher himself, all four of whom received four shares, Kit Carson’s 
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In the late fall of 1819, Pilcher accompanied Lisa and his wife to Fort Lisa at Council 
Bluffs where, due to rapidly failing health, Lisa restricted his activities to the fort 
throughout the winter of 1819-20. Pilcher meanwhile gained considerable experience that 
winter trading with the Indians in the vicinity of Council Bluffs. He also gradually 
assumed a greater role in directing Missouri Fur Company operations both at the fort and 
in the field, while Thomas Hempstead continued to manage company finances from St. 
Louis. Both of these arrangements remained in force following Lisa’s death in August 
1820 and the drafting by the company’s remaining shareholders of a new four-year 
partnership agreement that took effect in September of that same year.
171
  
Under Pilcher’s able direction, the prospects of the Missouri Fur Company soon 
improved.  First, he authorized the construction of Fort Benton at the mouth of the 
Bighorn River in the fall of 1821 and, somewhat later, the construction of Fort Recovery 
just north of the mouth of White River. The following spring “180 adventurers” under the 
command of St. Louisan Robert Jones and Michael Immel, a former army officer, 
departed St. Charles for the splendid beaver country of the Crows. And, by the fall of 
1822, the company’s prospects brightened even further as the Jones and Immel 
expedition’s harvest of twenty-five thousand dollars worth of furs arrived at St. Louis.172  
In addition to the men attached to Jones and Immel, Pilcher also dispatched three 
hundred traders under William Henry Vanderburgh, Moses Carson, Lucien Fontenelle, 
and Andrew Drips to the company’s posts on the Missouri. Based largely on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
brother, Moses B. Carson, and John B. Zenoni, each of whom took two shares; the company assigned the 
other four shares later; see Oglesby, Manuel Lisa, 172-173; Sunder, Joshua Pilcher, 29; Paul C. Phillips, 
“William Henry Vanderburgh: Fur Trader,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 30 (December 1943): 
381.   
171 Sunder, Joshua Pilcher, 30-33. 
172 Ibid., 36; Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 146-147. 
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perception of Pilcher’s high moral character and ethical field practices, the Missouri Fur 
Company’s good business reputation and sound credit rating allowed Hempstead, by 
posting a $5,000 bond, both to renew the company’s trading license and to ship trade 
goods from St. Louis to Council Bluffs first before shipping them on to more distant 
posts.
173
 Thus stocked, the company’s traders collected $42,000 worth of furs before the 
onset of winter.
174
 
But, disaster struck the following year. In the spring of 1823, Jones and Immel and 
more than thirty men left Fort Benton determined to trap the beaver-rich Blackfoot 
country. Later, following a successful spring hunt—the trappers collected some fifty-odd 
packs of beaver—the party headed for the Yellowstone River and Fort Benton.175 Then, 
on the last day of May 1823, forty Blackfoot warriors ambushed the party in a narrow 
pass. The trappers lost most of their equipment, all of their horses and traps, thirty-five 
                                                             
173 See Colonel Henry Atkinson to John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, St. Louis, 30 November 1821; in 
National Archives, Records of the War Department, Office of the Secretary, Letters Received, A-57 (15) 
1821; quoted in Morgan, The West of William H. Ashley, liv. This letter provides a good indication of how 
favorably the United States government viewed Pilcher and the Missouri Fur Company. Referring to a 
previous letter to Calhoun, Atkinson writes: “In the first place, my remarks in that letter were intended to 
apply more particularly to the vendors, or retailers of goods to the Indians than to the principles engaged in 
the trade, and now to state, that the character of the trade has materially changed since the winter of 19-20, 
particularly as it relates to the Missouri Fur Company, one of the principal partners, Mr. Pilcher, who 
manages the business above, and has resided in the Indian country since then, is considered, and as I 
believe in every respect entitled to the highest consideration for integrity & uprightness of character—His 
uniform disposition, as evinced on many occasions, to promote the views of the government in the 
discharge of his duties, as well as observing a strict conformity with the laws regulating intercourse with 
the Indians, are the strongest evidences of his sincerity & intention, to act correctly—and the young men 
engaged as clerks & vendors for the company, many of whom are known to me, have the confidence of the 
community here, and possess intelligence & enterprise.” 
174 Sunder, Joshua Pilcher, 36-37. 
175 Referring to the differences between the trappers’ spring and fall hunts, Hiram Martin Chittenden makes 
clear in a chapter entitled “Characteristic Features of the Fur Trade,” in American Fur Trade, 1: 41-42, that 
“[f]ew terms are more familiar in the nomenclature of the fur trade than spring and fall hunts [italics in the 
original]. Most of the beaver fur was taken in these two seasons. In the summer the fur was not in good 
condition, and the trapper improved this period of enforced inactivity to visit the annual rendezvous or 
some trading post, to settle his accounts for the year, to secure a new equipment, and to return to the theater 
of his approaching fall hunt. In the winter the climate was too severe for work, the peril of travel was 
extreme, the streams were frozen over, and the beaver was hibernating in his lodge. The trapper again made 
a virtue of necessity, selected some safe and sheltered retreat, and whiled away the long and lonely winters 
as best he could. The severity of the winter seemed to add quality to the fur, and skins taken in the spring 
hunts were better than those taken in the fall.” 
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packs of beaver valued at fifteen thousand dollars, seven men killed—including Jones 
and Immel—and four men wounded. The Missouri Fur Company never recovered from 
this setback, although it survived for a few more years under the name “Pilcher and 
Company.” Thereafter, Pilcher confined its operations to the lower Missouri below the 
Omahas.
176
 
Well before this disaster, however, rival firms had begun to threaten Pilcher’s upper 
Missouri operations. First, traders employed by the French Fur Company of 
Bartholomew Berthold, Bernard Pratte, Sr., and Pierre Chouteau, Jr., abruptly challenged 
the Missouri Fur Company for control of the Indian trade—particularly the Sioux trade 
with the construction of Fort Lookout [Fort Kiowa] just north of Fort Recovery—all 
along the upper Missouri from Council Bluffs to the Mandan villages.
177
 Second, the 
American Fur Company had at last established its Western Department at St. Louis, 
having both removed a major source of government interference with the disbanding of 
the United States factory system and by commencing negotiations for a business 
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association with one of the more successful and powerful St. Louis outfits, David Stone 
and Company or, alternatively, Stone, Bostwick and Company.
178
  Third, the new 
partnership of Andrew Henry and William H. Ashley threatened the Missouri Fur 
Company from two different and somewhat unanticipated directions: the new partners 
planned to compete with Hempstead in St. Louis for boats and supplies; and, by 
dispatching brigades of free-ranging trappers in the mountains to harvest furs under 
contract to Henry and Ashley, they hoped to eliminate the need for the type of fur trade 
system characterized by fixed trading posts manned by company employees dependent 
for their returns upon Indian trappers.
179
 And, fourth, the Columbia Fur Company 
emerged as a formidable competitor along the Missouri River from Council Bluffs to the 
Mandan villages. 
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III 
The Columbia Fur Company formed out of the wreckage left by the fusion of the 
Hudson’s Bay Company with the North West Company in 1821—an amalgamation 
ordered by the British crown for the purpose of ending the long-standing and mutually-
ruinous competition between the two companies. One result of that merger was that many 
of their employees had been released from service, a development which inspired Joseph 
Renville to induce a number of the more experienced men to join with him in forming a 
new fur-trading company. In the years leading up to the War of 1812, Renville had been 
one of the British traders operating out of a post located south of the Canadian border 
along the Red River of the North. Although he later served honorably as a British officer 
during that war, Renville’s subsequent return to United States territory and his Red River 
post initially cost him financially as the crown refused veterans their pensions if they left 
Canadian soil. Nevertheless, Renville had positioned himself admirably to enter the 
American fur trade along with the experienced traders who accepted his offer: Kenneth 
McKenzie, William Laidlaw; Honore Picotte, James Kipp, and J. P. Tilton.
180
 
Attempting to circumvent a United States law of 1816 that prohibited foreign 
nationals from participating in the fur trade, the partners invited an American named 
Daniel Lamont to join their new firm and, although they legally titled it Tilton and 
Company, the name Columbia Fur Company attached itself to the concern almost from 
the beginning.
181
 The company began operations in 1822 with very little capital. But 
while Chittenden explains its ultimate success on “the bold, experienced, and enterprising 
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men [who] rapidly extended their trade over a wide tract of country,” Phillips accounts 
for the company’s success by focusing on financing. He believes that, because obtaining 
credit from John Jacob Astor and the “hostile” American Fur Company was unlikely, the 
St. Louis-based importing business of Collier and Powell advanced trade goods to the 
Columbia Fur Company for the coming year to retaliate against Astor for his “inroads 
into its [Collier and Powell’s] business.”182 
The Columbia Fur Company commenced its trading ventures in the upper Mississippi 
River valley, but soon thereafter began to extend its reach into the upper Missouri 
country. In its first year of operation, the company located its most important supply 
depot at Lake Traverse between the St. Peter’s (Minnesota) River and the Red River of 
the North. Additionally, the firm maintained two subsidiary posts in the upper Mississippi 
country: one at Prairie du Chien on the Mississippi River; and a second stand on the 
western shore of Lake Michigan at Green Bay. Then in 1823, two of the partners, James 
Kipp and J. P. Tilton, built a trading house for the Mandans on the south shore of the 
Missouri near the future site of Fort Clark. Additionally, Columbia Fur maintained posts 
along the lower stretches of that river at the mouths of the Niobrara, James, and 
Vermillion rivers, as well as one at Council Bluffs. Undoubtedly, however, the most 
important of the firm’s trading establishments was Fort Tecumseh, built slightly above 
the mouth of the Bad (Teton) River in 1822. The company supplied all of its Missouri 
River posts either overland from Lake Traverse or by keelboat from St. Louis.
183
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It is difficult to overstate the importance of the Columbia Fur Company’s Fort 
Tecumseh—predecessor to Fort Pierre—to the history of the Teton Sioux and the 
American fur trade. Fort Tecumseh served as the headquarters of company president 
Kenneth McKenzie from 1822 to 1829. Under his adept management, the fort became the 
major trading center for the Yankton, Yanktonai, and Teton Sioux and the hub of a fur 
trade domain that eventually included the seven Missouri River trading posts described 
above as well as a number of smaller winter trading places.
184
 
Although no records of Fort Tecumseh’s original dimensions survive, Columbia Fur 
Company employees undoubtedly constructed it in accordance with the general 
characteristics of early fur trade forts—including those of Fort Pierre and Fort Laramie—
as described by Chittenden. He first notes that “their primary purpose was trade, but in a 
land of savage and treacherous inhabitants they served the purpose of protection as well. 
Their construction was therefore adapted to both ends.” He then provides a physical 
description of the forts’ defenses:  
The ground plan of the typical trading post was always a rectangle, sometimes 
square, but generally a little longer in one direction than another. The sides 
varied in length from one to four hundred feet . . . [and] to ensure protection 
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the fort was enclosed with strong walls of wood or adobe. The typical fort was 
protected by wooden palisades or pickets varying from twelve to eighteen feet 
high and from four to eight inches thick. [A] plank walk was bracketed to the 
inside of the pickets about four feet below the top so that sentinels could walk 
there and observe the ground outside. In case of attack the defenders could 
mount this walk and fire over the palisades or through the loopholes provided 
for the purpose. The main reliance for defense consisted of two bastions, or 
blockhouses, as they were commonly called, placed at diagonally opposite 
corners of the fort. They were square in plan, fifteen to eighteen feet on a side, 
with two stories, and were generally covered with a roof. The lower floor was 
a few feet above the level of the ground and was loopholed for the small 
cannon which all the more important posts possessed. Above the artillery floor 
was another for the musketry defense with about three loopholes on each 
exposed face. The blockhouse stood entirely outside the main enclosure, its 
inner corner joining the corner of the fort so that it flanked two sides; that is 
the defenders in each bastion could fire along the outer face of the two sides 
of the fort and thus prevent any attempt to scale or demolish the walls. A 
“fort” thus constructed was really very strong and was practically impregnable 
to an enemy without artillery.
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Chittenden finally remarks that “the garrison could look with indifference upon any 
attack, however formidable, so long as they used reasonable precaution and were 
supplied with provisions and ammunition. There is no record of a successful siege of a 
stockaded fort in the entire history of the fur trade west of the Mississippi.”186 
As vital as the forts’ defensive capabilities were to successful field operations, the fur 
companies’ profits depended upon how well their forts facilitated trade. Thus, Chittenden 
also notes that with the “necessary prerequisite of defense having been satisfied, the other 
arrangements of the fort related to the purposes of trade.” And, he continues: 
The entrance was through a strong and heavy door provided with a wicket 
through which the doorkeeper could examine a person applying for 
admittance. In the more elaborate posts there was a double door, with a room 
and a trading counter between them. The Indians were admitted only to this 
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space for the purposes of trade. In the single-door posts trading was 
sometimes conducted through the wicket when there was a suspicion if 
danger. On the opposite side of the enclosure from the entrance stood the 
house of the burgeois [chief executive] usually the most pretentious building 
in the post. Nearby stood the office and the house of the clerks. Along one 
side of the quadrangle stood the barracks of the engages [manual laborers] 
while across the square were the storehouses for the merchandise, provisions, 
furs, and peltries. There were also buildings for shops, of which the 
blacksmith shop was most important. A fur press was a necessary part of the 
establishment. The buildings usually stood with their back walls on the line of 
the enclosure and for the distance covered by them they sometimes replaced 
the pickets. In the center of the enclosure was a large square court in which 
ordinarily stood a piece of artillery trained upon the entrance, and a flag staff 
from which the ensign of the republic daily floated to the prairie breeze.
187
 
 
Having thus detailed the forts’ interior structures, along with their functions and 
highly efficient placement, Chittenden then describes the areas immediately surrounding 
the forts: 
Close to the fort, and itself protected by a strong enclosure, with a 
communication through the walls of the fort, there was often to be found a 
small field in which common vegetables were raised for the garrison.
188
 Then 
there was always some protection for the horses which were the great object 
of the Indian forays. Sometimes the corral was outside and close to the fort; 
but in many cases the stock was brought within the walls. On the plains 
around the post there was scarcely ever absent the characteristic tent of the 
Indian, and at certain seasons they were scattered by hundreds in every 
direction. Near most of the larger river posts there was some spot selected 
where timber was abundant at which the pickets and lumber for the post were 
manufactured, the mackinaw boats and canoes built, and such other work 
done as the establishment required. The description[s] given above [apply] 
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188 For additional information about the gardens maintained at nineteenth-century fur trade posts see David 
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only to the larger posts. There were besides a great number of smaller posts, 
which were intended for temporary occupancy only and were accordingly of a 
much less pretentious character. In many cases the resources of the traders did 
not permit of anything except the most primitive structures. Generally these 
posts or houses were simply log buildings, perhaps two or three huddled 
together, but often only one.
189
 
 
In a final passage that suggests one of the key factors for the material dependence of 
the Western Sioux on the American fur trade that developed beginning in the 1820s—
specifically, their ability to acquire Euro-American trade goods at numerous locations 
throughout the Tetons’ expanding domain—Chittenden explains:  
In the Upper Missouri country the smaller posts were not independent 
establishments but were connected with some larger post from which they 
received supplies, equipment, and men and to which they sent the produce of 
their trade. [Fort] Union and [Fort] Pierre are the most prominent examples of 
the larger posts, to each of which there were connected a number of smaller 
establishments.
190
     
 
From its inception, the Columbia Fur Company’s profits from its upper Missouri 
posts derived principally from the buffalo robe trade; and, beginning in the 1820s, one of 
its first concerns was to encourage the Indians’ production of tanned buffalo robes. Prior 
to that decade, however, Missouri River traders had not traded for them in appreciable 
quantities once the French had quit making cloth out of buffalo wool in the final years of 
the eighteenth century; nor was there a domestic American market for them in New York 
or elsewhere. Even as late as 1826, the accounts of the American Fur Company’s 
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Western Department indicate no purchases of buffalo robes, although Astor’s associates 
at Stone, Bostwick and Company may have acquired enough robes to satisfy the local St. 
Louis market.
191
   
The advent of the Columbia Fur Company on the upper Missouri, however, coincided 
with an expanding market for buffalo robes in the cities of the Atlantic seaboard; and that 
market continued to flourish until the near-extinction of the bison in the late nineteenth 
century. Charles E. Hanson, Jr., in his capacity as Director of the Museum of the Fur 
Trade, Chadron, Nebraska, and writing of the period from 1834 to 1849, laments that “it 
is still difficult for those with only a casual interest in the fur trade to realize that the trade 
we are talking about [i.e., fur trade activities in the Fort Laramie region] was primarily 
the [buffalo] robe trade. The medium of exchange was the winter skin of the cow buffalo 
expertly Indian-tanned and sent east for use as sleigh and carriage robes and bed 
coverings.”192 And, fur trade scholar Paul L. Hedren somewhat more pointedly addresses 
several myths that have become deeply embedded in the popular imagination: 
One of the unshakable modern beliefs about the American fur trade is that this 
was the near exclusive realm of a small band of hearty adventurers who, 
outfitted in gay, Indian-like regalia, plied keen mountain skills in chilled but 
captivatingly beautiful high valleys, trapping for beaver and other furs, and 
earning a modest profit that always was blindly dissipated at a boisterous 
summer rendezvous. Such a great embellishment is built upon kernels of truth, 
and right or wrong, stretched fact or not, it fires the public imagination. 
Sometimes, of course, popular notions get shattered by reality, both at the 
hands of historians who staff fur trade historic sites and museums, and by 
books like John E. Sunder’s The Fur Trade on the Upper Missouri, 1840-
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1865. In the high-stakes but potentially high-return western fur trade, the 
steady demand for tanned bison robes supported fur men long after attention 
had shifted from beaver and mountaineers. Moreover, this was an Indian 
trade, conducted at permanent posts on reliable transportation routes, with 
profits determined by the skillful negotiations of agents and clerks wearing 
white shirts, black cravats, and vests, not fringed buckskins [emphasis added]. 
And nowhere was this enterprise more yielding than in the Upper Missouri 
country of Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana.
193
 
 
And, in the upper Missouri country referred to by Hedren, the Columbia Fur Company 
became the first of the major firms to exploit the bison robe trade, while Fort Tecumseh 
functioned as the company’s operational center, and the Teton Sioux emerged as its most 
important producers and consumers.  
IV 
By May 1822, John Jacob Astor, American Fur Company agent Ramsay Crooks, and 
their political ally, Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton, had at last succeeded in 
pressuring Congress to eliminate the United States factory system for trading with the 
Indians.
194
 Established in 1796 both to ensure fair trading practices and to assert benign 
political influence with the nation’s free-ranging Indian tribes, private trading companies 
had bitterly opposed the factory system.
195
 In his survey of it, scholar Royal B. Way 
captures its tragic legacy in this incisive passage: 
This early effort of the government to assume its social responsibilities, 
however, must always be commendable. The popular failure to support the 
government in its undertaking to control the heartless commercial 
individualism of its citizens is easily understood by any student of western 
American history, but is none the less regrettable. Because of it the 
government had to turn to new methods of dealing with the Indian question, to 
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be met at every turn with the opposition of a mercenary public opinion which 
insisted, to a shameful degree, upon the prostitution of the Indian service for 
personal and partisan advantages.
196
 
 
With this lone element of public competition removed from the Indian trade, the 
American Fur Company moved swiftly to challenge the remaining privately-owned firms 
already operating on the upper Missouri.  
Although the business maneuvers orchestrated by Crooks and Astor in the founding 
of the American Fur Company’s St. Louis-based Western Department are outside the 
scope of this study, the fact that it firmly established itself in that city in 1822 is critical to 
understanding the Company’s eventual domination of the upper Missouri fur trade.197 For 
only from St. Louis could the Company have first penetrated and then gradually 
dominated that trade.  The result of an administrative reorganization that shaped the 
upper Missouri fur trade for the duration of its existence, beginning in 1822, American 
Fur Company posts on the Missouri, lower Mississippi, and Illinois Rivers came under 
the purview of the Western Department directed by Samuel Abbott, while the Northern 
                                                             
196 Way, “United States System for Trading with the Indians,” 235. 
197 Nevertheless, excerpts of two letters written by John Jacob Astor’s principal business agent in the 
American Fur Company, Ramsay Crooks, reveal much about his—and by extension, his company’s—
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reprinted in Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 320-321.  
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Department, managed by Robert Stuart from his headquarters at Michilimackinac, 
controlled all of the Great Lakes and upper Mississippi River posts.
198
  
In the years immediately following the establishment of its Western Department, the 
American Fur Company began to eliminate its competition by using either one or the 
other of two well-tested methods: the first involved negotiating with a rival firm for the 
purpose of eventually incorporating it, the second required that the AFC accept short-
term losses to undercut industry prices and drive the opposition from the field. After 
1823, the American Fur Company’s competition on the upper Missouri primarily 
included the firms of Stone, Bostwick and Company (or David Stone and Company), the 
French Fur Company (or Berthold, Pratte and Chouteau; later, Bernard Pratte and 
Company), and the Columbia Fur Company (also referred to as the “English Company”). 
For these principal rivals on the upper Missouri, the American Fur Company employed 
the former method. As for the Missouri Fur Company, from 1823 until its demise, the 
firm limited its trade to tribes along the lower Missouri under the name Pilcher and 
Company—and Crooks, therefore, no longer considered it a threat—while new partners 
Andrew Henry and William H. Ashley confined their field operations to the Central 
Rockies and, thus, did not interfere or compete with trade along the upper Missouri.
199
 
Stone, Bostwick and Company succumbed first. In a letter dated 8 February 1823 
Crooks wrote to Stuart from New York that, as of 1 April 1823, Stone, Bostwick and 
Company would be responsible for managing the Western Department at St. Louis for a 
period of three-and-one-half years, assisted by both Abbott and Crooks. Stuart, who was 
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to “take charge of the Detroit Department,” subsequently wrote to David Stone 
welcoming his firm into the American Fur Company and suggesting that “if the junction 
had been formed five years ago, there would have been cause for mutual 
congratulations.”200 
The agreement with Stone, Bostwick and Company expired on 1 October 1826, and, 
although Crooks extended it for one year, Astor, long dissatisfied with that company’s 
desultory performance and suspicious of Stone and Bostwick’s conduct, bought out its 
contract and transferred management of the Western Department to the French Fur 
Company of Bartholomew Berthold, Bernard Pratte, and Pierre Chouteau, Jr.—with 
Chouteau as chief agent—effective 1 January 1827.201 Paul C. Phillips explains how 
Chouteau later earned the respect of both Crooks and Astor by either eliminating or 
absorbing into the Western Department all but one of its St. Louis rivals: 
 With Bernard Pratte was associated Pierre Chouteau, Jr., a third-generation 
descendant of the St. Louis Chouteaus. Chouteau, in his new role as trader and 
with the support of Pratte and his fortune, soon attained unusual prestige. It 
was he who managed trade with the Otos and Sioux, from whom he purchased 
great quantities of beaver skins and buffalo robes. So successful was he that 
during the seasons of 1825-26 and 1826-27, Pratte and Company obtained 
one-half the skins brought to St. Louis. With the rise of this company, the 
other small concerns that had been trading at St. Louis passed out of 
existence. Some of the members joined Pratte’s organization and became 
prominent in affairs of the Western Department.
202
  
 
By late 1827, therefore, the only serious threat to Crooks and Astor’s interests remaining 
on the upper Missouri was the Columbia Fur Company with its principal establishment at 
Fort Tecumseh. In a letter to Ramsay Crooks dated as early as 1826, Robert Stuart 
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highlighted the threat and then suggested one possible way to neutralize it: “McKenzie & 
Co. [Columbia Fur Company] damage us $5000 annually. I do not know how much to 
offer them to get out for others will come in. Why not employ them as clerks & furnish 
them goods & give them a district?”203 Crooks eventually adopted Stuart’s solution.  
V 
Sioux winter counts for the year 1823-24 record the episode that ushered in a new era 
in the American fur trade—the Arikara campaign of 1823. Its consequences were many: 
it reinforced the good relations that had developed between the Western Sioux and 
American fur traders; it precipitated the simultaneous expansion of both groups further 
west; and it implanted feelings of contempt among the Indians for the United States 
government and its army that persisted for decades. The counts tell of “whites and 
Dakotas fight[ing] the Rees [Arikaras]”; of “white soldiers [making] their first 
appearance in the region”; and, that “United States troops fought Ree [Arikara] 
Indians.”204 White accounts of the fight contain more detail, but are no more accurate. 
The United States army first engaged in combat west of the Mississippi River in this 
campaign. The events leading up to it began in May 1823 with the arrival before the 
Missouri River Arikara villages of a trapping and trading expedition commanded by St. 
Louis entrepreneur William H. Ashley. Although he suspected that the Arikaras might be 
in a vengeful mood following the recent loss of two of their warriors following a raid 
downriver on the Missouri Fur Company trading post for the Sioux, Ashley attempted to 
trade with the Arikaras for horses to carry his men on to the Yellowstone country. 
Ignoring the suspicions of seasoned trapper Edward Rose, Ashley negotiated with the 
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Indians throughout the next day. But, at dawn on 2 June the Arikaras attacked his men 
without warning and, in fifteen minutes of fighting, killed all of the trappers’ horses and 
either killed or wounded twenty-three men. Ashley and the survivors retreated 
downstream.
205
  
With his remaining men safely encamped on an island in the Missouri, Ashley 
dispatched Jedediah Smith to the Yellowstone to inform the general’s partner, Andrew 
Henry, of the disaster; Ashley also sent a message to Indian agent Benjamin O’Fallon at 
Council Bluffs for reinforcements. Colonel Henry Leavenworth, commander of the 
troops at Fort Atkinson, organized a relief force of 220 infantrymen, 2 six-pounder 
cannon, several swivel guns, and 3 keelboats and headed upriver on 22 June. Meanwhile, 
O’Fallon had appointed Joshua Pilcher sub-agent for both the Yankton and Teton Sioux 
during the crisis. Pilcher, still trying to recover from the shock of the Jones and Immel 
catastrophe, outfitted two keelboats, added a five-and-a-half inch howitzer from the fort, 
and overtook Leavenworth on 27 June.
206
 
After a period of reorganization at Fort Recovery, the self-styled Missouri Legion, 
comprising Ashley’s survivors, augmented now by the arrival of Henry and his men, 
Pilcher’ trappers, Leavenworth’s command, and roughly eight hundred Yankton and 
Teton Sioux—making a total of eleven hundred men—finally approached the Arikara 
villages on 9 August. Although the Arikaras fielded anywhere from six to eight hundred 
fighting men, they prepared no extraordinary defense measures other than to take refuge 
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inside their fortified towns. The Sioux attacked first, suffering two men killed and seven 
wounded, but killing thirteen of their enemies who had sortied out into the open. With the 
rest of the Missouri Legion approaching, the Arikaras retreated inside their villages while 
the Sioux contented themselves with raiding the Arikaras’ cornfields along the river.207  
The Missouri Legion, minus its Indian auxiliaries, resumed the attack the next 
morning supported by artillery. The Arikaras, however, put up a surprisingly stiff defense 
against long odds, a defense that discouraged Leavenworth enough that he suspended the 
attack and offered to parley. Over the course of the next two days, Leavenworth 
negotiated a treaty with the Arikaras requiring only that they return Ashley’s property 
taken in the fight on 2 June and recognize American sovereignty on the Missouri.  
The campaign thus ended badly for all parties involved. Ashley and Pilcher and their 
men, believing the siege should have ended favorably—thereby resurrecting their 
fortunes—bitterly denounced Leavenworth as inept and a coward. The Arikaras 
interpreted Leavenworth’s moderation as weakness and continued thereafter to interfere 
with Americans on the Missouri, a situation that persisted even though continued 
harassment by the Tetons eventually forced the Arikaras to abandon their upper Missouri 
villages and endure a twelve-year hiatus among their southern relatives, the Skidi 
Pawnees. And the Sioux, thoroughly disgusted with the army’s dismal performance, 
afterward felt nothing but contempt for the United States government and its armed 
forces, an attitude that would persist for decades.
208
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VI  
While American fur companies were largely absent from the upper Missouri country 
throughout the five-to-seven-year period immediately following the Treaty of Ghent, 
French entrepreneurs from St. Louis, operating according to well-established patterns 
dating back to the eighteenth century, moved swiftly to take advantage of that 
interruption in the American fur trade. Beginning with the post on Cedar Island founded 
by Registre Loisel in 1809 until the construction of Fort LaFramboise on the Fort Pierre 
Plain in 1817, the French dedicated their efforts to securing the Teton trade in furs—
trading initially for the smaller and finer furs such as beaver, otter, mink, and muskrat 
and, later, for buffalo robes as the newly-mounted Western Sioux occupied the rich 
buffalo ranges west of the Missouri River. And, enterprising French fur traders continued 
to participate actively in the upper Missouri fur trade as the Americans struggled to 
reestablish themselves there. 
Although Manuel Lisa’s death in 1820 had briefly suspended the Missouri Fur 
Company’s return to active operations along the upper Missouri, several favorable 
political and economic developments beginning in 1819 encouraged his able successor, 
Joshua Pilcher, to continue Lisa’s initiatives, albeit with mixed success. Pilcher 
constructed two new fixed posts at the mouths of the Bighorn and White Rivers that 
reopened trade with the Crows and Tetons, respectively, and sent several hundred 
trappers into the beaver-rich Three Forks country. Unfortunately, however, a number of 
unanticipated setbacks—including the rise of stiff competition, the death of two of his 
most trusted lieutenants, and the loss of thousands of dollars worth of furs—finally forced 
Pilcher to dissolve the Missouri Fur Company. Following so closely upon Lisa’s death, 
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Pilcher’s decision marked the end of one era in the American fur trade and the beginning 
of another.  
One of the more prosperous of the new firms on the upper Missouri proved to be the 
Columbia Fur Company. Created in 1822 by a group of experienced traders who 
suddenly found themselves unemployed following the forced merger of the Hudson’s 
Bay and Northwest Companies, the Columbia Fur Company moved quickly to capture 
the upper Missouri buffalo robe trade with seven fixed posts anchored by Fort Tecumseh 
located at the mouth of Bad (Teton) River. The Western Sioux soon became the 
company’s most important trading partners.   
In contrast to the Rocky Mountain fur trade that, at least throughout the 1820s and 
1830s, depended on harvesting beaver and on the mountain rendezvous, the principal 
items of exchange in the upper Missouri country during the same period were buffalo 
robes and hides—commodities produced almost exclusively by the Western Sioux and 
the other buffalo-hunting tribes of the north, central, and southern Great Plains. The 
buffalo robe trade was, therefore, an Indian trade that trade depended upon both the 
Indian hunters’ ability to procure enough bison to exceed the number of animals required 
merely for subsistence and the women’s skill at tanning the robes in a manner that both 
preserved and enhanced their value for trade.  
The nineteenth-century buffalo robe trade, therefore, reinforced a gendered division 
of labor that had prevailed in Teton society from the time of their first buffalo hunts: men 
found and killed the animals; women skinned and dressed the hides and fashioned all of 
the many articles derived from the bison that both sustained their nomadic lifestyle on the 
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plains and effected a revolution in their political economy.
209
 By the nineteenth century, 
that economy reflected profound changes from the Tetons’ eighteenth-century, pedestrian 
modes of procurement and production. 
And to accommodate the nineteenth-century robe and hide trade, fur companies 
constructed larger, permanent forts such as Fort Tecumseh according to a set of semi-
standardized features that included the following: rectangular ground plans, wood or 
adobe walls, pickets and blockhouses for defense, double doors to control entry, houses, 
barracks, shops, and storehouses, and gardens, corrals, lumber and boat yards. Most of 
the smaller posts, however, might consist of no more than a log building or two in which 
to conduct the trade.  
But, then in the spring of 1823, ambitious newcomer to the upper Missouri fur trade, 
William H. Ashley, having led a relief expedition upriver from St. Louis and finding 
himself and his men attacked by the Arikaras opposite their villages, retired downstream 
with the loss of both men and materiel to await assistance. A contingent of United States 
infantry from Fort Atkinson—styled the Missouri Legion, commanded by Colonel Henry 
Leavenworth, and augmented by a sizeable party of trappers and hundreds of Teton and 
Yankton Sioux warriors under their sub-agent Joshua Pilcher—ultimately reinforced 
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Ashley and carried the fight to the Arikaras. In that fight, the first for the army west of the 
Mississippi River, it failed to distinguish itself and set a precedent—with dire 
consequences—for its reputation among the Teton Sioux. As for Ashley and his party, 
disheartened by the difficulties inherent in proceeding by boat up the Missouri—
particularly the lack of support from the army—they purchased horses from the Indians 
and, in a bold move that freed them from the necessity of river navigation and fixed 
posts, proceeded overland toward the central Rockies and fame.  
The following year, Joshua Pilcher answered a series of questions before Congress 
regarding the state of the fur trade in the upper Missouri country. Senator Thomas Hart 
Benton of Missouri, Chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs, had earlier forwarded 
three questions to Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun: (1) “What would be the probable 
expense of moving a military post, of competent strength, to some point between the 
mouth of the Yellow Stone River and the Falls of the Missouri?” (2) “What would be the 
probable amount of appropriation necessary to hold treaties, for the purpose of 
establishing relations of trade and friendship with the Indian tribes beyond the 
Mississippi?” (3) “Whether additional agencies are necessary among those tribes; and if 
so, how many?”210 The details of both the Arikara campaign on the Missouri and 
Blackfoot depredations in the Three Forks region had evidently roused government 
officials to action; and, Pilcher’s testimony would, they hoped, provide the information 
necessary to choose the appropriate courses of action. 
Pilcher first established his credibility with the committee: “Having been engaged in 
the Indian trade for the last four years, on the Missouri river, and its tributary waters, I 
                                                             
210 Senator Thomas H. Benton, Chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs, Senate Chamber, to 
Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, 11 February 1824, 18th Cong., 1st sess., serial set vol. 91, sess. vol. no. 
3-S. Doc. 56, 1. 
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have had an opportunity of becoming acquainted personally, and by information to be 
relied upon, with most of the Indian tribes in all that region beyond the state of Missouri 
as far as the Rocky Mountains.”211 He then proceeded to name the following tribes with 
which he had become “acquainted personally” or had “information to be relied upon”: 
Kansas, Otos, Missouris, Pawnees, Omahas, Poncas, Yanktons, Tetons, Saones, Oglalas, 
Hunkpapas, Yanktonais, Cheyennes, Arikaras, Mandans, Hidatsas, Arapahos, Kiowas, 
Crows, Assiniboins, and Blackfoot. Despite the fact that Pilcher estimated the population 
of all the Sioux in the upper Missouri country at somewhere between 10-12,000 
individuals, he mentioned them only briefly; undoubtedly because, by 1824, they had 
become allied with the United States government and caused little or no trouble.
212
 Not 
surprisingly, however, considering the hostility of the Blackfoot and Arikaras toward 
American fur traders, much of his testimony focused on those two tribes.
213
  
Pilcher continued his testimony with a prescient statement that predicted the 
American fur trade’s future financial returns:  
I would further beg to be indulged in making a few statements, to impress the 
committee with an idea of the value of the Indian trade in the United States. 
The returns of licenses show, that upwards of $600,000 was embarked, last 
year, in the trade; and, if extended into the Rocky Mountains, I should 
suppose that it would employ a capital of three times the amount now 
employed in that trade, for an indefinite term of years to come.
214
 
 
Pilcher then concluded his testimony with statements that, indirectly, affirmed just 
how dependent the Indians of the upper Missouri country had become on an incredible 
                                                             
211 “Mr. Pilcher’s Answers to Questions, put to him by the Committee of the Senate on Indian Affairs,” 18th 
Cong., 1st sess., serial set 91, sess. vol. no. 3-S. Doc. 56, 9. 
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array of Euro-American trade goods and the blacksmiths’ shops necessary to manufacture 
and repair metal trade goods:  
Almost the whole of the articles necessary for this trade can be made in the 
United States. They consist of hardware, comprehending light guns, knives, 
hatchets, axes, hoes, lances, battle-axes, and beaver traps; cottons, 
comprehending checks, stripes, coarse calicoes, handkerchiefs, &c.; woolens, 
comprehending coarse cloths, blankets, flannels; to which may be added, 
tobacco, powder, lead, and many other articles of smaller value. The company 
of which I am a member, has always kept several blacksmiths’ shops in 
operation on the Missouri, for the manufacture of some of the above-
mentioned articles; and at the time of the commencement of hostilities, had 
one at the Mandans, one at the Big Bend of the Missouri, and two forges in 
the neighborhood of the Council Bluffs. The woolen and cotton goods 
particularly, can be made by American manufacturers, of a quality equally as 
well suited to the Indian trade as British goods, with which the Indians are at 
present supplied.
215
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 CHAPTER THREE 
 
 “COMPETITION, CONSOLIDATION, AND EXPANSION: 
 LURE OF THE CENTRAL ROCKIES  
 AND 
 THE RISE OF THE COMPANY,  
 1824-1832” 
I      
The field strategies implemented in the wake of the Arikara campaign of 1823 by the 
fur trade partnership of Andrew Henry and William H. Ashley directly led both to the 
founding of Fort Laramie in 1834 and to the permanent occupation of the Platte River 
valley by the westernmost Teton Sioux from 1834 to 1854. Yet, despite the significance 
of Andrew Henry’s historical legacy to the American fur trade and the exploration of the 
trans-Mississippi West, relatively little is known of his early life. The documentary 
record for his younger years does, however, suggest the later man of action who would 
make such a remarkable impact on the history of the American fur trade.  
Henry was born in York County, Pennsylvania,
216
 between 1773 and 1775 to George 
and Margaret Young Henry, devoted parents who, among other strictures, insisted that 
their son learned to read and write. Their solicitude eventually went too far, however, as 
young Andrew left home permanently at the age of eighteen in protest of his parents’ 
                                                             
216 Although both Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 249; and Louis Houck, History of Missouri, 3 vols. 
(Chicago: R.R. Donnelley & Sons, 1908), 3: 95 record Fayette County, Pennsylvania as Henry’s place of 
birth, Henry biographers Linda Harper White and Fred R. Gowans argue that York County is more likely as 
Henry’s 1805 marriage license “lists him as a native of York County;” see Andrew Henry Papers, Missouri 
History Museum Archives, St. Louis (hereafter Henry Papers); White and Gowans, “Traders to Trappers,” 
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objections to his intended marriage.217 Nothing whatever is known of his activities for the 
next five years. What is certain is that from 1798 to 1800 Henry lived in Nashville, 
Tennessee, the city where he may have met Ashley for the first time. Henry spent two of 
the next three years in Ste. Genevieve in upper Louisiana, returning for one of those years 
to Nashville.
218
 
Physically imposing, Henry was also a spiritual man of good character and wide 
interests. Chittenden describes him as “tall and slender, yet of commanding presence, 
with dark hair and light eyes inclined to blue. He was fond of reading and played the 
violin well. He was not a member of any church, but was a believer in the Christian 
religion. He was evidently a man of acts rather than words and no letter or recorded 
expression of his has come down to us.”219 Henry was a Mason who belonged to 
Louisiana Lodge, No. 109. A principled man with strong convictions and high ideals, he 
once confided to a young miner who worked in “Henry’s Diggings” that “honor and self 
respect were more to be prized than anything else.”220 Henry’s integrity was above 
reproach, and he endeavored to comply with all of his many personal and commercial 
obligations.
221
  
Henry’s business associations prior to his final partnership with William H. Ashley, 
although they provided him with a wealth of practical experience, ultimately proved to be 
                                                             
217 Interview with Mrs. George Henry, Andrew Henry’s daughter-in-law, 1 August 1906, Henry Papers; 
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financial disappointments. By 1806 at the latest, Henry entered into his first partnership 
with Ashley—a joint purchase of 640 acres of land containing a lead mine called 
“Henry’s Diggings” by the partners—in Washington County, Missouri. A year later, 
however, Ashley, intrigued more by manufacturing gunpowder than mining lead, sold his 
half of the property to Henry.
222
 In 1807, he became a second lieutenant in the Cavalry 
Company of the District of Ste. Genevieve, eventually attaining the rank of colonel.
223
 
Henry’s fur trade career began in earnest in 1809 with his acceptance as a full partner in 
the St. Louis Missouri Fur Company.
224
 His leadership qualities apparently surfaced early 
as the company entrusted him from the outset with command of trappers in the field.
225
 
Henry’s experiences with the Missouri Fur Company from 1809 to 1812 convinced him 
that trapping in the mountains would yield greater profits than trading with Indians on the 
Missouri River.
226
 In July 1812, Henry and Ashley both enlisted in the volunteer army. 
Ashley subsequently formed a regiment—the Sixth—in which he served as its lieutenant 
colonel, while Henry became a major in the same regiment and commanded its first 
battalion. In January 1815, the House of Representatives of the Missouri Territory 
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nominated him to the territorial Legislative Council.
227
 Henry’s financial situation 
worsened considerably beginning with the War of 1812. From 1816 to 1821, he found 
himself involved in thirty court cases stemming from his habit of personally guaranteeing 
the debts of others. It was a habit that eventually resulted in his accumulation of an 
enormous debt totaling over $12,000—an obligation that finally forced him to abandon 
lead mining in favor of farming fertile soil along the Black River in Washington County, 
Missouri.
228
 By 1821, opportunities for American fur traders in the upper Missouri 
country had improved so much that the fur trade once again appealed to him as both the 
means to pay off his debts and the chance once again to participate in an endeavor at 
which he had previously excelled.
229
 As Ashley scholar Dale L. Morgan has observed, 
Henry was the one “partner in the old Missouri Fur Company [who] had penetrated to the 
remotest sources of the Missouri and even crossed the continental divide . . . to build a 
post. If anyone was capable of re-establishing the American fur trade on the fabulously 
rich waters of the high Missouri, Andrew Henry appeared to be that man.”230 
In common with his more obscure partner, much of Ashley’s early life remains a 
mystery; what little is known comes from a memorial address given in St. Louis by the 
Rev. W.G. Elliot, Jr., shortly after Ashley’s death in 1838:   
Gen. Wm. H. Ashley was born in Virginia, in Chesterfield county, and the 
town of Manchester, A.D. 1785. Of his parentage and early life we know 
almost nothing, except that when he was a child, his family moved to 
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Powhattan county, where he resided until he came West. He seems to have 
had very few advantages of education growing up—as boys in the old 
dominion are often permitted to do,—without any particular trade or 
profession, and left to his own resources and ingenuity, wherewith to carve 
out his fortune in after life. Whatever he learnt, in boyhood and youth, was the 
result of his own seeking, and consisted rather in a practical knowledge of 
men and things, than in an acquaintance with books; and even his 
experimental knowledge must have been of a desultory nature, in consequence 
of his not having his attention directed to any one definite pursuit. It is indeed 
stated that he was for a short time engaged in one of the mechanic arts . . . But 
the connexion . . . must have been brief, for we find that, in about his 20
th
 
year, he emigrated from his native State to the West, which was then, as it is 
now, the great field for enterprise, and offered almost irresistible allurements 
to young men of the Eastern States [emphasis added].
231
  
 
By 1805, Ashley had settled near Andrew Henry in Ste. Genevieve, where the two 
men soon became friends.
232
 In December of that year, Ashley served as witness to 
Henry’s marriage to Marie Villars—a marriage that, for reasons unknown, lasted a mere 
three weeks.
233
 Morgan describes Ashley as being of “slight of frame and of medium 
height, with a thin face, prominent nose and jutting chin, not especially striking in his 
appearance yet a man of distinguished presence. Intelligent and forceful, he inspired 
confidence and respect, and was early made a captain in the Ste. Genevieve militia and a 
justice of the peace for his district.”234 
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From 1806 to 1822, Ashley engaged in several questionable business ventures, while 
simultaneously furthering careers in both the territorial militia and Missouri territorial 
and state politics. Commissioned lieutenant colonel of the Sixth Regiment of Washington 
County in 1814, by 1819, he was the regiment’s colonel, and, by 1822, he had become its 
brigadier general. In the wake of his brief lead-mining partnership with Henry beginning 
in 1806, Ashley manufactured powder and shot, later engaging in both surveying and real 
estate promotion.  Shortly after Ashley had presided over the first session of the Missouri 
Senate, he became the new state’s first lieutenant governor in the same election in which 
his friend, Thomas Hart Benton, became Missouri’s governor. Although Ashley’s 
political fortunes steadily improved throughout this period, his business ventures prior to 
entering the fur trade were largely financial disasters that left him “nearly one hundred 
thousand dollars in debt” and nearly bankrupt.235 
The last of the business partnerships formed by Henry and Ashley dates from the 
summer of 1821
236—an entrepreneurial arrangement destined to exploit the previously 
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untapped wealth in furs of the Central Rocky Mountains, to restructure many of the field 
strategies utilized by American fur traders from 1825 to 1840, and to lead indirectly to 
the permanent occupation of the Platte River Valley by the westernmost bands of Teton 
Sioux. In assessing their enterprise, fur trade scholar Richard M. Clokey concludes: 
The partnership was an ideal blending of skills and experience, reinforced by 
twenty years of friendship. Although the precise terms of agreement were 
never made public, it was clear that Henry was to be the partner in the field. 
His historic trip across the Rocky Mountains to the Columbia River and back 
during the winter of 1810-11 endowed him with unexcelled knowledge of the 
region and revealed an inherent courage and ingenuity at the same time. By 
the summer of 1821, Henry was ready to gamble everything on a return up the 
Missouri and his ten-year-old dream of fortune in the fur trade. Ashley’s role 
in the partnership was equally suited to his capabilities, for he was to manage 
the details of organization, financing, and marketing in St. Louis and the East. 
He had never before been involved in the fur trade, but his years of 
merchandising lead in southeast Missouri had not only acquainted him with 
the problems of supply, transportation, and marketing in the wilderness but 
also taught him to analyze the business of resource development. By June or 
July of 1821 the partners had apparently completed their plans and began the 
necessary preparations to put them into action. Trial and error over the 
succeeding years would force some revision, and serious setbacks would 
threaten failure several times, but within five years the two men would 
revolutionize the business of gathering furs as thoroughly as had any men 
since Europeans first introduced it in North America more than two centuries 
before.
237
 
 
The innovations alluded to by Clokey include the exclusive reliance on trappers under 
contract to Henry and Ashley, the abandonment of fixed trading posts, and their 
substitution by the rendezvous system of procurement and supply.  
The most famous want ad in the history of the American fur trade appeared in the 13 
February 1822 edition of the St. Louis Missouri Gazette & Public Advertiser:  
 TO 
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 Enterprising Young Men 
The subscriber wishes to engage ONE HUNDRED MEN, 
to ascend the river Missouri to its source, there to be 
employed for one, two, or three years.—For particulars 
enquire of Major Andrew Henry, near the Lead Mines, in 
the County of Washington, (who will ascend with, and 
command the party) or to the subscriber at St. Louis. 
 
  Wm. H. Ashley 
238
 
 
As there was no shortage of “enterprising young men” in the city of St. Louis in 1822, 
the response to the ad was prompt, many of the respondents eager to leave their relatively 
comfortable circumstances for the hazards of the wilderness.
239
 The partners had decided 
to make for the Three Forks of the Missouri—an area overflowing with a “wealth of furs 
not surpassed by the mines of Peru”—and dividing their party so that forty or fifty men 
might travel overland while the rest would proceed upriver by keelboat. 
240
 Henry 
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commanded this three-year trapping expedition, working all “the streams on both sides of 
the mountains in that region and very likely penetrat[ing] to the mouth of the 
Columbia.”241 
Henry departed St. Louis for the mountains on 3 April 1822 with the first of two 
keelboats that the partners procured.
242
 The upriver journey was relatively uneventful 
until after the expedition passed the Mandan villages. With Henry himself aboard the 
keelboat, it entered a stretch of the river where the channel carried it toward the far shore, 
effectively separating Henry and the boatmen from the land-borne members of the 
expedition. Seizing their opportunity, a number of Assiniboin Indians approached the 
shore party professing friendship but then unexpectedly made off with fifty of their 
horses. Although he had initially planned to press on to the Three Forks and raise a fort 
there before the onset of cold weather, the loss of the horses forced Henry to build it 
instead at the mouth of the Yellowstone. It was there that the expedition eventually spent 
the winter. Meanwhile, the hunters systematically trapped the numerous streams in the 
vicinity of the new post—named Fort Henry in honor of Ashley’s senior partner—while 
Henry acquired more horses.
243
 
The second of Henry and Ashley’s two keelboats, the Enterprize, embarked on 8 May 
1822 under the command of Daniel S.D. Moore. On a windy day later that month, 
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approximately twenty miles below Fort Osage, the boat’s mast unexpectedly snagged an 
overhanging tree and, turning broadside to the current, capsized with the loss of $10,000 
of freight; with great difficulty, the crew made it safely to shore. With no alternative but 
to advise Ashley of the calamity, Moore set off downriver while the men encamped and 
prepared to wait for relief.
244
 
Ashley reacted to Moore’s sudden appearance in St. Louis on 9 July with vigor and 
determination; in the brief span of only eighteen days, he secured another boat and forty-
six additional men. Moore may have declined to accept the responsibility for this latest 
expedition, or else the General was simply unwilling to risk another such disaster; but 
whichever the case, Ashley decided to accompany the boat upriver. After reuniting with 
the men stranded by the loss of the Enterprize, the expedition proceeded upriver past the 
Platte and Council Bluffs to the Grand Detour of the Missouri, location of the Missouri 
Fur Company’s newest post, Cedar Fort or Fort Recovery. A mere dozen miles above it, 
the French Fur Company of Berthold, Pratte, and Chouteau soon raised a fort known 
alternately as Fort Lookout, Fort Kiowa, or Fort Brazeau in honor of the man in charge of 
it, Joseph Brazeau, or “Young Cayewa as the French referred to him.245  
The area surrounding the two forts was Sioux country. Since leaving St. Louis aboard 
the Enterprize, the Teton Sioux were the first Indians Jedediah Smith had seen who 
seemingly remained untouched by Euro-American civilization. Smith observed that, 
compared to other Indians, they were tall, had relatively light complexions, radiated 
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intelligence, and were generally handsome in appearance. He further noted—and Morgan 
believes “this might indicate that no brave had offered the strait-laced young man [i.e., 
Smith] his wife or sister for a bedfellow”—that, morally, the Sioux ranked higher than 
other Indians. Although the Tetons had allied themselves with the United States during 
the War of 1812 and, by 1822, rarely interfered anymore with American trapping parties 
moving up or down the Missouri, Ashley nevertheless prudently smoked the pipe with 
their headmen, afterward dispensing the requisite number of trade goods as presents.
246
  
Ashley’s party arrived at the mouth of the Yellowstone on 1 October 1822, their 
eagerly-awaited appearance cheerfully hailed by Henry and his men with a discharge of 
the fort’s cannon.247 The two friends and partners agreed soon after this heartfelt reunion 
that Ashley should return to St. Louis during the winter to assemble an outfit for the 
following year while Henry would remain at the fort to coordinate the trappers’ fall hunt. 
Henry divided his men into two parties: the first, which he personally accompanied, 
proceeded up the Missouri as far as the Musselshell; and the second, under the command 
of an associate from the partners’ years in Ste. Genevieve, John H. Weber, ascended the 
Yellowstone to the mouth of Powder River. A brief visit to Fort Henry that fall by the 
Missouri Fur Company’s ill-fated “mountain expedition”—forty-three men under 
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Michael Immel and Robert Jones—dramatically illustrated the developing competition 
for the fur riches of the upper Missouri country.
248
   
In the early spring of 1823, Henry sent Jedediah Smith downriver by boat to St. Louis 
with an express urging Ashley to hurry upriver with supplies—particularly horses, a 
sufficient number of which Henry had been unable to procure. Ashley had already 
departed St. Louis on 10 March in two keelboats—the Yellow Stone Packet and The 
Rocky Mountains—when he met up with Smith somewhere below the Arikara villages. 
This site became the scene on 2 June 1823 of “the worst disaster in the history of the 
Western fur trade”249—a sudden attack by Arikara warriors on Ashley’s expedition that 
cost him thirteen men killed and eleven wounded, two mortally, in all, one-sixth of his 
force. 
250
 In the wake of this catastrophe, Ashley, after first dispatching Smith upriver 
with an express for Henry on the Yellowstone, sent the terrified French-Canadian 
engagés to St. Louis in the larger of the boats, while he withdrew downriver to the mouth 
of the Cheyenne River with thirty or so volunteers to wait for reinforcements.
251
 
In the aftermath of the “Aricara Campaign of 1823” that had pitted Colonel Henry 
Leavenworth’s six companies of the United States Sixth Infantry—“The Missouri 
Legion” as he called it—Henry and Ashley’s survivors, a contingent of Missouri Fur 
Company men under the command of Joshua Pilcher, and hundreds of Teton and 
Yankton Sioux warriors all against the heavily-outnumbered Arikaras, the two partners 
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reevaluated their prospects for the coming year.
252
 Their recent financial losses had been 
considerable. Beginning with the theft of seven horses valued at $420, followed by 
$1,540 lost to the Blackfoot in the spring of 1823, and the $2,265 forfeited in the Arikara 
campaign, those losses had added up to the sobering total of $4,225.
253
 Nevertheless, the 
two partners’ prospects for an uncontested return to the mountains appeared excellent. 
First, not only had the Jones and Immel massacre driven the Missouri Fur Company from 
the Yellowstone, that company had largely forsaken its post among the Mandans as well. 
Second, by 1823, the French Fur Company traded no higher than Fort Lookout below the 
Sioux. And finally, although the Columbia Fur Company had firmly established itself at 
Fort Tecumseh on the Fort Pierre Plain, the company traded no farther upriver than the 
Mandan villages—and that trade was minimal.254  
Given these generally favorable circumstances, therefore, Henry and Ashley resolved 
to abandon the Missouri and dispatch two major trapping parties overland. Henry 
personally led the first, which promptly set out for Fort Henry. Upon arrival, however, 
Henry determined that the site was too vulnerable and proceeded with more than a dozen 
trappers up the Yellowstone to the mouth of the Bighorn River where they constructed a 
second Fort Henry. From there, the trappers headed southwest to trap a mountainous 
region claimed by the Crows. The partners’ second expedition headed west from Fort 
lookout under the command of Jedediah Smith in September 1823. Smith’s party later 
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joined Henry’s men at the Crow villages where both groups passed the winter of 1823-24 
in the Wind River Valley.
255
  
That spring the combined expeditions penetrated the Green River country, where they 
discovered an undreamed-of wealth of beaver. It was on his way to Green River that 
Jedediah Smith and his men “discovered” South Pass. Morgan celebrates the discovery as 
“a high moment in American history. Others had traversed South Pass before him, but 
Jedediah Smith’s was the effective discovery, the linking of the pass in the long lines of 
force along which the American people were sweeping to the Pacific.”256 Following a 
successful spring hunt, James Clyman and Thomas Fitzpatrick took the furs to St. Louis, 
leaving the rest of the men free to trap. These somewhat unexpected developments 
convinced Ashley by the fall of 1824 to outfit a supply train for the Central Rockies, 
which would enable his trappers to remain in the mountains year-round. Ashley 
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subsequently delivered the supplies to a pre-determined site in April of 1825 for 
distribution that summer at the first of the American fur trade mountain rendezvous.
257
 
II 
The general unrest that had prevailed among most of the tribes in the upper Missouri 
country even before the outbreak of hostilities in 1812, combined with the armed 
aggression of both the Blackfoot and the Arikaras in 1823, prompted Congress to pass 
legislation the following year that, among other provisions, sanctioned treaties “with the 
Indians beyond the Mississippi.”258 To negotiate those treaties, a primary purpose of 
which was to assert American dominance and power over the region at the expense of its 
Indian inhabitants, President James Monroe authorized General Henry Atkinson and 
Indian agent Benjamin O’Fallon to conduct an expedition across the central and northern 
Plains.
259
 Throughout its duration, the expedition produced a dozen minor treaties, all of 
which the signatories largely disregarded. Only three of those treaties involved the Teton 
Sioux, treaties that represented for most of them their first diplomatic experience with 
American officials.
260
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The United States government had thus responded swiftly to the disturbances in 
Indian country with its authorization of the Atkinson-O’Fallon expedition to negotiate 
treaties with a number of the region’s tribes; and, although it failed to establish American  
hegemony in the upper Missouri country, the expedition did successfully conclude twelve 
treaties, including three with the Teton Sioux. The treaties did not, however, prevent the 
them from continuing their harassment of the Arikaras and forcing those unfortunate 
people to abandon their Grand River villages and head south to join their relatives, the 
Skidi Pawnees, on the lower Missouri—a development that removed the final obstacle to 
westward migration for those bands of Saones that still roamed east of the Missouri 
River. 
The Arikara exodus south from their Grand River villages removed the only 
remaining obstacle to Teton migration west across the Missouri. The last Tetons to make 
the crossing were bands of Saones, mostly Hunkpapa and Blackfoot Sioux, they now 
occupied the hunting grounds flanked by the Cheyenne and Cannonball Rivers so 
recently claimed by the Arikaras. As the 1820s came to a close, therefore, all of the 
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Tetons were west of the Missouri River and strategically positioned for a conquest of the 
central and northern plains.
261
 
The Tetons saw their first steamboat as it carried the Atkinson-O’Fallon expedition 
upriver in the spring and summer of 1825. Eight keelboats accompanied it, all eight fitted 
with hand-powered wheels operated by Colonel Atkinson’s soldiers, laden with trade 
goods, and named after the most important fur-bearing animals of the upper Missouri fur 
trade—Beaver, Buffalo, Elk, Mink, Muskrat, Otter, Raccoon, and White Bear. Charged 
with negotiating treaties between the United States government and a number of Missouri 
River tribes, the expedition eventually signed three treaties with various bands of Sioux: 
the first on 22 June at Fort Lookout with the Brules, Yanktons, and Yanktonais; a second 
treaty on 5 July with the Oglalas, Minneconjous, Sans Arcs, Blackfoot Sioux, and Two 
Kettles; and a third on 16 July at the Arikara villages near the mouth of Grand River with 
the Hunkpapas.
262
 
The expedition’s reports, though abbreviated, nevertheless provide some useful 
information about the approximate locations and population estimates of the Teton Sioux 
in 1825. The Brules, likely numbering three-thousand souls, traded freely at Fort Lookout 
on the Missouri and wandered the lower White River watershed all the way to the Black 
Hills country. The Oglalas, estimated at half that number, likewise roamed clear to the 
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Black Hills, although their principal range encompassed the Bad (Teton) River drainage; 
they traded regularly at Fort Teton, located at the mouth of Bad (Teton) River and, about 
a mile to the north of it, at Fort Tecumseh. The reports listed the Saones, as with the 
Brules, at three-thousand people roving in two groups on either side of the Missouri from 
the mouth of Bad (Teton) River to approximately fifty miles north of Cheyenne River: 
Minneconjous and Sans Arcs lived west of the Missouri and traded at the mouth of the 
Cheyenne; while bands of Hunkpapas, Blackfoot Sioux, and Two Kettles ranged as far 
east as the Minnesota River, although they usually traded on James River.
263
 
If the expedition’s references to the Tetons as a whole are disappointing, the names of 
the four chiefs and four headmen that appear on the Oglala treaty—names that suggest 
four distinct bands—provide invaluable information regarding the disposition of that 
tribe. First, there were the True Oglalas, whose chief, Standing Bull (Tatanynka Najin), 
and their head-warrior, Black Elk, had by this time reestablished that band as preeminent 
among the Oglalas. The names of Shoulder and Lone Bull, chief and head-warrior, 
respectively, of the Shiyo or Sharp-tail Grouse band also appear, although by sometime 
around 1845, it disappeared as a separate entity after joining with the True Oglalas. The 
Kiyuksas, led by Crazy Bear (Mato Witko), emerge as the third band present. The head-
warrior of the Kiyuksas, Bull Bear (Mato Tatanyka), would later become head-chief of 
all the Oglalas. The identity of the fourth band present at the treaty-signing remains a 
mystery. The names of this band’s chief and head-warrior translate as Ghost Heart 
(Wanonrechege) and Mad Shade, respectively. Around the time of the founding of Fort 
Laramie in 1834, these four bands—by that time all followers of Bull Bear—became 
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known as the Bear People. And, just as that chief first led his followers to the Platte River 
valley in that year, several bands of Brules and Saones, including the bands of Chief 
Smoke, Red Water, and Red Cloud’s father—thereafter known as the Smoke People—
broke away and also headed for the Platte, calling themselves Oglalas in the process, and 
eventually forming the other half of that tribe.
264
  
III 
In 1827, John Jacob Astor’s American Fur Company (AFC)—known simply as “The 
Company” in recognition of its dominance of the American fur trade—purchased the 
Columbia Fur Company, renamed it the Upper Missouri Outfit (UMO) with McKenzie 
retained as its chief agent, and made it accountable to the AFC’s Western Department 
headquartered in St. Louis. Also in that same year, the American Fur Company engaged 
Bernard Pratte & Company to manage its Western Department, along with Pierre 
Chouteau, Jr., one of the company’s partners, as chief agent. 
An unusually high Missouri River threatened Fort Tecumseh in the spring of 1831 
and forced Chouteau to order the construction of a new fort on higher ground on the Fort 
Pierre Plain. Christened Fort Pierre in his honor, its builders located it two miles north of 
old Fort Tecumseh with ready access to wood, water, pasture, and most importantly, the 
Missouri River waterway. And, just as they had earlier, first at Fort LaFramboise and 
later at Fort Tecumseh, the Teton Sioux became the foremost trading partners at Fort 
Pierre. It was there that a talented young artist by the name of George Catlin became 
familiar with the Teton Sioux and their increasing dependence on the American fur trade. 
Born on July 26, 1796, in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, Catlin was the fifth of Putnam 
and Polly Catlin’s fourteen children. Putnam had seen service in the Revolutionary War 
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as a fifer. He was a loving father, strict disciplinarian, part-time farmer, and perennial 
office seeker. Putnam’s character, training in the law, and largely unsuccessful attempts 
to secure patronage influenced his son’s life and career.  
George Catlin left home in July 1817 to study law in Litchfield, Connecticut. He 
joined the bar a year later but abandoned his practice after only three years; Donald 
Jackson claims that Catlin “called himself a ‘Nimrodical lawyer’ who would rather fish 
than prepare briefs.”265  In 1821, he moved to Philadelphia to pursue a career in art. The 
promising young artist specialized in miniatures and proved talented enough to win 
election to the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts in 1824.  
That same year, as Catlin saw a delegation of western Indians pass by on a 
Philadelphia street, he experienced a passionate conversion of the spirit. The Indians had 
affected him deeply and the idealistic young artist resolved to devote the rest of his life to 
preserving them forever on canvas. He later wrote: 
In silent and stoic dignity these lords of the forest strutted about the city for a 
few days, wrapped in their pictured robes, with their brows plumed with the 
quills of the war-eagle, attracting the gaze and admiration of all who beheld 
them. The history and customs of such a people, preserved by pictorial 
illustrations, are themes worthy the lifetime of one man, and nothing short of 
the loss of my life shall prevent me from visiting their country and becoming 
their historian.
266
  
 
Some years later, Catlin proposed that the government set aside a large enough tract of 
land to preserve the Indian cultures, flora, and fauna of the West; i.e., a “nation’s park, 
containing man and beast, in all the wildness and freshness of their nature’s beauty. I 
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would ask no other monument to my memory . . . than the reputation of having been the 
founder of such an institution.”267  
At first glance, Catlin’s words appear to have been written by a man well ahead 
of his time, i.e., a man possessed of an expanded—if somewhat romantic—cross-
cultural awareness coupled with an appreciation for resource conservation. But this 
impression is only partially correct; for if Catlin was ahead of his time—and he 
was—he nevertheless remained a product of the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Having made its way across the Atlantic in the early part of that century, the 
Romantic Revolution had transformed American art and literature by the 1830s. The 
works of Byron, Shelley, Keats, and Wordsworth inspired the nature poems of William 
Cullen Bryant, the “noble savage” novels of James Fenimore Cooper, and a new and 
exciting approach to painting styled the Hudson River School. Named for the locale 
where it originated, Hudson River painters pioneered a fresh vision of the American 
wilderness as something of value that Americans should admire and appreciate rather 
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than despise and subjugate. Romantic age literature affected a similar cultural 
appreciation for the Indian inhabitants of that wilderness.
268
  
Yet, for white Americans, the 1830s represented far more than simply a romantic 
interlude in nineteenth-century America. Although the century had begun with the United 
States government negotiating with Indian tribes as sovereign nations, the open hostility 
of President Andrew Jackson to the 1832 decision of Chief Justice John Marshall 
regarding Cherokee territorial claims foreshadowed decades of broken treaties and the 
end of trans-Mississippi Indians as politically-independent peoples. A single word 
expresses American Indian policy throughout that decade: removal. Scholar Brian W. 
Dippie summarizes its intent: “Removal was the ultimate means to an established end. 
Along with other measures passed in the 1830s, it constituted a functioning isolationist 
policy.” The other “measures” included a ban on introducing liquor into Indian country, a 
bill supported by Lewis Cass, Secretary of War, which created the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, and a revision of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802. The rejection by 
Congress of a final “measure” sabotaged the entire concept of Indian isolation. That bill 
would have created the Western Territory as well as a government for the resettled 
natives. Had the bill passed, it would have also provided legal safeguards prohibiting 
white encroachment on Indian lands.
269
 Implicit in this doomed legislation, of course, 
was the assumption that America’s national expansion would halt well before reaching 
the Rocky Mountains. But, unfortunately for the Indians, an essay expressing the 
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prevailing Anglo-American view that there could be no permanent barrier to westward 
expansion appeared in a November 1818 edition of Niles’ Weekly Register.270  
George Catlin seems to have grasped the implications of that view long before most 
of his contemporaries. In fact, Dippie’s attempt to ridicule Catlin’s challenge to the 
United States government to create a “nation’s park” serves instead as a tribute to the 
artist’s prescience: “In the 1830s George Catlin could still wander around the far western 
‘fairy land’ and dream of a permanent wilderness reserve where the Indians and the 
buffalo might live wild and free, but his fantasy, like the whole mirage of isolation as a 
long-term solution, evaporated before the expansionist energies of the next decade.”271 
Contemporary Southern Cheyenne W. Richard West offers a more generous appraisal of 
Catlin’s vision: 
Seen in the larger context of his time and place . . . he becomes far more 
appealing as being in many ways exceptional for his time. Whatever racist 
notions of the day may have been embedded in his imagination, Catlin placed 
great value on Indians and their cultures, revealing genuine concern at how 
they were being systematically stressed or destroyed by non-Indians. No artist 
could so passionately pour himself into his work the way Catlin did without 
having sincere respect and affection for the subjects of his work.
272
 
 
Ironically, the years between 1831 and 1837 during which Catlin traveled among, 
lived with, and sympathetically painted hundreds of western Indians were also years 
during which the United States government forcibly removed tens of thousands of eastern 
Indians from their ancestral homes and resettled them on less-desirable lands west of the 
Mississippi River—episodes brutally punctuated by the Trail of Tears and the Black 
                                                             
270 “The American Aborigines,” Niles’ Weekly Register (Baltimore), 14 November 1818, quoted in Dippie, 
The Vanishing American, 72. 
271 Dippie, The Vanishing American, 72. 
272 Quoted in Dippie et al., Catlin and His Indian Gallery, 21. 
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Hawk War. If the decade of the 1830s overflowed with contradictions, George Catlin 
certainly belonged to his age.
273
 
IV 
In recognition of his growing talent, Catlin had, by 1826, won election to the newly-
founded and prestigious National Academy of Design. The following year, he moved to 
New York City and became an accomplished portrait painter. Perhaps because his duel 
status as a member of both the Pennsylvania and National Academies contributed to his 
financial security and to the recognition of his peers, Catlin next took the first tentative 
step toward the fulfillment of his dream to journey throughout the trans-Mississippi west 
and paint its Indian inhabitants—a visit to the newly-created Indian reservations in 
western New York state, exploring and sketching as a prelude to his western travels.
274
  
By 1830, Catlin apparently felt himself prepared for his new career. Leaving behind 
his wife, his home, and a successful career as a portrait artist, he set out for St. Louis, 
                                                             
273 Over time, the literature on Catlin has reflected these contradictions. Prior to the 1970s, historians 
generally cast the artist in a positive light. For instance, Bernard DeVoto wrote in 1947 that Catlin “was an 
extraordinary man, a man with a certain greatness in him; his work is notable and his life was picturesque;” 
see Bernard DeVoto, Across the Wide Missouri (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947), 393. In 1948, Loyd 
Haberly claimed that Catlin was one of America’s great native painters and a great man who “as sincerely 
and unreserved as a mortal can, devoted himself to the Indian cause;” see Loyd Haberly, Pursuit of the 
Horizon: A Life of George Catlin Painter and Recorder of the American Indian (New York: Macmillan, 
1948), 235. And Harold McCracken, writing in 1959, gushed that the artist’s long career “entitles George 
Catlin to a place of distinction among the most extraordinary men of the nineteenth century;” see Harold 
McCracken, George Catlin and the Old Frontier (New York: The Dial Press, 1959), 13. But beginning in 
the 1960s, scholars began to reexamine the concept of race and its significance to American history. This 
reevaluation of the historical experiences of Asians, Africans, and American Indians resulted in a wide 
range of fresh interpretations. A new wave of western historians represented by Patricia Nelson Limerick, 
William Cronon, Richard White, and Donald Worster sought nothing less than a redefinition of western 
history freed from the “intellectual straitjacket” of the long-standing thesis first advanced by Frederick 
Jackson Turner; see Ronda, Lewis and Clark among the Indians, xi-xii. Catlin’s legacy suffered in the 
backlash of this more critical, less-accepting interpretive approach. The unqualified praise of earlier 
commentators yielded to the more balanced treatments of historians writing a “New Western History.” For 
example, Brian W. Dippie describes Catlin as a “traveler, author, showman, entrepreneur, crackpot theorist, 
inventor, treasure hunter, rhinologic pioneer, extrovert, recluse, mendicant, expatriate, proud American 
original, and an artist of unconventional but commanding gifts;” see Brian W. Dippie, Therese Thau 
Heyman, Christopher Mulvery, Joan Carpenter Troccoli, ed., George Catlin and His Indian Gallery, with a 
preface by Elizabeth Broun and introduction by W. Richard West (Smithsonian American Art Museum: 
W.W. Norton, 2002), 27.    
274 Dippie, et al., Catlin and His Indian Gallery, 29-30. 
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“Gateway to the West.” Upon his arrival, Catlin announced himself to General William 
Clark, co-leader of the famed Lewis and Clark Expedition of 1803-1806 and then 
governor of Missouri Territory. As governor, Clark used his unique position to assist the 
artist in embarking upon his new vocation. For instance, individual members of the 
Indian delegations that frequently came to St. Louis to parley with Clark often stood for 
their portraits, thus allowing the determined artist gradually to perfect his techniques. 
Following the summer of 1831, after Catlin had accompanied Clark on a diplomatic 
mission to the Sioux, Iowa, Missouri, and Sauk and Fox Indians and a jaunt up the 
Missouri River, the artist could feel with some justification that his western travels had at 
last begun.
275
  
According to Catlin’s own family, 1832 was his “big year.” Although he would make 
several more journeys at various times from 1833 to 1837, he never surpassed, in quantity 
and quality, the artwork he produced in 1832.
276
 The buffalo-hunting tribes of the upper 
Missouri provided Catlin with the most dramatic and outstanding examples of the free, 
wild, and unconquered nomadic hunters and warriors of the northern plains. From Fort 
Pierre at the mouth of Bad (Teton) River to Fort Union at the mouth of the Yellowstone, 
the artist executed the portraits, ceremonies, hunts, village scenes, and landscapes of that 
vast area’s Teton Sioux, Blackfoot, Assiniboin, Ojibwa, Crow, and Plains Cree tribes.277 
Counting his paintings of these and other tribes along the upper Missouri, most notably 
the Mandans, Catlin’s artistic output over an 86 day period resulted in 135 drawings that 
included 36 views of Indian life, 25 landscapes, and 8 hunting scenes. The remainder 
                                                             
275 Getlein, Lure of the West, xii.  
276 Marjorie Catlin Roehm, The Letters of George Catlin and His Family: A Chronicle of the American 
West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 65.  
277 George Catlin, North American Indians, ed. and with an introduction by Peter Matthiessen (New York: 
Viking, 1989), xii.  
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comprise a remarkable series of portraits of both men and women that faithfully capture 
the grace, dignity, and character of the artist’s proud models.278 
Catlin practiced the techniques of outdoor painting a full generation ahead of the 
artists normally associated with it—the French Impressionists. Thirty years before the 
Barbizon painters, he experimented with methods that allowed him to capture on canvas 
the wilderness landscapes of his travels illuminated in their natural light. He painted in 
his camps on the plains and along the rivers. He often painted while gently drifting in a 
canoe and even—according to the artist—from the back of a horse. Catlin restricted 
himself to very few colors. He pre-painted his canvases with a neutral blue for the sky, a 
somewhat hazy horizon line, and a neutral green for the grassy plains. With his 
backgrounds largely filled in, he would then add the natural features, Indians, and 
wildlife as they appeared. Two of his paintings, Buffalo Hunt Under the Wolf-Skin Mask 
and A Bird’s-Eye View of the Mandan Village are classic examples of these skillfully-
employed techniques.
279
 Catlin used elevated viewpoints, which allowed him to suggest 
the vastness of the grassy plains. A fine example of this approach painted by the artist in 
1832, River Bluffs, 1320 miles Above St. Louis, dramatically renders a line of sunlit bluffs 
along the upper Missouri by capturing the “beautiful clear-cut outlines of [those] billowy 
slopes”—the result of fires deliberately set by the Indians to control tree growth. But 
Catlin’s art anticipated more than just the techniques of the French Impressionists—the 
sheer number of his paintings seems to have foreshadowed the magic of photography.
280
 
                                                             
278 Dippie, et al., George Catlin and His Indian Gallery, 33.  
279 Getlein, Lure of the West, 40-45. 
280 Dippie, et al., Catlin and His Indian Gallery, 21, 114-117. And far beyond the mere application of these 
techniques, Catlin’s work vividly showcased his extraordinary artistic skills. In defense of Catlin’s innate 
abilities, Paris art critic Charles Baudelaire responded in 1846 with a letter to several of the artist’s harsher 
critics: “When M. Catlin came to Paris with his museum and his Ioways, the word went round that he was a 
good fellow who could neither paint nor draw, and that if he had produced some tolerable studies, it was 
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Catlin’s 1832 steamboat voyage up the Missouri inaugurated his career as a 
chronicler of the trans-Mississippi West.
281
 In addition to his artistic achievements 
detailed above, Catlin generated a voluminous output of notes and open “letters” on this 
voyage in his capacity as a correspondent for the Spectator, Daily Commercial 
Advertiser, and other New York City publications. Eight “letters” from the “Mouth of the 
Yellowstone” combined with another thirteen written from “a Mandan village” comprise 
nearly half of his entire journal. His inspired artistic and literary output from this journey 
through the upper Missouri country represents the very core of his work.
282
  
Catlin’s sojourn began with an invitation from Pierre Chouteau, Jr. to travel to Fort 
Union on the American Fur Company’s new steamboat Yellow Stone.283 Although the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
thanks only to his courage and his patience. Was this an innocent trick of M. Catlin’s, or a blunder on the 
part of the journalists? For today it is established that M. Catlin can paint and draw very well indeed . . . I 
had been particularly struck by the transparency and lightness of his skies. M. Catlin has captured the proud 
free character and the noble expression of these splendid fellows in a masterful way; the structure of their 
heads is wonderfully well understood. With their fine attitudes and their ease of movement, these savages 
make antique sculpture comprehensible. Turning to his color, I find in it an element of mystery which 
delights me more than I can say;” quoted in Getlein, Lure of the West, 51. Baudelaire’s intellectual 
credentials included his earlier discovery and promotion of a heretofore despised and ignored poet by the 
name of Edgar Allan Poe. Even Catlin’s detractors could be generous. For instance, one critic noted that 
“[s]ome of [Catlin’s] portraits are perfunctory, slipshod. He was capable of compressing the torso and 
limbs absurdly . . . whatever the cost to anatomy. Sometimes he mounted small heads on elongated trunks. 
Legs seemed to sprout from stomachs; tiny arms folded across giant chests.” Nevertheless, this same critic 
also conceded that “[t]here is a tendency to forgive Catlin such lapses. He was working under impossible 
conditions, at a killing pace, rushing to record what he saw;” quoted in Brian W. Dippie, Catlin and His 
Contemporaries: The Politics of Patronage (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 437. 
Ethnohistorian John C. Ewers likewise excused Catlin’s perceived deficiencies as a technical artist: “To 
accomplish so much in a single summer Catlin had to work very quickly. Many of his paintings of Indians 
were impressionistic—omitting or merely approximating the details of his sitters’ costumes or of Indian 
actions in their villages, in their camp movements, or on their hunts or war expeditions;” quoted in Jackson, 
Voyages of the Steamboat Yellow Stone, 38.  
281 For an excellent account of Catlin’s role in this record-breaking steamboat voyage up the Missouri see 
chap. 2, “Platform for an Artist’s Easel” in Jackson, Voyages of the Steamboat Yellow Stone, 28-50. For a 
comprehensive history of steamboats on the upper Missouri, see Hiram Martin Chittenden, History of Early 
Steamboat Navigation on the Missouri River: Life and Adventures of Joseph La Barge, Pioneer Navigator 
and Indian Trader Identified with the Commerce of the Missouri Valley, 2 vols. (New York: Francis P. 
Harper, 1903; reprint, Ross & Haines, 1962).  For a brief but informative study of the men who piloted and 
manned the Missouri River steamboats, see Michael Allen, “The Riverman as Jacksonian Man,” The 
Western Historical Quarterly 21 (August 1990): 305-320.   
282 Catlin, North American Indians, xiii. 
283 The name, “Yellow Stone,” as spelled in this dissertation, appears in Jackson, Voyages of the Steamboat 
Yellow Stone; and Wood, et al., Karl Bodmer’s Studio Art; and elsewhere; the name spelled alternately as, 
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year before it had proceeded upriver only as far as Fort Tecumseh [Fort Pierre], in 1832 
the crew succeeded in making the entire two-thousand mile trip to the mouth of the 
Yellowstone River.
284
 Hiram Martin Chittenden, prominent historian of early steamboat 
navigation on the upper Missouri, captured the significance to the American fur trade of 
that historic voyage:  
In several respects the voyage of the Yellowstone in 1832 has been a landmark 
in the history of the West. It demonstrated the practicability of navigating the 
Missouri by steam as far as to the mouth of the Yellowstone with a strong 
probability that boats could go on to the Blackfoot country. Among the 
passengers was the artist Catlin, whose works have given added celebrity to 
the voyage [emphasis added]. This noted voyage gave great satisfaction to the 
company [i.e., American Fur Company]. It completed the second step in 
reaching the head of navigation on the Missouri by steam, the first having 
been accomplished from St. Louis to Council Bluffs in 1819, and the third 
from Fort Union to Fort Benton in 1859. From 1832 on, the Missouri River 
steamboat was a constant and indispensable feature of frontier life in every 
department until the railroad destroyed its usefulness. It is needless to say that 
the appearance of this wonderful craft made a profound impression upon the 
Indians. Its power against the current, as if moved by some supernatural 
agency, excited the keenest astonishment, and even aroused a feeling of terror. 
One good effect was to increase their respect for Americans. The Missouri 
Republican, commenting upon the voyage said: “Many of the Indians who had 
been in the habit of trading with the Hudson [’s] Bay Company, declared that 
the company could no longer compete with the Americans, and concluded 
thereafter to bring their skins to the latter; and said that the British might turn 
out their dogs and burn their sledges, as they would no longer be useful while 
the Fire Boat walked on the waters.”285 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“Yellowstone;” appears in Chittenden, American Fur Trade; Chittenden, Early Steamboat Navigation; and 
elsewhere; fur trade scholars have generally accepted either spelling.  
284 Catlin Roehm, Letters of George Catlin, 57; Jackson, Voyages of the Steamboat Yellow Stone, 47; 
Chittenden, Early Steamboat Navigation, 22-23; Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 338.  
285 Chittenden, American Fur Trade, I: 338-340. A 24 March 1832 roster of the fur traders and clerks who 
traveled upriver aboard the Yellowstone contains many of the most illustrious names in the history of the 
American fur trade: Kenneth McKenzie, Lucien Fontenelle, William Laidlaw, Daniel Lamont, L. Bissonet 
(Louis Bissonette), Joseph Brazeau, Duchoquette Brazeau, Pascal Cerré, F. A. Chardon, John Dougherty, 
Jr., Jacob Halsey, James Kipp, Frederick Laboue, M.P. Laferriere, D.D. Mitchell, P.D. Papin, Henry 
Picotte, E. Primeau, and Thomas L. Sarpy; quoted in Jackson, Voyages of the Steamboat Yellow Stone, 167-
168.  
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Ironically, the same steamboat voyage that provided Catlin with the opportunity to 
preserve Native American cultures on canvas also represented the advent of Euro-
American technologies that would ultimately destroy those cultures within a few short 
decades.  
V 
On the Yellow Stone’s return voyage, Catlin descended the Missouri to Fort Pierre in 
advance of the steamboat in a “little bark” with Bátiste and Bogard, his two “compagnons 
du voyage,” and accepted the hospitality of the fort’s bourgeois, William Laidlaw. 
Finding himself, again, “in the heart of the country belonging to the numerous tribe of 
Sioux or Dahcotas,” Catlin noted the thousands of Teton Sioux encamped on the Fort 
Pierre plain waiting their turn to trade. And just as he had on his previous journey 
upriver, the artist set out to paint as many of them as his brief stay permitted.
286
 
Catlin first painted the portrait of Ha-wan-je-tah, or, Ha-wan-ghee-ta (One Horn), of 
the Mee-ne cow-e-gee band.
287
 The artist referred to Ha-wan-je-tah as “a superior chief 
                                                             
286 Catlin, North American Indians, 203-266. Catlin often combined his notes from the upriver and return 
voyages on board the Yellow Stone; therefore, the chapters titled “Mouth of Teton River, Upper Missouri,” 
compiled from “Letters—No. 26-31,” narrate somewhat indiscriminately with regard to date and time the 
artist’s experiences on the Fort Pierre Plain.  
287 In Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 41, the author frankly expresses his antipathy toward Catlin’s writings, 
specifically, his rendering of Indian names: “In 1832 that foolish fellow George Catlin visited the Indians at 
the mouth of Bad River, but there is nothing to be gained from his romantic and rather addle-headed pages 
further than the names of two or three individuals, these names being so badly mutilated that they are 
almost unrecognizable. His one statement of any interest is that Whirlwind, the well known chief of later 
times, was an Oglala of the Kiyuksa band.” In the artist’s defense, his desire to spell Indian names correctly 
may have faded in his eagerness to accommodate all of the Indians waiting to have their portraits drawn. As 
Catlin later remembered: “I was busily engaged painting my portraits, for here were assembled the 
principal chiefs and medicine-men [italics in the original] of the nation. To these people, the operations of 
my brush were entirely new and unaccountable, and excited amongst them the greatest curiosity 
imaginable. Every thing else (even the steamboat) was abandoned for the pleasure of crowding into my 
painting-room, and witnessing the result of each fellow’s success, as he came out from under the operation 
of the brush. They had been at first much afraid of the consequences that might flow from so strange and 
unaccountable an operation; but having been made to understand my views, they began to look upon it as a 
great honour [italics in the original], and afforded me the opportunities that I desired; exhibiting the utmost 
degree of vanity for their appearance, both as to features and dress. The consequence was, that my room 
was filled with the chiefs who sat around, arranged according to the rank or grade which they held in the 
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[italics in the original] and leader, a middle-aged man, of middling stature, with a noble 
countenance, and a figure almost equaling the Apollo.”288 The chief had been the first of 
about “one in five or eight . . . willing to be painted, [as] the rest thought they would be 
much more sure of ‘sleeping quiet in their graves’ after they were dead, if their pictures 
were not made.”289 
The artist found painting Lakota women to be even more difficult than painting the 
men. He initially found himself “being heartily laughed at by the whole tribe, both by 
men and by women” because they “had never taken scalps, nor [done] anything better 
than make fires and dress skins” and would therefore be a poor choice to represent “the 
most distinguished and worthy of the Sioux” to the “white chiefs” that Catlin planned to 
show his drawings. But after explaining that he “merely [wished] to shew [sic] how their 
women looked, and how they dressed [italics in the original], without saying any more of 
them, [he] succeeded in getting a number of women’s portraits.”290 
The last portrait that Catlin painted among the Sioux was of a distinguished warrior 
whose name the artist rendered as Mah-to-chee-ga (Little Bear). Catlin was in the process 
of painting that venerable chief of the Onc-pa-pa band (Hunkpapas) when a surly and 
unpopular chief of the Caz-a-zshee-ta band named Shon-ka (The Dog) entered the lodge 
in which the artist was working and, seating himself before Little Bear, began to insult 
him by sneering that, because Catlin was, as the artist later remembered, “painting almost 
a profile view of [Little Bear’s] face, throwing half of it in shadow,” the missing half of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
estimation of their tribe; and in this order it became necessary for me to paint them, to the exclusion of 
those who never signalized themselves, and were without any distinguishing character in society;” see 
Catlin, North American Indians, 241.     
288 Catlin, North American Indians, 206. 
289 Ibid., 219. 
290 Ibid. 
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his face must be “good for nothing.” Little Bear responded evenly to this slander by 
saying that The Dog was nothing but “an old woman and a coward.” Upon hearing this, 
the other chiefs present burst into laughter, after which The Dog stood up and rushed 
immediately to his lodge to arm himself. Little Bear calmly remained seated until Catlin 
had completed the portrait. The grateful chief then presented the artist with “a very 
beautiful shirt of buckskin, richly garnished with quills of porcupine, fringed with scalp-
locks (honourable memorials) from his enemies’ heads, and painted with all his battles 
emblazoned on it.” Little Bear thereupon retrieved his own weapon which, unfortunately 
for him, his wife, unaware of the nature of her husband’s dispute with The Dog but still 
fearing the possible consequences of it, had unloaded without Little Bear’s knowledge. In 
the ensuing duel, he suffered a mortal wound, while The Dog was unhurt and 
subsequently fled from the village with his followers.
291
 Catlin later recalled the 
“frightful agitation amidst several thousand Indians, who were divided into jealous bands 
or clans, under ambitious and rival chiefs. The blood of the Onc-pa-pas was roused, and 
the indignant braves of that gallant band rushed forth from all quarters, and, swift upon 
their heels, were hot for revenge.” As for Catlin, he was simply grateful to have escaped 
the whole affair with his life.
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291 Catlin wrote that “Little Bear lay weltering in his own blood (strange to say!) with all that side of his 
face entirely shot away, which had been left out of the picture; and, according to the prediction of the Dog, 
“good for nothing;” carrying away one half of the jaws, and the flesh from the nostrils and corner of the 
mouth, to the ear, including one eye, and leaving the jugular vein entirely exposed;” see Catlin, North 
American Indians, 244.  
292 Catlin, North American Indians, 240-245. See also DeLand, ed., “Fort Tecumseh and Fort Pierre Journal 
and Letter Books,” 165, n. 171. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
   
 “TRANSITIONS: 
 THE RISE OF FORT LARAMIE  
 AND 
 THE TETON OCCUPATION OF THE PLATTE RIVER VALLEY, 
 1832-1837” 
 
 
I 
 
In the years from 1832 to 1837, the American Fur Company firmly established its 
business operations along the Missouri River from St. Louis all the way to the Blackfoot 
country, successfully extended those operations into the Platte River Valley, and 
recaptured the trade of the westernmost Sioux with an efficient supply and procurement 
network anchored at Fort Pierre and terminating at Fort Laramie. As one result of this 
trade, the Tetons came to dominate the rich buffalo ranges of the northern and central 
plains. But while that domination ensured their continuing participation in the buffalo 
robe and hide trade, their almost unlimited access to the goods it provided masked their 
illusions of independence from Anglo-American culture and civilization.   
 Preceding these significant developments, John Jacob Astor’s American Fur 
Company had already absorbed its chief rival on the Missouri, the Columbia Fur 
Company—the profitable and efficiently-managed firm under the able direction of 
experienced trader, Kenneth McKenzie—and had renamed the new combination the 
Upper Missouri Outfit (U.M.O.). The origins of this durable enterprise—it would exist 
under the aegis of the American Fur Company until 1865—provide yet another example 
of Astor’s principal business strategy for dealing with his competition: amalgamation.  
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The Columbia Fur Company had become so successful by 1825 that the following 
year John Jacob Astor’s exceptionally-talented agent, Ramsay Crooks, opened 
negotiations with McKenzie to explore the possibility of dividing the trade on the upper 
Mississippi River above the St. Croix. McKenzie answered Crooks with a demand that he 
grant the Columbia Fur Company all trade on the Minnesota River, a condition that 
Crooks could not abide. Subsequent negotiations in the spring of 1827 stalled after 
McKenzie again refused to compromise. As an explanation for failing to reach 
agreement, Crooks tersely reported to Astor that “McKenzie’s demands are too great.”293  
The impasse then prompted Astor to consider absorbing McKenzie and his company 
into the American Fur Company’s Western Department. With that in mind, Astor wrote 
Crooks: “I still hope you will succeed in arranging with Mr. McKenney [sic]—as it will 
be better than to carry on one opposition after another.”294 Although Crooks persisted 
with the negotiations through June, McKenzie’s insistence on including his partners in 
any combined business arrangement, his repeated demand for a $1,500 annual salary, an 
understanding that the Western Department would employ former Columbia Fur 
Company men on the upper Missouri in preference to American Fur Company people, 
and the condition that Astor advance money for the purchase in England and the United 
States of trade goods by McKenzie’s associates, Collier and Powell, all combined to 
make an agreement unlikely. In desperation, Crooks wrote to American Fur Company 
agent Robert Stuart at Mackinac: “I have done all I could (in the greatest sincerity) to 
become friends with our opponents and since they have refused peace on fair terms, they 
                                                             
293 Crooks to Astor, 30 August 1827; quoted in Phillips, The Fur Trade, 2: 418. 
294 Astor to Crooks, 7 May 1827; quoted in ibid. 
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must take the consequences.”295 And to American Fur Company trader Joseph Rolette, 
also at Mackinac, Crooks lamented that “all my sincere efforts to arrange with the 
Columbia Fur Company on equitable terms have proved abortive. We must now fight 
harder than ever, and I rely with the utmost confidence on your opposing them 
successfully.”296 
Only days later, however, as scholar Annie Heloise Abel so colorfully observed: “It 
was a case, seemingly, of the hour being darkest just before the dawn; for early in July, 
[Crooks] had his deserts.”297  In his report to Astor, Crooks seemed very satisfied with his 
achievement: “It affords me pleasure to inform you that after an almost useless 
negociation, I have, at last succeeded in agreeing on preliminaries with the Columbia Fur 
Company to give up their trade entirely and take a share with us in that of the Upper 
Missouri.”298  
Somewhat surprisingly, especially considering Crooks’s apparent elation at the 
successful outcome of the negotiations, the actual terms of the merger did not favor his 
firm; in fact, McKenzie’s adroit maneuvering retained for his company substantial 
autonomy within the new organization.
299
 Indeed, as Hiram Martin Chittenden explains: 
                                                             
295 Crooks to Robert Stuart at Mackinac, 22 June 1827; quoted in Annie Heloise Abel, Chardon’s Journal 
at Fort Clark, 1834-1839: Descriptive of Life on the Upper Missouri; of a Fur Trader’s Experiences 
Among the Mandans, Gros Ventres, and Their Neighbors; of the Ravages of the Smallpox Epidemic of 
1837, with historical introduction and notes by Annie Heloise Abel, introduction to the Bison Books edition 
by William R. Swagerty (Pierre: South Dakota Dept. of History, 1932; reprint, Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 
1997), 199.   
296 Crooks to Joseph Rolette at Mackinac, 27 June 1827; quoted in ibid.  
297 Abel, Chardon’s Journal, 199. 
298 Crooks to Astor, 6 July 1827; quoted in Abel, Chardon’s Journal, 199. 
299 The main reason for McKenzie’s unwillingness to come to terms prematurely—i.e., without first 
securing his own and his partners’ best interests—was undoubtedly his firm’s consistent financial success. 
For as Paul Phillips reports: “Gross income of the Columbia Fur Company for the seasons ending in 1825, 
1826, and 1827 was from $150,000 to $200,000 annually. Approximately one-half of this was from buffalo 
robes [emphasis added]. The cost of merchandise and supplies for those years did not run over $20,000 or 
$25,000 annually. The balance went to pay off old debts and for salaries and profits;” see Phillips, The Fur 
Trade, 2: 417. Conversely, Annie Heloise Abel grants Crooks the advantage throughout the negotiations: 
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“The partners of the retiring company became partners or proprietors of the [Upper 
Missouri Outfit], and McKenzie, [William] Laidlaw, and [Daniel] Lamont conducted the 
affairs of the upper Missouri quite as independently as if they had remained a separate 
company.”300 In his brief discussion of the merger, Paul Phillips grants the partners 
somewhat less freedom of action than does Chittenden: 
The organization known as the Columbia Fur Company was renamed the 
Upper Missouri Outfit and was to operate under the general supervision of the 
Western Department [emphasis added]. It gave up trade on the Mississippi 
and Red River [and the St. Peter’s] and confined its activities to the upper 
Missouri and to the territories westward. Here it had no competition from 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“Amalgamation was resolved upon after repeated attempts to create distinct spheres of influence had 
proved unsuccessful. That all went well, finally, was doubtless due to the fact that Crooks and McKenzie, 
being compatriots, were unhampered by personal prejudices and were disposed to be as conciliatory 
towards each other as was consonant with duty. More than all else, however, it was due to the fact that the 
Columbia Fur Company was financially embarrassed, being hard-pressed by the supply merchants 
[emphasis added]. Of this situation Ramsay Crooks was nothing loath to take advantage;” see Chardon, 
Chardon’s Journal, 197. Interestingly, Abel seems to contradict herself as she relates how successfully 
McKenzie clearly negotiated the final terms of the agreement: “That union . . . was in the nature of an 
absorption, whereby McKenzie and his friends, Daniel Lamont and William Laidlaw, passed over to the 
Astor concern but upon the understanding that they, collectively, should constitute a separate and distinct 
branch of its Western Department, at the head of which stood Pierre Chouteau, Jr., Bernard Pratte, and 
other merchants of St. Louis. Thus had come into being the famous Upper Missouri Outfit, which, in all its 
essentials, was but the old Columbia Fur Company in another guise, Tilton gone, Renville gone, but the 
rank and file of its personnel retained. Retained, likewise, were its ambitions, though operating, henceforth, 
in one respect, in a restricted area; for Astor’s new recruit, retiring altogether from the St. Peter’s, once its 
richest field, was to confine its energies to the development of the fur trade of the upper Missouri and 
across the mountains to the Far West [emphasis added];” see Abel, Chardon’s Journal, xxxvii. The Upper 
Missouri Outfit’s rapid expansion into the upper Missouri so soon after its formation—McKenzie would 
found Fort Union in 1829 at the confluence of the Yellowstone River with the Missouri, Fort Clark in 1831 
at the Mandans, Fort Cass in Crow country in 1833, and Fort McKenzie in Blackfoot country at the mouth 
of the Marias in 1834—suggests that his foremost ambition had always been to dominate the upper 
Missouri fur trade. Indeed, Annie Heloise Abel even suggests that McKenzie’s interests had always 
included Oregon: “To control the trade of the Far West, thus out-witting the Hudson’s Bay Company 
[murderous former rival of McKenzie’s old North West Company], had long been Kenneth McKenzie’s 
dearest wish and the very name of the Columbia Fur Company, of which he was reputed to be the real 
head, had been as significant in its day as was that now bestowed upon the establishment near the mouth of 
the Yellowstone [Fort Union]. In joining forces with Ramsay Crooks, an ex-Astorian and therefore 
presumably committed to an interest in Oregon, McKenzie had done the wisest thing possible in the 
furtherance, at long range, of his own pet ideas;” see Abel, Chardon’s Journal, xxxix. Hiram Martin 
Chittenden, however, does not ascribe nearly the same degree of significance to the name “Columbia Fur 
Company” as does Abel, saying mildly only that the “legal title of the firm was Tilton and Company, but 
the name by which it was always known was the Columbia Fur Company. Whether this name was given in 
token of the ambitious schemes of the new company and their purpose to carry their trade to the Pacific 
does not appear;” see Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 326.  
300 Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 328. For a useful study of the Upper Missouri Outfit, see Ray H. 
Mattison, “The Upper Missouri Fur Trade: Its Methods of Operation,” Nebraska History 42 (1961): 1-28. 
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other of Astor’s traders. Astor supplied it with goods and was to receive all 
the pelts it collected either by purchase or to sell on commission. The 
agreement gave the American Fur Company a monopoly of all the fur trade of 
the upper Missouri. The free traders in the country beyond the mouth of the 
Yellowstone remained dependent upon McKenzie to supply them with goods 
and to buy their pelts. McKenzie remained head of the organization, and 
James Kipp became his most active assistant. Laidlaw and Lamont generally 
made their headquarters at Fort Tecumseh, which in 1832 was replaced by the 
better-built Fort Pierre. From there they supervised trade on White River, the 
Cheyenne, the Moreau, and more distant trading centers.
301
 
 
For the Teton Sioux, it was to be the construction of Fort Pierre at the expense of old Fort 
Tecumseh, followed by the Upper Missouri Outfit’s control of trade on the White, 
Cheyenne, and Moreau Rivers, as well as the eventual expansion of that control to “more 
distant trading centers (e.g., Fort Laramie)” that would, by 1851, allow them to reach the 
furthest extent of their military, political, and economic domination of the north-central 
plains.  
II   
Born in St. Louis on 19 January 1789 to Pierre Chouteau—second son of the founder 
of St. Louis, Pierre Lacléde Liguest—and to Pelagie Kiersereau, Pierre Chouteau, Jr. 
inherited not only his father’s name but, as was appropriate for a second son, the elder 
Pierre’s nickname, “Cadet,” as well. As the younger Pierre’s biographer, Janet Lecompte, 
explains:  
He also inherited his father’s shrewdness and diligence, and his lust for wealth 
and power. But the son’s ambition came not altogether from the father, nor in 
any part from the placid, frivolous creole society of his heredity. It came from 
the new materialism of the nineteenth century, and from its first behemoth 
exponent, John Jacob Astor. The interest in Chouteau’s character lies in the 
                                                             
301 24 October 1831 report of John Forsythe in 22nd Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Document 90 (Serial 213), 75; 
Phillips, The Fur Trade, 2: 419. See also Abel, Chardon’s Journal, xxxvii-xl, 197-199;  
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conflict between the gentle, home-loving creole he was, and the grasping 
American tycoon he became.
302
 
 
The fortunate circumstances of Pierre Chouteau, Jr.’s birth could hardly have been 
more propitious; as Lecompte explains: “For at least a century the Chouteaus were the 
leading family of St. Louis—a clan whose many intermarriages produced a tight core of 
social and business eminence. If one wished to make a name or a fortune in St. Louis, it 
was best to be born a Chouteau.”303  
Pierre Chouteau Jr.’s long and eventful career in business began when he entered the 
fur trade at the age of fifteen as a clerk in the office of his uncle, Auguste Chouteau. Soon 
afterward Pierre became a trader to the Osage Indians. For while Cadet’s pursuits varied 
as he mined lead on the upper Mississippi River for several years, then opened a store in 
St. Louis with Bartholomew Berthold, and six weeks later married twenty-year-old 
Emilie Anne Gratiot, daughter of Charles Gratiot and Victoire Chouteau.
304
  
Although initially the partnership of Berthold and Chouteau focused solely on their 
St. Louis store, by 1814 the two partners’ business interests had gravitated toward the fur 
trade. That year, the firm dispatched traders to the Otos, the Loup River Pawnees, and the 
Pawnees along the Platte and Missouri rivers. In 1815, Berthold and Chouteau outfitted a 
financially-disastrous trading expedition to the Rocky Mountains—an experience that 
permanently biased Chouteau against the mountain trade. Thereafter, until 1819, the firm 
of Berthold and Chouteau confined its fur-trading operations to the lower Missouri, the 
only notable exception being the post maintained on Cedar Island for trade with the 
                                                             
302 Janet Lecompte, “Pierre Chouteau Junior,” in Mountain Men and Fur Traders of the Far West: Eighteen 
Biographical Sketches, 10 vols., ed. LeRoy R. Hafen, selected and with an introduction by Harvey L. Cater 
(Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, 1965-1972; reprint, Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1982), 24-25 (page 
citations are to the reprint edition).   
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Sioux. Also in that year, the company, in conjunction with Jean P. Cabanné and 
Company and other firms, underwrote an unsuccessful Missouri Fur Company expedition 
to the upper Missouri led by Manuel Lisa. For the next several years, Berthold and 
Chouteau found themselves outmatched in the competition for the fur trade of the upper 
Missouri—particularly that offered by Missouri Fur Company men such as Lisa, Joshua 
Pilcher, Lucien Fontenelle, Andrew Drips, William Vanderburgh, and Charles Bent. 
Beginning in 1822, that competition intensified with the advent of Andrew Henry and 
William H. Ashley and their “enterprising young men” on the upper Missouri and in the 
Rocky Mountains.
305
  
It was in that year also that John Jacob Astor’s American Fur Company established its 
Western Department in St. Louis, a shrewd move by Astor that linked his interests with 
that of long-established St. Louis merchants and one that also had far-reaching 
implications for Chouteau’s future in the fur trade. Berthold and Chouteau had recently 
restructured their firm under the name Berthold, Chouteau, and Pratte with the addition of 
Bernard Pratte, Sr. as a full partner. It was Pratte who had arranged with Ramsay Crooks 
in February 1822 for Berthold, Chouteau, and Pratte to sell furs to and buy supplies from 
the American Fur Company—an arrangement that proved to be enormously profitable for 
Chouteau and his partners. Nevertheless, over the next four years, not only were 
Chouteau and his partners unable to convince Astor to deal exclusively with them in St. 
Louis, their firm also engaged in some highly questionable business schemes that cost it 
dearly in both lives and treasure. With the further addition of J. P. Cabanné to Berthold, 
Chouteau, and Pratte in May 1823, the partners replaced that name with Bernard Pratte 
and Company. Competition from the Columbia Fur Company in the fall of 1826 finally 
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forced Ramsay Crooks to approach Chouteau and his partners with a proposal to combine 
the personnel and financial resources of the American Fur Company with those of 
Bernard Pratte and Company. The resulting agreement, signed by Astor and Chouteau in 
December 1826, established the latter firm as exclusive western agent for the former 
company with each receiving equal distributions of profit and each absorbing half of all 
losses. Chouteau’s effective control of the upper Missouri fur trade thus dates to 1827, 
the first year during which his company began to manage the affairs of the AFC’s 
Western Department in St. Louis.
306
 
III 
Fort Tecumseh had served as Kenneth McKenzie’s headquarters from 1822 to 1829, a 
period during which he had first directed the operations of the Columbia Fur Company 
and, subsequently, after its merger with the American Fur Company’s Western 
Department, the business affairs of its sub-department, the Upper Missouri Outfit. 
                                                             
306 Articles of agreement, with letter of P. Chouteau, Jr., New York, December 21, 1826, to B. Pratte & Co., 
Chouteau Family Papers; Lecompte, “Pierre Chouteau, Junior,” 31-35; Schuler, Fort Pierre, 29. The 20 
December 1826 agreement between Astor and Chouteau—not the establishment of the AFC’s Western 
Department in St. Louis or its later incorporation of the Columbia Fur Company—was actually the most 
important component of Astor and Crooks’s strategy to monopolize the upper Missouri fur trade. The terms 
of the agreement also reveal how much Chouteau personally benefited from it after he and Astor “agreed to 
make a joint concern of their two St. Louis fur companies, sharing equally in profit and loss. The American 
Fur Company would furnish all supplies, collecting 7% interest on all disbursements and 5% commission 
on all goods imported from England, and on all charges, including transportation and insurance and the 
60% duty charged on woolen goods. No commission was to be charged on American goods. B. Pratte & 
Co. would offer its whole collection of furs to the American Fur Company. If Astor did not choose to buy 
them, they would be sold by Astor at a commission of 2½%. If not sold by September 25 of each year, they 
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to be agent of the American Fur Company, general superintendent of the business and director of affairs in 
the Indian country at an annual salary of $2000 and traveling expenses. Bernard Pratte was to act in his 
stead in case of illness (Cadet was frequently and severely ill during this period) or absence from St. Louis. 
Berthold and Cabanné were to remain in charge of the Sioux country and Council Bluffs respectively at a 
salary of $1200 apiece. The new company would begin on July 1, 1827, or with the outfit for that year, and 
continue for four years, or until the returns of 1831. Now the little company of Berthold and Chouteau, a 
French creole organization of limited imagination and effectiveness, was backed by the country’s biggest 
monopoly. The power and wealth of Pierre Chouteau Junior may be said to have begun in 1827, even 
though he had already been in the fur business for twenty years [my italics];” this summary of the 
agreement in Lecompte, “Pierre Chouteau, Junior,” 35-36.  
136 
 
Ironically, it was McKenzie who first suggested the means by which Pierre Chouteau, Jr. 
ascended the Missouri in the spring of 1831 and decreed the end of Fort Tecumseh. The 
example of a profitable steamboat route between St. Louis and Fort Leavenworth had 
inspired McKenzie in the summer of 1830 to recommend the use of a steamboat on the 
upper Missouri. The idea intrigued Chouteau who, despite the initial opposition of both 
Pratte and Cabanné to the scheme, nevertheless contracted that fall with a firm in 
Louisville for the delivery of a new boat to St. Louis no later than April 1831. Chouteau 
had argued that steamboats were safer than keelboats and the Anglo-American mechanics 
who operated the former would undoubtedly be a more disciplined lot than the volatile 
French-Canadian engagés who manned the latter. Moreover, the company would then be 
able to pay its employees largely in trade goods rather than cash, as it could maintain all 
of its employees in Indian country. Chouteau allocated $7,000 for construction, another 
$1,000 for spare parts, and he installed a blacksmith on board in case of mechanical 
failure. Christened the Yellow Stone, its on-time arrival at St. Louis and its proposed 
destination generated considerable enthusiasm. One St. Louis newspaper declared it a 
“new and handsome steam boat  . . . [bound] for the mouth of the Yellowstone. . .  . 
Should the [American Fur Company] succeed in reaching this point with their boat . . . 
we shall have the pleasure of beholding what, it was thought the other day, was reserved 
for the next generation.”307    
The Yellow Stone departed St. Louis for the upper Missouri on 16 April 1831; its 
most illustrious passenger was Pierre Chouteau, Jr. The steamboat made good progress 
until it passed the mouth of the Niobrara River at which low water prevented it from 
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proceeding beyond the Company’s Ponca post. Impatient with the delay, Chouteau went 
ashore every day, climbed a high river bluff—known ever since as Chouteau’s Bluffs—
and scanned the horizon for a change in the weather to bring more water. Unwilling to 
stand passively by, however, he presently ordered keelboats brought down from Fort 
Tecumseh to lighten the steamboat’s load. Thus unencumbered, it continued upriver and 
docked at the fort on 19 June 1831; it would go no further that year.
308
 
An unusually high Missouri River had earlier that spring threatened to inundate the 
nine-year-old fort. American Fur Company employees at first responded to the crisis 
merely by relocating the fort’s storehouse to higher ground; but after Chouteau’s arrival 
in June, he authorized the construction of a new fort. In addition to locating it on higher 
ground than that upon which the Columbia Fur Company had raised Fort Tecumseh, the 
site of the new fort also required a dependable water supply; ample timber for building; 
heating, and cooking; ready water access to the Missouri River to minimize cargo 
transport; good pasture; and, of paramount importance, a location in the center of the 
Teton Sioux buffalo range. The traders eventually settled on a site that satisfied all of 
these requirements, a broad level plain roughly two miles north of Fort Tecumseh that, at 
1442 feet elevation, all but eliminated the danger from flooding, greatly facilitated the 
hauling of supplies, and provided the Sioux—the new fort’s principal trading partners—
with an ideal setting for their camps. With construction of the new fort well under way, 
the Yellow Stone, with Chouteau on board, headed for St. Louis fully loaded with packs 
of buffalo robes and furs and ten thousand buffalo tongues and arrived there without 
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incident on 15 July 1831. Chouteau declared the steamboat’s maiden voyage a qualified 
success and resolved to repeat the waterborne expedition the following year.
309
 
The 1832 voyage of the Yellow Stone began with its departure from St. Louis on 26 
March. Hiram Martin Chittenden terms it “a landmark in the history of the West [as it] 
demonstrated the practicability of navigating the Missouri by steam as far as to the mouth 
of the Yellowstone with a strong probability that boats could go on to the Blackfoot 
country. Among the passengers was the artist Catlin, whose works have given added 
celebrity to the voyage.”310 Writing from the mouth of Teton (Bad) River, upper 
Missouri, Catlin portrayed his first visit to Fort Pierre in glowing terms: 
I am here living with, and enjoying the hospitality of a gentleman by the name 
of Laidlaw, a Scotchman, who is attached to the American Fur Company . . . . 
This gentleman has a finely-built Fort here, of two or three hundred feet 
square, enclosing eight or ten of their factories, houses and stores, in the midst 
of which he occupies spacious and comfortable apartments, which are well 
supplied with the comforts and luxuries of life and neatly and respectably 
conducted by a fine looking, modest, and dignified Sioux woman, the kind 
and affectionate mother of his little flock of pretty and interesting children.  
 
This Fort is undoubtedly one of the most important and productive of the 
American Fur Company’s posts, being in the centre of the great Sioux 
                                                             
309 Schuler, Fort Pierre, 29, 32; Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 338; Jackson, Voyages of the 
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310 Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 338. 
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country, drawing from all quarters an immense and almost incredible number 
of buffalo robes, which are carried to the New York and other Eastern markets 
and sold at a great profit. This post is thirteen miles above St. Louis, on the 
west bank of the Missouri, on a beautiful plain near the mouth of the Teton 
river [now called Bad River] which empties into the Missouri from the West, 
and the Fort has received the name of Fort Pierre in compliment to Monsr. 
Pierre Chouteau, who is one of the partners in the Fur Company residing in St. 
Louis.   
 
The Fort is in the centre of one of the Missouri’s most beautiful plains, and 
hemmed in by a series of gracefully undulating, grass-covered hills, on all 
sides; rising like a series of terraces, to the summit level of the prairies, some 
three or four hundred feet in elevation, which then stretches off in an 
apparently boundless ocean of gracefully swelling waves and fields of green. 
On my way up the river I made a painting of this lovely spot, taken from the 
summit of the bluffs, a mile or two distant, shewing an encampment of Sioux, 
of six hundred tents or skin lodges, around the Fort, where they had 
concentrated to make their spring trade.
311
  
 
Even making certain allowances for the artist’s somewhat romanticized vision of the 
fort and its location, Catlin nevertheless had artfully described the American Fur 
Company’s most profitable business enterprise on the Missouri River.312 Naturally, the 
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administrative talents of the fort’s bourgeois, William Laidlaw, its superb location, and 
its facilities for warehousing trade goods and supplies and for processing furs were key 
elements of its success, but the most important reason for that success may have been 
Fort Pierre’s association with the Teton Sioux—a people whose political economy 
focused almost exclusively on the buffalo robe trade.  
The buffalo robe and hide was an Indian trade. Its relations of production depended in 
equal measure upon the skill and efficiency of the Indian men who hunted buffalo from 
the backs of swift ponies as well as upon the knowledge and endurance of the Indian 
women who tanned the robes and hides. In the case of the Teton Sioux, their nineteenth-
century acquisition of the horse occurred simultaneously with the expansion of the upper 
Missouri American fur trade as these two parallel developments collided on the Tetons’ 
new home range west of the Missouri. New economic incentives then emerged in the 
form of previously-undreamed-of wealth in Euro-American trade goods, the pursuit of 
which radically transformed Teton relations of production and distribution—particularly 
those based on gender—from eighteenth-century collectivism to nineteenth-century 
individualism, a transformation that hastened the onset of the Tetons’ dependency on a 
global market economy controlled from New York and London. But unfortunately for 
those Indians and their traders alike, the buffalo robe and hide trade involved the 
widespread use of spirituous liquors as one of the most ubiquitous—and lethal—of 
Anglo-American trade goods—a very unromantic reality that George Catlin discovered to 
his sorrow at Fort Pierre and elsewhere.  
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IV 
In a passage from James Fenimore Cooper’s 1826 novel, The Last of the Mohicans, 
Cooper’s Indian villain, Magua, justifies his treacherous behavior to white captive Cora 
Munro: “Listen, Magua was born a chief and a warrior among the red Hurons of the 
lakes. Then his Canada fathers came into the woods, and taught him how to drink the 
fire-water, and he became a rascal. Who gave him the fire-water? Who made him a 
villain? T’was the pale-faces, the people of your own color.”313 Although Cooper’s novel 
takes place almost three-quarters of a century before Catlin made his way up the Missouri 
River in 1832, courtesy of Pierre Chouteau, Jr. and the American Fur Company, the 
passage underscores the long and tragic history of alcohol in Indian country. 
Hiram Martin Chittenden opens a chapter from the American Fur Trade of the Far 
West entitled “The Liquor Traffic” with his observation that the “degrading and 
demoralizing influence of intoxicating spirits upon the Indian was well understood from 
the experience of two centuries of frontier life.”314 Chittenden adds that, unfortunately, 
liquor was the most powerful weapon the traders possessed in their relentless competition 
with rival companies, primarily because its attraction to the Indians proved irresistible. 
Without regard to national boundaries, liquor remained the one indispensable article that 
the fur traders—American or British—had to have to stay in business.315  
George Catlin encountered that grim reality at both Fort Pierre and Fort Union during 
his 1832 steamboat voyage. With his moral sensibilities outraged, Catlin proceeded to 
write letters to New York City newspapers denouncing the American Fur Company’s 
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unscrupulous trade practices.
316
 Western historian Patricia Nelson Limerick claims in The 
Legacy of Conquest that Catlin’s affected moral indignation concealed his true feelings, 
and that instead of confronting his hosts with the evil embodied in their indiscriminate 
trading practices, the artist chose instead to express gratitude to Pierre Chouteau, Jr. and 
Kenneth McKenzie for their hospitality. Limerick maintains that the American Fur 
Company acted toward Catlin in the capacity of a modern-day “corporate sponsor” and 
that the artist eagerly accepted their largesse and conducted himself accordingly.
317
 
Limerick’s assessment of Catlin’s actions overlooks the complex political and 
economic realities that confronted the fur companies, circumstances that Catlin, a highly-
intelligent man, undoubtedly grasped. For example, although in July 1832 Congress 
enacted a bill prohibiting liquor as an article of trade with the Indians, fur traders in the 
field soon recognized the impracticability of its enforcement. In a letter to Catlin’s host 
on the upper Missouri, Pierre Chouteau, Jr., American Fur Company executive Ramsay 
Crooks lamented: “I regret truly the blindness of the government in refusing liquor for the 
trade of the country in the vicinity of Hudson’s Bay Posts, because the prohibition will 
not prevent the Indians getting it from our rivals, to our most serious injury.”318 
The American Fur Company penalized Catlin for his denunciation of their 
participation in the liquor trade. Thereafter, the Company forced the artist to cover his 
own travel expenses and offered neither hospitality nor assistance. On a subsequent trip 
to visit and paint the Comanches in 1834, he steadfastly refused financial assistance from 
the government, despite making the journey in the company of United States army 
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dragoons. Two years later, the American Fur Company spared no efforts to hinder his trip 
to the Coteau des Prairies in present-day Minnesota. And, after having witnessed and 
faithfully recorded the Mandan self-torture ceremony known as the O-KEE-PA (Okipa), 
the Company refused to corroborate Catlin’s account despite the general public’s ridicule 
of his literary and artistic depictions of the ritual as products of his vivid imagination. 
Unfortunately for his reputation, that tribe’s near-extinction from smallpox during the 
upper Missouri epidemic of 1837 precluded further opportunities for verifying the 
ceremony’s existence.319 
Catlin went well beyond merely expressing sympathy for the Indians’ plight; he 
depicted the tragic consequences of the liquor trade both in print and on canvas and 
worked diligently to stop it. For instance, in “Letter—No. 58.,” the final “letter” in 
Letters and Notes, he reflected on the effects of alcohol among the tribes. After first 
identifying the fur traders as the source of the liquor, he wrote: 
In the Indian communities, where there is no law of the land or custom 
denominating it a vice to drink whiskey, and to get drunk; and where the poor 
Indian meets whiskey tendered to him by white men, whom he considers 
wiser than himself, and to whom he naturally looks for example; he thinks it 
no harm to drink to excess, and will lie drunk as long as he can raise the 
means to pay for it. And after his first means, in his wild state, are exhausted, 
he becomes a beggar for whiskey, and begs until he disgusts, when the honest 
pioneer becomes his neighbor; and then, and not before, gets the name of 
“poor, degraded, naked, and drunken Indian,” to whom the epithets are well 
and truly applied.
320
 
 
In “Appendix—C.” to Letters and Notes, Catlin constructed a chart with the Indians’ 
original character traits on one side contrasted with the traits they acquired soon after 
                                                             
319 Catlin, Letters and Notes, 1: 251. 
320 Ibid., 1: 266. 
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contact with white civilization and alcohol—eg., handsome vs. ugly; temperate vs. 
dissipated; cleanly vs. filthy; etc.
321
  
Two paintings from the artist’s “Indian Gallery” poignantly capture the moral 
degradation experienced by the wild tribes following sustained contact with whites. The 
first is a painting of Shin-gos-se-moon, or Big Sail, an Ottawa chief. Blind in one eye and 
an alcoholic, Big Sail epitomized one of “the miserable living victims and dupes of white 
man’s cupidity, degraded, discouraged, and lost in the bewildering maze that is produced 
by the use of whiskey and concomitant vices.”322 The second, a side-by-side painting of 
Wi-jun-jon, or Pigeon’s Egg Head (The Light), a young Assiniboin warrior, pictures the 
Indian on the left side in his splendid buckskin finery—a compelling study in noble 
dignity. On the right half of the painting, Catlin drew Wi-jun-jon after the Indian had 
spent eighteen months in Washington, DC. The warrior returned home dressed in a 
general’s uniform complete with a top hat, umbrella, fan, high-heeled boots, and the 
ubiquitous bottle of whiskey. Revolted by his transformation, Wi-jun-jon’s own 
tribesmen eventually murdered him. Perhaps more than any other of his paintings, 
Catlin’s poignant illustration of Wi-jun-jon’s fallen state expressed the artist’s conviction 
that white civilization destroyed Indian culture.
323
 Indeed, for Catlin, the altered moral 
                                                             
321 Ibid., 2: 266. 
322 Dippie, et al., George Catlin and His Indian Gallery, 198.  
323 Ibid., 202. If Catlin, using both his art and his pen, had challenged white Americans to confront the 
unfortunate costs of relentless and irresponsible western expansion, most of his contemporaries not only 
ignored him, but exacted retribution as well. In early 1838, a resolution before the House of 
Representatives urging the Library Committee to purchase “Catlin’s Indian Gallery” stalled due to a 
combination of apathy and hostility. Nevertheless, the 10 November 1838 issue of Nile’s National Register 
expressed its outrage: “We felt ashamed and mortified at the indifference shown Catlin’s most interesting 
exhibition whilst it was in this city, but especially at the little interest which was felt in the attempt to 
secure it to the nation;  and almost hope that the permission granted . . . [by the Lords of the Treasury] to 
land the collection in England free of duty, may be the first step to place it beyond our reach, as a 
punishment to the illiberal feeling manifested here.” The newspaper’s reference to England pointed to 
Catlin’s thinly-veiled attempt to pressure the United States government into buying his paintings. In 
response, a second resolution introduced in the House on 11 February 1839 directed the Commissioner of 
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qualities attributed to Indians who had associated with whites for too long revealed as 
much about the decline of nineteenth-century America as it did that of the Indians he so 
genuinely admired. In his own words: “Black and blue cloth and civilization are destined, 
not only to veil, but to obliterate the grace and beauty of Nature.”324 
V 
A number of Sioux winter counts reflect the increasing presence of the American fur 
trade along the upper Missouri in the years from 1830 to 1833. For example, according to 
the American Horse winter count for 1830-31, the Sioux “saw wagons for the first time. 
Red Lake, a white trader, brought his goods in them.”325 Although Short Man 
inexplicably placed the destruction of Red Lake’s post by fire in the winter of 1830-31; 
the winter counts of No Ears, Iron Crow, and American Horse correctly record that event 
for 1831-32; the translation of the latter’s pictograph for that year reads: “Red Lake’s 
house, which he had recently built, was destroyed by fire, and he was killed by the 
accidental explosion of some powder”; “Red Lake” was the name the Lakotas gave to 
American Fur Company clerk Thomas L. Sarpy.
326
 Also for the year 1831-32, the winter 
counts of Lone Dog, The Swan, and Cloud Shield all depicted a white trader named Le 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Indian Affairs to investigate the artist’s terms of purchase. Although Catlin offered his paintings and 
artifacts for a very reasonable price, Congress again refused to act. Later that same year, Catlin sailed for 
Europe. Thirteen years later, a congressional bill authorizing the purchase of “Catlin’s Indian Gallery” 
failed to pass by a single vote. Despite eloquent pleas for the bill’s passage by Senators Daniel Webster and 
Henry Clay, Senator Jefferson Davis of Mississippi cast the fatal ballot. Ironically, it was Davis who, as a 
young lieutenant of dragoons in 1834, had befriended Catlin on their odyssey to Comanche country. 
Fortunately, although Catlin never lived to see it, the Smithsonian Institution acquired and displayed 
“Catlin’s Indian Gallery” in 1965; see Dippie, et al., Catlin and His Indian Gallery, 61; Catlin, North 
American Indians, xiii-xvi. 
324 Catlin, Letters and Notes, 1: 2.  
325 Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 138. Interestingly, the wagons referred to in American Horse’s 1830-
31winter count may have been the four-wheeled variety rather than the two-wheeled carts so often used by 
the traders to transport their goods to the Indians’ remote camps; for a carefully-researched study of these 
“Red River” carts complete with photographs, drawings, and schematic diagrams, see Charles Hanson, Jr., 
“Red River and Other Carts,” Museum of the Fur Trade Quarterly 19 (Fall 1983): 1-12.  
326 Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 138; Walker, Lakota Society, 137. 
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Beau (Gray Eyes) killing one of his employees, a white man named Kermel (Kennel); 
while that of The Flame records the killing of two white men by a third, undoubtedly Le 
Beau.
327
  
George Catlin found more than twenty Teton Sioux bands encamped on the Fort 
Pierre Plain in the summer of 1832; their presence there provided the artist with the 
opportunity to observe them closely.  Writing from the mouth of the Teton (Bad) River, 
after having “descended the Missouri, a distance of six or seven hundred miles, in my 
little bark, with Bátiste and Bogard, my old ‘compagnons du voyage,” the artist expresses 
unqualified admiration for the Sioux as well as an appreciation for their unrestricted 
access both to abundant natural resources and to Euro-American trade goods:  
I am now in the heart of the country belonging to the numerous tribe of Sioux 
or Dahcotas, and have Indian faces and Indian customs in abundance around 
me. This tribe is one of the most numerous in North America, and also one of 
the most vigorous and warlike tribes to be found, numbering some forty or 
fifty thousand, and able undoubtedly to muster, if the tribe could be moved 
simultaneously, at least eight or ten thousand warriors, well mounted and well 
armed. This tribe take vast numbers of the wild horses on the plains towards 
the Rocky Mountains, and many of them have been supplied with guns; but 
the greater part of them hunt with their bows and arrows and long lances, 
killing their game from their horses’ backs while at full speed.328 
 
                                                             
327 Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 115, 138; Walker, Lakota Society, 137. The “Le Beau” referred to in 
these English translations of the various winter counts is undoubtedly that Frederick [or Frederic] 
LaBoue—alternately spelled “Laboue” and “Labone,” and known to the Sioux as “Grey Eyes”—who first 
went upriver to Fort Pierre on the Yellow Stone in 1832 and who later became one of the American Fur 
Company’s most innovative and successful traders; see Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail,” 5; Bray, 
“The Oglala Lakota and the Establishment of Fort Laramie,” 4, 12; Jackson, Voyages of the Steamboat 
Yellow Stone, 168. 
328 Catlin, North American Indians, 202. Catlin’s observation that the Tetons preferred bows, arrows, and 
lances for buffalo-hunting in the early 1830s, even though Northwest trade guns were available at Fort 
Pierre and elsewhere in considerable numbers—and many of the Indians already owned them—supports 
Charles E. Hanson, Jr.’s conclusion that the Sioux hunted buffalo at the turn of the nineteenth century in the 
same manner that Catlin witnessed. Interestingly, Hanson claims that hunting buffalo without firearms in 
the early 1800s was the main reason that the Tetons traded only for a few essential items such as metal 
knives and pots and wool blankets; conversely, although they still preferred to hunt buffalo with bows and 
arrows and lances in the early 1830s, the Sioux were by then trading for an astonishing variety and quantity 
of Euro-American trade goods—including luxury items.  
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There is no tribe on the Continent, perhaps, of finer looking men than the 
Sioux; and few tribes who are better and more comfortably clad, and supplied 
with the necessaries of life. There are no parts of the great plains of America 
which are more abundantly stocked with buffaloes and wild horses, nor any 
people more bold in destroying the one for food, and appropriating the other 
for their use.
329
 
 
Catlin also noted that the Fort Pierre Plain was “the nucleus or place of concentration of 
the numerous tribe of the Sioux, who often congregate here in great masses to make their 
trades with the American Fur Company”; 330 trade that would make it possible, over the 
next twenty years, for the Teton Sioux first to conquer the north-central plains and then to 
dominate the region so completely that the United States government would tacitly 
recognize that geo-political reality in the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851. Ironically, 
however, having reached the pinnacle of their military and political power relative to 
neighboring plains tribes and the United States government by 1851, the Western Sioux 
would be a mere three years away from discovering to their horror that their wealth in 
Euro-American trade goods had fostered only the illusion of independence.  
On 10 April 1833, Alexander Philip Maximilian, Prinz zu Wied-Neuwied [Prince of 
Wied-Neuwied] boarded the steamboat Yellow Stone at St. Louis bound for the upper 
Missouri. Accompanying the prince were hunter and taxidermist David Dreidoppel, and 
the artist Johann Karl Bodmer. The boat arrived at Fort Pierre on 30 May, the first of six 
days that afforded Maximilian and his party the opportunity to observe, and for Bodmer 
to paint, the Teton Sioux encamped there.
331
 And in at least one of his portraits—that of a 
                                                             
329 Ibid., 203-205.  
330 Ibid., 206. 
331 Wood et al., Karl Bodmer’s Studio Art, 2, 12; here in the introduction to this study, anthropologist W. 
Raymond Wood compares Bodmer’s portraiture with that of Catlin: “Only George Catlin can compete with 
Bodmer in the number of works portraying the Indians of the upper Missouri valley—but while few would 
doubt the purity of Catlin’s motives, the accuracy of some of his written work leaves much to be desired; 
some of it is flatly wrong or contradictory. His art, too, has been criticized [although] he was capable of 
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Lakota woman named Chan-Chä-Uiá-Teüin—Bodmer captured on canvas some of the 
luxury goods that many wealthier Sioux had accumulated through trade by the early 
1830s. After first noting that the “precision of Bodmer’s renderings [of objects] is 
inescapable and almost beyond superlatives,” Anthropologist W. Raymond Wood offers 
the following description:  
As did most of Bodmer’s male subjects, Chan-Chä-Uiá-Teüin carefully 
prepared herself for her portrait, and her clothing and jewelry demonstrate that 
she was from a well-to-do family. Like [Bodmer’s] portrait of [two Yankton 
warriors], her portrait reveals how the fur trade had insinuated itself among 
the Lakotas by the 1830s [emphasis added]. Her necklace is of blue and white 
glass trade beads, and she pulled tendrils of her hair through a series of beads 
to frame her face. She wore an extraordinary set of loop earrings made of 
trade beads. Small metal cones, or “tinklers,” decorate the fringes of her dress, 
and she wears a buffalo robe with the geometric “box and border” design, a 
highly regarded style among the Lakotas, especially for women. Her portrait 
reveals her status in a wealthy Lakota family because of the abundance of 
beads that embellish her hair and jewelry and because of the wonderful robe 
that she wears.
332
 
 
And, in addition to the wide variety of luxury items such as beads, buttons, combs, 
mirrors, and vermillion acquired by the Tetons at Fort Pierre, even a partial list of other 
valued trade goods must include: Northwest guns, gun powder, powder horns, flints, 
knives, battle axes, tomahawks, lances, colored blankets, tobacco, coffee, sugar, salt, 
pepper, metal awls and scrapers, metal arrow points, cloth and ready-made clothing, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
delicate nuances of facial expression. Bodmer was trained in the finest of European traditions, whereas 
Catlin was essentially self-trained. Bodmer often would spend several days on a single painting, while 
Catlin would paint several canvasses in the course of one day. While it is a disservice to call them 
caricatures, Catlin’s portraits and landscapes clearly lack the precision that Bodmer brought to his art.” 
332 Ibid., 13, 55-56; Wood’s detailed description of the luxury trade goods that appear in Bodmer’s painting 
of this Sioux woman strongly suggest that since the early 1800s Teton trading behavior had evolved well 
beyond exchanging buffalo robes for only a few practical items such as metal knives and cooking pots. For 
a classic treatment of both Catlin and Bodmer on the upper Missouri, other artists who painted the 
nineteenth-century American West, and a representative sampling of their work, see William H. 
Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire: The Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning of the American West 
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1966), 181-228. 
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needles. Indeed, as early as 1829, United States government officials had observed that 
“since the introduction of these articles [of trade] among the Indians, a corresponding 
change has taken place in their modes of life, and many of the tribes could not subsist, 
were they deprived of their accustomed supplies.”333 
The records of William Clark, Superintendent of Indian Affairs at St. Louis, contain a 
remarkable document from the fall of 1831that records in some detail the geographical 
descriptions by agency of the posts for trade with the Indian tribes within Clark’s 
jurisdiction. Under the heading “Upper Missouri Agency” is a catalogue of posts for the 
westernmost Sioux that includes this entry describing the Fort Pierre Plain and the 
location of Fort Tecumseh: “A tract of country not exceeding three miles square at a 
place called Hollow Wood on the Teton (Bad) River. A tract of country some space at the 
mouth of Teton (Bad) River.”334 But, with buffalo herds along the Missouri noticeably 
thinning, several bands of Oglalas and Brules had already begun to winter well to the 
west of that river near the Black Hills of present-day South Dakota and Wyoming. And in 
September of that year the Oglalas complained to William Laidlaw, bourgeois at Fort 
Tecumseh, about having to come all the way to Hollow Wood to trade, preferring instead 
to have a post near their winter encampments at the confluence of Rapid Creek and the 
south fork of the Cheyenne River.  American fur traders were quick to grasp the 
implications of the Lakotas’ increasing dependence on Euro-American trade goods. As 
early as the late 1820s, they had begun to shift their business west to accommodate those 
                                                             
333 James Austin Hanson, Metal Weapons, Tools, and Ornaments of the Teton Dakota Indians (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1975), 8-9; Schuler, Fort Pierre, 115-120; Senate Journal, 20th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 9 February 1829, 5; quoted in Schuler, Fort Pierre, 112. 
334 National Archives, Office of Indian Affairs, St. Louis Superintendency, 28 November 1831; reproduced 
in Charles E. Hanson, Jr., ed., “Trading on the Missouri and Upper Mississippi, 1831, Museum of the Fur 
Trade Quarterly 2 (Summer 1966): 7.  
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bands which had migrated and had begun, more or less permanently, to inhabit the plains 
just east of the Black Hills in present-day South Dakota and Wyoming. 
In February 1833, William H. Ashley responded to a request from Major Henry 
Dodge, commander of the United States Battalion of Mounted Rangers, for information 
regarding conditions beyond the settlements. Dodge was at that time preparing to lead an 
expedition among the western Indians to impress them with the power of the United 
States government. Although Ashley had by then retired from the fur trade and was 
instead serving in Washington, D.C. as a congressional representative from Missouri, his 
extensive experiences in that industry had secured his reputation as an authority on the 
West. In this case, Dodge sought Ashley’s opinion concerning routes through the region 
and conditions once there. Ashley’s written response, accompanied by a map copied from 
Jedediah Smith’s original manuscript map, fully justified Dodge’s confidence in Ashley’s 
knowledge. In his detailed letter, the former fur trader outlined a possible route for the 
expedition as well as the locations of certain tribes, their dispositions toward the United 
States, and their military potential.  
 One particularly-illuminating passage in Ashley’s report places the Tetons on the 
North Fork of the Platte seasonally and cautions Dodge to approach them only with a 
sizeable contingent of men: 
On reaching the south fork of the River Platt, marked on the map, Ashley’s 
route in 1824, I would send a detachment of not less than two hundred men to 
strike the north fork of said river near the point marked on the map, The 
Chimneys [Chimney Rock, near present Bayard, Nebraska]—thence to ascend 
that fork & join the Battn. at the foot of the mountains. The Shyannes, 
Arapahoes & a large band of the Sioux are in the habit, frequently in the 
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summer season of the year [emphasis added], of locating themselves on [the 
North Platte] river between the mountains and the Chimney.
335
 
 
The significance of Ashley’s observation as it pertains to the Sioux—and here he is 
almost certainly referring to the Oglalas—is that their presence on the North Platte at the 
time of his report was seasonal rather than year-round.
336
 
The Platte River valley, however, was only one of many summer hunting grounds that 
comprised an enormous region utilized by the Tetons—especially the Oglalas. 
Anthropologist James R. Walker deduced the vast extent of territory—including both 
summer hunting grounds and winter camps—covered by a single band of Oglalas over a 
twenty-one-year period by combining the birth years of certain prominent men from that 
band with information extrapolated from its winter counts: (White Hawk, b. 1819) that 
winter Bull Bear’s followers—the Kuinyan (Kiyuksa) band camped near the big bend of 
the Minnesota River in present-day Minnesota; (Red Cloud, b. 1821) that summer they 
hunted buffalo on the Smoky Hill River in present-day Kansas; (Little Wound, Bull 
Bear’s son, b. 1828) that summer the band chased buffalo on the headwaters of the south 
fork of the Cheyenne River in present-day Wyoming; (Wolf Ears, b. 1833) that summer 
Bull Bear’s people chased buffalo just east of the mountains on the south fork of the 
                                                             
335 National Archives Microfilm Publication 1637, roll 3, frames 1-10; reprinted in James S. Hutchins, ed., 
“A Letter From William H. Ashley,” Museum of the Fur Trade Quarterly 36 (Fall 2000): 2-5; Bray, “The 
Oglala Lakota and the Establishment of Fort Laramie,” 6. 
336 Bray, “The Oglala Lakota and the Establishment of Fort Laramie, 7. Here, the author expands upon 
Ashley’s brief notation concerning the Sioux in the Platte River valley: “Although other Lakotas, chiefly 
Brules and Miniconjous, were forging trade contacts as far south as Bent’s Fort, Ashley undoubtedly 
referred to the Oglalas. Moreover, it was the Kuinyan band, an important Oglala subdivision united under 
the leadership of the Bull Bear family that aggressively carved out the district [the Platte river valley] for 
Lakota use. Visitors were pressured to accept secondary status as guests of the Kuinyan. As early as 1822 
the band made a spring visit to Ash Hollow on the North Platte. In 1828 Bull Bear led the band far up the 
south fork of the Cheyenne River into the plains southwest of the Black Hills. In 1832 the Kuinyan 
ventured as far as the South Platte near the Colorado Rockies. Besides these band-level hunting operations, 
Ashley’s report implies that by 1832 the Kuinyan were hosting the Oglala tribal Sun Dance on the North 
Platte. Certainly in 1830 and 1831 Lakotas participated with the Cheyennes and Arapahos in joint 
offensives against the Pawnees, descending the North Platte in large villages.” See also Hyde, Red Cloud’s 
Folk, 40-42. 
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Platte River in present-day Colorado; (American Horse, b. 1840) they camped that winter 
near the mouth of Grand River in present-day North Dakota. Thus, according to Walker, 
“it appears that the Tetons usually made their winter camps near or east of the Missouri 
River, and in the summertime roamed as far north as well as up in North Dakota, as far 
west as the Rocky Mountains, as far south as well as down into Kansas.” 337 Walker 
demonstrates that even Bull Bear’s followers—the first Teton band to trade at Fort 
Laramie in 1834—did not remain in the Platte River valley year-round. Nevertheless, the 
founding of that fort in the spring of that year proved to be a pivotal event for the 
Kuinyans, the other Oglala bands, and, in fact, for all of the Western Sioux.   
VI   
Eighteen thirty-four marked a turning point in the history of both the Teton Sioux and 
the American fur trade for a number of reasons. First, the United States Congress 
thoroughly restructured federal Indian policy by reorganizing the Indian Office, by 
clarifying the duties of Indian agents, and by passing legislation to regulate the Indian 
trade in the lands west of the Mississippi River.
338
 Second, John Jacob Astor retired from 
the fur trade. As the result of negotiations concluded on 1 June 1834, he sold his interest 
in the American Fur Company to a firm whose most illustrious partner was Ramsay 
Crooks, former chief executive of Astor’s Northern Department. 339 Third, this new 
                                                             
337 Walker, Lakota Society, 88-89; No Ears Winter Count, 1819, 1821, 1828, 1833, 1840, in Walker, Lakota 
Society, 134-139. 
338 Robert A. Trennert, Alternative to Extinction: Federal Indian Policy and the Beginnings of the 
Reservation System, 1846-1851 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1975), 3-5.  
339 Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 365; here Chittenden claims that “Astor was no doubt partly 
influenced to take this step in view of impending changes which he foresaw must soon overtake the fur 
trade. While in London the summer before [1832] he had noted the beginning of the downfall of the beaver 
trade. He said in a letter written at the time: ‘I very much fear beaver will not sell very soon unless very 
fine. It appears that they make hats of silk in place of beaver.’” See also Phillips, The Fur Trade, 2: 466; 
here the author observes: “The French, who had lost all their fur dominions, had introduced the silk hat, 
which soon [by the 1840s] became more popular than either nutria or beaver.” In T. Lindsay Baker, 
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American Fur Company, now under the direction of Crooks, sold its Western Department 
to Pratte, Chouteau and Company with the stipulation that the AFC would furnish the 
trade goods and market the furs of the Western Department’s new owners.340 Fourth, the 
Rocky Mountain fur trade began to decline due to lack of demand for beaver pelts. 
341
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“Beaver to Buffalo Robes: Transition in the Fur Trade,” Museum of the Fur Trade Quarterly 23 (Spring 
1987), 5, the author explains the attraction of the fur-bearing nutria to fur traders: “The nutria is best 
described as a large water rat. The animal, living in the hundreds of thousands in southern South America, 
had a habitat near rivers and marshes, building in its dens on the banks or in nests in the water itself. The 
fur companies in the United States and Europe discovered that they could buy nutria skins in Buenos Aries 
and elsewhere in South America far cheaper than they could secure beaver pelts from the Rocky 
Mountains, and within a few years the nutria successfully displaced the beaver for almost all hat 
manufacture.” And in common with many fur trade scholars, Lindsay claims: “The final death blow for 
beaver came a few years later [early 1840s] with the introduction of silk as a substitute for animal hair in 
the manufacture of high-quality hats [emphasis added];” Scholars whom Lindsay cites for his conclusions 
include: David A. Dary, The Buffalo Book: The Full Saga of the American Animal (Chicago: The Swallow 
Press, 1974), 74-75; Charles E. Hanson, Jr., “The Nutria and the Beaver Pelt,” Museum of the Fur Trade 
Quarterly 12 (Fall 1976): 6-10; Horace T. Martin, Castorologica or the History and Traditions of the 
Canadian Beaver (Montreal: Wm. Drydale & Co.; London, England: Edward Stanford, 1892), 114; 
Phillips, The Fur Trade, II: 470-471; see also Gowans, Rocky Mountain Rendezvous, 144. Fur trade 
scholars are far from unanimous, however, in conceding that the introduction of silk hats was the most 
important reason for the decline of the beaver trade in the late 1830s. For instance, James Hanson writes 
“about the myth of the silk hat and the end of the rendezvous” and provides statistical evidence to support 
his conclusion that beaver pelt imports actually peaked in England in 1860 and rebounded in the United 
States during the late 1850s; see James A. Hanson, “The Myth of the Silk Hat and the End of the 
Rendezvous,” Museum of the Fur Trade Quarterly 36 (Spring 2000): 2-11. Hanson also offers for 
consideration a newspaper article from 1840 submitted by James S. Hutchins that claims federal import 
duties placed American traders at a serious disadvantage in their competition with Canadian traders; see 
Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), 24 December 1840 1:4; quoted in James A. Hanson, ed., “Source Material: 
Why the Rendezvous Ended,” Museum of the Fur Trade Quarterly 36 (Fall 2000): 6. Similarly, Paul C. 
Phillips argues that “the panic of 1837 put an end to high prices for [beaver] furs [while t]he costs of 
producing them could not be reduced.” Furthermore, “beaver imported into England from foreign parts was 
taxed four times the amount levied on imperial beaver,” again, making it nearly impossible for American 
firms to compete overseas; see Phillips, The Fur Trade, 2: 466, 559. Fred R. Gowans points to the changing 
character of the mountain men themselves—for the worse it turns out—as many of them found stealing 
horses in California to be a much more lucrative enterprise than trapping for furs; see Gowans, Rocky 
Mountain Rendezvous, 197.   
340 Schuler, Fort Pierre, 15.  
341 From the sixteenth century until the late 1840s the most profitable return on beaver pelts came from 
their use in the making of felt hats. In Russell, Firearms, Traps, & Tools of the Mountain Men, 5-6, the 
author first explains this fascinating process in detail and then concludes his discussion by agreeing with 
those scholars who lay the blame for the end of the beaver trade on silk hats: “For three hundred years 
before Lewis and Clark, the hatters of the world had raised a cry for beaver. In the day of the mountain 
man, 100,000 beaver skins were consumed each year in the production of hats for men. Dandies of the 
boulevards were not the only buyers of the ‘beavers;’ the armies of many nations wanted their own 
particular styles of beaver hats, and stalwarts in rural communities everywhere needed them for Sunday-go-
to-meeting dress. The beaver pelt as it came from the trader was a rough, greasy skin covered with coarse 
brown hair under which was the fine fur or wool. The first step in hatmaking was to shave both hair and 
wool from the skin. The bare skin was then sold to a maker of glue, and the wool and hair were separated 
by a blowing process. Only the wool found use in hatmaking. The soft, loose fur was applied in small 
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This last, highly significant development occurred simultaneously with the decision by 
William Sublette and Robert Campbell—partners in the St. Louis Fur Company, which 
they had formed during the winter of 1832-33—to construct a trading fort at the junction 
of Laramie’s Fork and the North Platte River. Their decision had everything to do with 
the Rocky Mountain beaver trade and virtually nothing to do with Teton Sioux 
migrations to the plains surrounding the Platte River valley.  
Throughout the spring, summer, and fall of 1833, the St. Louis Fur Company, still 
under the direction of Sublette and Campbell, challenged the American Fur Company for 
control of the upper Missouri fur trade by constructing nearly a dozen trading posts in the 
immediate vicinity of AFC establishments along that river; the most important of the St. 
Louis Fur Company posts was Fort William, located three miles below Fort Union. By 
virtue of its considerable financial reserves, however, American Fur Company negotiator 
Kenneth McKenzie forced Sublette and Campbell to offer their Missouri River posts for 
sale to the AFC. Nevertheless, Sublette was able to extract the concession from 
McKenzie that the American Fur Company would abandon the Rocky Mountain trade 
and restrict its future operations to the Missouri River. Sublette and Campbell were thus 
left free to concentrate all of their energies on the fur trade in the mountains; only New 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
quantities to a perforated copper revolving cone within which was a suction device that pulled the fur 
against the cone. A spray of hot water turned upon the fur-covered cone, together with manipulation of the 
fur with the hands, started the felting process. Repeatedly fur was added, and the manipulation continued 
until the felt became tough in texture. Then it was removed as a hood from the cone and placed in a mold 
where it was worked into the desired shape. While it was still soft and warm, shellac was forced into it 
from the inside. Fine fur was then applied to the outside of the shaped hat. With the aid of hot water and 
careful handwork the outer surface was made to appear covered with a growth of fur. The final step in 
making the dress hat was to give it a high gloss and embellish it with a band and lining. By means of a 
revolving block and the application of brushes, irons, sandpaper, and velvet, a finish as bright as that of silk 
was obtained. Because of its long velvety ‘pile’ or fur, the ‘beaver’ was characterized by an exquisite 
beauty that never distinguished the silk hat. Beaver-hat making is now a lost art. The introduction of silk in 
the 1830s gradually displaced beaver fur in the hatter’s industry [emphasis added]; today [1960s] ‘beavers’ 
are seldom found except in museum collections.”  
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Englander Nathaniel Wyatt remained a threat to their plans to supply the mountain outfits 
with trade goods exchanged for furs that they would then transport to St. Louis.
342
 
William Marshall Anderson accompanied Sublette’s caravan to the mountains in the 
spring of 1834 and became an eyewitness to Sublette’s decision to build Fort Laramie. In 
his journal entry for 30 May, Anderson recorded that “this evening we arrived at the 
mouth of Laramee’s Fork where Capt. Sublette intends to erect a trader’s fort.”343 And, 
for 31 May:  
This day we laid the foundation log [emphasis in the original] of a fort, on 
Laramee’s fork. A friendly dispute arose between our leader and myself, as to 
the name. He proposed to call it Fort Anderson, I insisted upon baptizing it 
Fort Sublette, and holding the trump card in my hand (a bottle of champagne) 
was about to claim the trick. Sublette stood by, cup reversed, still objecting, 
when Patton offered a compromise which was accepted, and the foam flew, in 
honor of Fort William, which contained the triad prenames of clerk, leader, 
and friend.
344
 
 
The establishment of Fort Laramie in 1834 proved to be a highly favorable 
development for the Teton Sioux—particularly for certain bands of Oglalas and Brules—
as the sizeable concentrations of Indians trading at the succession of posts located on the 
Fort Pierre Plain had significantly reduced the buffalo herds in that region. As a 
consequence of that reduction in their resource base, those Indians continued their 
westward migration in pursuit of more substantial herds and, as a result, forced many of 
the traders at Fort Pierre to follow them. In response to these traders’ complaints, the 
                                                             
342 Fred R. Gowans, Rocky Mountain Rendezvous: A History of the Fur Trade Rendezvous, 1825-1840 
(Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 1976; reprint, Layton, UT: Gibbs M. Smith, 1985), 80, 98-
99 (page citations are to the reprint edition); Hanson, “Fur Trade Activities in the Fort Laramie Region, 
1834-1849,” 8; Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail,” 4. 
343 Dale L. Morgan and Eleanor Towles Harris, eds., The Rocky Mountain Journals of William Marshall 
Anderson (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1967; reprint, Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1987), 108 
(page citations are to the reprint edition). 
344 Ibid. 
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American Fur Company eventually divided the trade between the two forts at a point 
along White River, a move that both increased Fort Laramie’s relative importance and 
further encouraged the westernmost Sioux to trade there.
345
 
Subsequent developments induced Sublette and Campbell to sell Fort William to 
Fontenelle, Fitzpatrick and Company in 1835. Ownership of the fort changed hands again 
a year later when Pratte, Chouteau and Company purchased it. Although that firm 
eventually rebuilt the fort of adobe brick in 1841 and rechristened the new structure Fort 
John, it had, almost from the beginning, been called Fort Laramie. With the acquisition of 
the fort in 1836 by Pratte, Chouteau and Company—generally known as the American 
Fur Company—the AFC had, by 1837, positioned itself to extend the Teton Sioux trade 
into the Platte River valley by utilizing a portion of “the old Spanish trail”; i.e., the Fort 
Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail.
346
 
As an integral feature of the American Fur Company’s trade with the Teton Sioux, 
the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail remained in year-round use from 1837 to 1849. The 
AFC trader generally recognized as the originator of the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail 
was a hard-driving, often violent man by the name of Frederick LaBoue—“Grey Eyes” to 
the Sioux.
347
 Although Sublette and Campbell had supplied Fort Laramie by way of the 
five-hundred- mile-long Platte River road, using it exclusively had proven to be too 
costly and was, therefore, a primary reason for their decision to sell out to Fontenelle, 
Fitzpatrick and Company, a firm that experienced similar financial difficulties utilizing 
                                                             
345 Colin Campbell, White River, to P. D. Papin, 29 December 1837, Chouteau Family , MHMA; quoted in 
Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail, 9; Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail,” 4-5.   
346 Hanson, “Fur Trade Activities in the Fort Laramie Region,” 9; Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail,” 
3. 
347 Earlier English translations of the Sioux winter counts in Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts spell 
“LaBoue” as “Le Beaux;” the spelling used here follows that found in the “Fort Tecumseh and Fort Pierre 
Journal and Letter Books,” ed. Charles Edmund De Land, notes by Doane Robinson, South Dakota 
Historical Collections, Vol. 9 (1918), passim; Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail,” passim.       
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the same road. LaBoue, however, conceived the complementary ideas of using Fort 
Pierre as both the main supply depot and fur storehouse for Fort Laramie—an option not 
available to the previous owners of the fort—and of transporting those supplies and furs 
over the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail. Not only was the overland route between the two 
posts two hundred miles shorter than the Platte River road, but Fort Pierre also possessed 
critical supplies, skilled labor, food stocks, and warehousing facilities needed by the 
traders. The American Fur Company already absorbed water transportation costs to and 
from Fort Pierre as part of the Company’s larger operations supplying the Upper 
Missouri Outfit’s numerous posts along the Missouri River; by 1837, the trail was a 
major component of Fort Pierre’s transportation network.348  
Within a year of the American Fur Company’s acquisition of Fort Laramie in 1836, 
LaBoue resolved to exploit the lucrative Indian trade in buffalo robes by establishing a 
number of smaller trading posts in the sheltered river valleys and creek beds between 
Forts Laramie and Pierre where the tribes generally wintered. LaBoue located one of 
them on Chadron Creek, near the modern town of Chadron, in the Pine Ridge country of 
present-day, northwestern Nebraska, and chose Missouri Frenchman, James Bordeaux to 
oversee it. Bordeaux’s trading post consisted of a one-room trading store, living quarters 
for Bordeaux and his family, a storeroom, fur press, and garden.
349
 
In common with many of the French traders, Bordeaux enhanced his trade with the 
Indians through marriage. By 1838, he had married an Arikara woman, who later left him 
to return to her people. Unwilling to sever his relationship with the Sioux, however, 
Bordeaux remained in their country and married a Brule woman named Huntkalutawin 
                                                             
348 Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail,” 5. 
349 “The Bordeaux Trading Post,” Museum of the Fur Trade, accessed 6 October 2011, http://www. 
furtrade.org/2brdx.html.  
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(Marie Bordeaux) the daughter of Lone Dog and sister of Swift Bear of the Corn Band.
350
 
Thus, the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail, anchored by those two major trading 
establishments, combined with the satellite posts strung along the entire length of the trail 
and the familial relationships fostered by many of the traders with their Indian trading 
partners, all served to connect the Teton Sioux to a global market economy that reached 
from the Platte River valley to the East Coast of the United States, and Europe. And 
although that intricate commercial network provided the Sioux with what had become, 
even long before 1837, vital Euro-American trade goods, their very indispensability 
fostered a dependency on that trade, a dependency with consequences that few Lakotas 
anticipated. 
                                                             
350 Charles E. Hanson, Jr., “James Bordeaux,” Museum of the Fur Trade Quarterly 2 (Spring 1966): 2. 
159 
 
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
 “THE GOLDEN YEARS: 
 
 THE FORT PIERRE-FORT LARAMIE TRAIL 
 AND 
 THE TETON ASCENDANCY, 
  1837-1846” 
 
 
I 
 
On or about 17 April 1837, an American Fur Company steamboat, the St. Peter’s, 
commissioned to carry annuity and trade goods to the Indian agencies and the Company’s 
fur trade posts of the upper Missouri, respectively, left St. Louis and began its journey 
upriver. In its wake, the ill-fated craft spread illness and death in the form of smallpox on 
an almost unimaginable scale among the upper Missouri tribes all the way from the Great 
Bend of the Missouri to Fort Union and beyond. The epidemic permanently overturned 
the region’s geo-politics, temporarily disrupted the upper Missouri fur trade, and, created 
circumstances that inexorably forced several bands of Western Sioux—particularly those 
of the Brules and Oglalas—into Fort Laramie’s trade orbit. And from 1837 to 1849, the 
American Fur Company supplied that fort by the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail, a 
transportation innovation capable of sustaining Fort Laramie’s large business volume and 
that, in turn, encouraged those bands of Tetons that regularly traded there to occupy the 
Platte River valley year-round.  
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The route traced by the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail neatly bisected the vast 
region—anchored by Fort Pierre on the Missouri and Fort Laramie on the Platte—that the 
Teton Sioux freely ranged and permanently occupied beginning in the late 1830s and 
lasting until their dispersal in 1854.
351
 Fur traders who actually used the trail made few 
written references to it, undoubtedly thinking of it as just one more “humdrum” aspect of 
what were, to them, routine operations, although in later years they might occasionally 
rough-out a map of the trail for interested cartographers.
352
 Of them all, apparently only 
Rufus Sage left a written record of his passage of the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail.
353
  
Francis Parkman made one of the few contemporary references to it in his account of 
an altercation at Fort Laramie between a French-Canadian engage named Perrault and the 
fort’s bourgeois, James Bordeaux. The context of the reference is illuminating for its 
glimpse of the volatile relations that often prevailed among the isolated employees of the 
American Fur Company. Parkman writes: 
When we reached [Fort Laramie], a man came out of the gate with a pack at 
his back and a rifle on his shoulder; others were gathering about him, shaking 
him by the hand, as if taking leave. I thought it a strange thing that a man 
should set out alone and on foot for the prairie. I soon got an explanation. 
                                                             
351 Fur trade scholars Charles E. Hanson, Jr. and his son, James A. Hanson, relied heavily on the 
information contained in the “Report of Lieutenant G. K. Warren, Topographical Engineer of the ‘Sioux 
Expedition,’ Of Explorations in the Dacota Country, 1855,” particularly the “Plot of the Route from Fort 
Laramie to Fort Pierre, August 1849,” P & R File, Map 31, Records Group 92, National Archives and 
Records Administration, “Journal 1855,” Box 5, Warren Papers for their respective descriptions of the trail 
in Hanson, “The Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail” and Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail.” While the 
elder Hanson notes that the trail “has received little historic notice, probably because it both began and 
ended in the far wilderness,” he also points out that, in the original 1902 edition of Chittenden, American 
Fur Trade, the author indicated the trail on a map that accompanied the work and referred to it several 
times in the text. Yet another detailed depiction of the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail appears in Charles 
Edmund De Land, “Basil Clement,” South Dakota Historical Collections, Vol. 11 (1922): 243-389; here 
De Land identifies the trail by name and includes its path on a fine map of western trails. The description of 
the trail that appears in this essay relies almost exclusively on the two Hanson articles.   
352 Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail,” 5. 
353 Rufus B. Sage: His Letters and Papers, 1836-1847; With an Annotated Reprint of His “Scenes in the 
Rocky Mountains, and in Oregon, California, New Mexico, Texas, and the Grand Prairies,” with an 
introduction, biographical sketch, and notes by LeRoy R. Hafen and Ann W. Hafen (Glendale, CA: Arthur 
Clark, 1956), 232-240; Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail,” 5. 
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Perrault—this, if I recollect right, was the Canadian’s name—had quarreled 
with the bourgeois, and the fort was too hot to hold him. Bordeaux, inflated 
with his transient authority, had abused him, and received a blow in return. 
The men then sprang at each other, and grappled in the middle of the fort. 
Bordeaux was down in an instant, at the mercy of the incensed Canadian; had 
not an old Indian, the brother of his squaw, seized hold of his antagonist, it 
would have fared ill with him. Perrault broke loose from the old Indian, and 
both the white men ran to their rooms for their guns; but when Bordeaux, 
looking from his door, saw the Canadian, gun in hand, standing in the area 
and calling on him to come out and fight, his heart failed him; he chose to 
remain where he was. In vain the old Indian, scandalized by his brother-in-
law’s cowardice, called upon him to go to the prairie and fight it out in the 
white man’s manner; and Bordeaux’s own squaw, equally incensed, screamed 
to her lord and master that he was a dog and an old woman. It all availed 
nothing. Bordeaux’s prudence got the better of his valor, and he would not 
stir. Perrault stood showering opprobrious epithets at the recreant bourgeois, 
till, growing tired of this, he made up a pack of dried meat, and, slinging it at 
his back, set out alone for Fort Pierre, on the Missouri, a distance of three 
hundred miles, over a desert country, full of hostile Indians.
354
   
 
The Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail paralleled two major drainage systems for much of 
its distance: the Bad (Teton) and White Rivers; the trail also cut perpendicularly to the 
Niobrara River and Rawhide Creek before terminating at Fort Laramie. After departing 
Fort Pierre, the trail headed west, southwest up the Bad [Teton] River to its source, a 
distance of approximately 110 miles. The river rushed by in a deep and narrow channel 
shouldered by gently-sloping terrain generously supplied with grass and firewood. The 
trail then turned abruptly south at the river’s source and cut through the Badlands headed 
for White River. Three springs afforded drinking water for this portion of the trail.
355
 The 
Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail struck the White River valley 160 miles from Fort Pierre at 
the approximate half-way point and continued up the north bank of the White into the 
                                                             
354 Parkman, The Oregon Trail, 121-122.  
355 The southernmost of the three springs, known now as Harney Spring, then as Ash Spring, surfaced just 
outside the Badlands at a point that, today, denotes the rough northern limit of the Pine Ridge Indian 
Reservation; see Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail,” 6.  
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Pine Ridge country until near the present site of Whitney, Nebraska, where it crossed 
over to the south bank of the river to avoid the suddenly-difficult terrain lining the north 
bank.
356
  
Eighty miles northeast of Fort Laramie the trail split, with one fork, the western, more 
suited for pack animals and accepted by traders indifferent to uneven ground and scarce 
fuel and water. As this branch of the trail neared the source of White River, sheer cliffs 
compelled the traders to cross it perhaps a dozen times in one ten-mile stretch. The road 
then veered to the southwest after leaving the Pine Ridge country, finally striking the 
Niobrara. As its banks were devoid of firewood, winter travel forced the crews to pack 
their own when snow buried the buffalo chips that generally served as fuel along that 
stretch of the road.
357
  
The western branch then threaded its way into present-day Wyoming and on toward 
upper Rawhide Creek. Once across that stream, the trail finally met the North Platte at its 
confluence with the Laramie River and terminated at the fort itself. The total distance of 
this route from Fort Pierre averaged anywhere from 319 to 326. The westernmost fork of 
the trail served as an “express” route when making good time to and from Fort Laramie 
was important; it also offered the traders readier access to the Indian camps on the upper 
White River and in the western and southern Black Hills than its more easterly 
counterpart.
358
 
The eastern fork of the trail, although twenty miles longer than the western, was 
considerably less demanding on both the traders and their stock. The eastern branch left 
the White River before striking the precipitous canyon walls near its source. As the trail 
                                                             
356 Hanson, “A Forgotten Fur Trade Trail,” 6.  
357 Ibid. 
358 Ibid. 
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next wound its way up the valley of Deadman Creek, the traders first encountered a 
single “very steep” hill followed by six miles of jagged terrain across a pine-covered 
ridge, twelve miles of gently-rolling plains, before cutting the Niobrara twelve miles 
below where the western fork had crossed it. At Horn Spoon Butte near the present-day 
Nebraska-Wyoming border, springs provided fresh drinking water as the trail turned to 
the west and continued on to Rawhide Creek before finally reaching the North Platte 
eight miles below Fort Laramie. The eastern branch thus offered numerous opportunities 
to rest after a demanding journey of hundreds of miles.
359
 
Sturdy wagons pulled by oxen and strings of pack mules and horses afforded most of 
the heavy transport on the trail; nevertheless, carts—particularly, the Red River type of 
two-wheeled cart—also carried much of the traffic; and, significantly, the Fort Pierre-
Fort Laramie Trail almost certainly represented the southernmost use of the Red River 
cart.
360
 There are numerous references to the use of these carts in contemporary accounts. 
For example, in 1833 at Fort William on the Missouri—the opposition post built by 
Robert Campbell and William Sublette to challenge Fort Union’s hold on the region’s 
trade—Charles Larpenteur used “an old cart purchased from some half-breeds.”361 The 
traders undoubtedly manufactured their own carts; Robert Campbell noted in his journal 
for December 1833 that, because “they are very useful,” he had already finished 5 carts 
                                                             
359 Ibid. 
360 The finest description of these carts, complete with a photograph and four scale drawings of the 
Smithsonian Red River cart collected in 1882 is in Charles E. Hanson, Jr., “Red River and Other Carts,” 
Museum of the Fur Trade Quarterly 19 (Fall 1993): 1-12.    
361 Larpenteur, Forty Years A Fur Trader, 54; here, too, Larpenteur’s editor, Elliott Coues, writes of the 
carts: “This was a one-horse, two wheeled cart built of wood without any iron whatsoever, the ramshackle 
affair being held together with rawhide. But the ‘Red River cart,’ as it was called because it was made in 
this fashion by the Canadian French and their half-breeds of the Red River of the North, answered all 
ordinary purposes, and many thousands of these primitive vehicles were in use during the years of which 
Larpenteur writes [1833-1872], especially on the annual buffalo hunts which were conducted on the plains 
in large companies.” 
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with harnesses “and material was on hand for 6 more.”362 While the traders used but a 
single horse to pull most of the carts, some required two or more draft animals to carry 
the heaviest loads along the trail. Following especially good trading seasons, two or three 
round trips by as many as 100 carts might be necessary to haul the more than 25,000 
buffalo robes exchanged at Fort Laramie and carried to Fort Pierre.
363
 And this 
transportation network created by Frederick LaBoue and the Chouteau Company between 
Fort Laramie and Fort Pierre also readily accommodated the establishment of smaller, 
intermediate posts to facilitate trade with those wide-ranging people. 
II 
The 1837 outbreak of smallpox on the upper Missouri, a demographic catastrophe of 
unprecedented proportions that would have far-reaching consequences for all of the 
Indian tribes of that region, began with the debarkation from St. Louis of the American 
Fur Company steamboat, St. Peter’s. Laden with annuity goods for the tribes and trade 
goods and supplies for the Company’s upriver posts, the steamboat also carried Joshua 
Pilcher, Indian agent for the Sioux, and Indian subagent for the Mandans, William N. 
Fulkerson. In a tragic irony, by the time the epidemic had abated, smallpox had reduced 
the tribal population of the Mandans to a level “below the genetic survival threshold” and 
virtually ended that tribe’s military, political, and economic influence on the upper 
Missouri. The Teton Sioux and other mounted hunters, however, “more nomadic and less 
damaged by the disease, moved farther westward into areas where game still could be 
                                                             
362 George Brooks, ed., Robert Campbell’s Journal (St. Louis, 1964), 29, 34.  
363 Hanson, “Red River and Other Carts,” 3; Hanson, “The Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail,” 5; Hanson, “A 
Forgotten Fur Trade Trail,” 6-7. 
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procured.” In the case of the Sioux, “farther westward” meant the buffalo-rich plains 
surrounding Fort Laramie and the Platte River valley.
364
      
In addition to Pilcher and Fulkerson, the St. Peter’s carried its crew and other AFC 
employees, as well as a number of Indians headed for the upper Missouri and home; 
Bernard Pratte, Jr. piloted the vessel.
365
 Pratte was the son of that same Bernard Pratte, 
                                                             
364 Clyde D. Dollar, “The High Plains Smallpox Epidemic of 1837-38,” The Western Historical Quarterly 8 
(January 1977): 15.  
365 James A. Hanson, “An Interesting Reference to the Upper Missouri Smallpox Epidemic of 1837,” 
Museum of the Fur Trade Quarterly 47 (Spring 2011): 2. Here Hanson briefly describes the voyage of the 
St. Peter’s and the effects of the epidemic on the Indians of the upper Missouri to provide the context for 
introducing a letter written by Pratte that confirms the steamboat’s complement was very aware that 
smallpox was aboard long before they reached the Sioux agency below Fort Pierre. The most recent 
account of the entire episode is found in Dollar, “High Plains Smallpox Epidemic,” 15-38; other extended 
treatments of the epidemic appear in Chittenden, American Fur Trade, II: 613-620 [somewhat surprisingly, 
Chittenden does not even mention the 1837 voyage of the St. Peter’s in his History of Early Steamboat 
Navigation]; and DeVoto, Wide Missouri, 279-301. Regarding the cause[s] of the epidemic, here Dollar 
holds both Chittenden and DeVoto accountable for a “recriminatory [historiographical] approach [that] has 
grown in sinister connotations until, in recent times, the white man in general stands indicted of 
premeditated Indian genocide through the introduction of smallpox.” According to Dollar, the list of 
scholars who later adopted and expanded upon this “recriminatory approach,” includes William T. Hagan, 
Buffy Sainte-Marie, Angie Debo, and others. For instance, Dollar writes that “Chittenden castigated the 
American Fur Company for its role in the epidemic and pointed to a purloined blanket as the principal 
means of introducing the scourge to the Mandan.” And Dollar claims that DeVoto “ also pinned the blame 
on the American Fur Company and a stolen blanket [despite] being more moderate in his condemnations;” 
see Dollar, “High Plains Smallpox Epidemic,” 16. But a more careful reading of both Chittenden and 
DeVoto reveals that neither author subscribed to what Dollar terms “a rather pointed racial indictment.” For 
instance, according to Chittenden: “The plague was introduced through the annual steamboat St. Peters 
[sic], of the American Fur Company, which according to Larpenteur, arrived at Fort Union on the 24th of 
June 1837; see Charles Larpenteur, Forty Years a Fur Trader on the Upper Missouri: The Personal 
Narrative of Charles Larpenteur, 1833-1872, 2, ed. by Elliott Coues (Reprint, Minneapolis: Ross & 
Haines, 1962), I: 131-132. Some accounts say there was but a single case on board, but it appears certain 
that there were several. The course of the American Fur Company on this occasion was in many respects 
culpable, for, knowing the terrible effects of the disease, it should not have permitted the infected boat to 
visit the tribes. The situation, however, was a very difficult one to deal with. The Indians expected the boat 
and knew that it had many goods for them, and if it failed to arrive they could never have been made to 
understand that it was not because of an attempt to rob them. Moreover, to have returned and sent up 
another steamboat would have been impossible, for the river would have been too low by that time. As the 
company would be the greatest sufferer from any epidemic among the Indians, they [ie., the AFC] cannot 
be accused of any selfish motives in the course they pursued [my italics]; see Chittenden, American Fur 
Trade, II: 613. And DeVoto adds: “This narrative will not be suspected of admiring the business ethics of 
the Company. But it must protest the tendency of twentieth-century historians to hold the eighteen-thirties 
in American history to ideas which the eighteen-thirties had never heard of, which they would not have 
understood, and which produce confusion or nonsense when imposed on them today. In the fifth decade of 
the twentieth century [DeVoto first published Across the Wide Missouri in 1947] it is easy to say that the 
St. Peter’s should have tied up somewhere till the smallpox aboard had burned out, or should have returned 
to St. Louis, and that meanwhile the Indians should have been kept away from her. Try to do it. In 1837 the 
germ theory and the concept of immunization did not exist: Pasteur was ten years short of investigating 
even his silkworms. No one knew how smallpox was communicated. If the best physicians of America had 
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Sr. who, along with Pierre Chouteau, Jr., had purchased John Jacob Astor’s Western 
Department in 1834 and subsequently formed Pratte, Chouteau and Company. Although 
the younger Pratte, too, nurtured interests in the fur trade and eventually became a 
principal partner in Pratte and Cabanne Fur Company, he first became fascinated with 
steamboat navigation. Having distinguished himself earlier with service aboard the 
Yellow Stone, and later supervising the construction of and commanding its successor on 
the upper Missouri, the Assiniboine, Pratte, in the spring and summer of 1837, found 
himself piloting the deadliest vessel yet to ply the unpredictable waters of the Missouri 
River, the St. Peter’s. 366  
On 29 April, a mere thirteen days out of St. Louis, as the St. Peter’s docked at Fort 
Leavenworth, a deckhand described by Pilcher as a “mulatto” already lay ill with fever. 
Pratte, understandably reluctant to pronounce the man sick with smallpox, declined to 
abandon him onshore despite the fact that Fulkerson had apparently recommended doing 
so. But even before the St. Peter’s reached the Oto, Omaha, and Pawnee agency at 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
been aboard the St. Peter’s they would have done exactly what the Company agents did [emphasis added]: 
they would have instructed the uninfected to avoid miasmas, to eat no foods that were held to alter the 
proportions of mythical bodily attributes, and on the first symptoms of any illness whatever to take strong 
physics and various magical substances. The best physicians knew empirically that it was best to isolate 
smallpox victims as soon as you knew what they were suffering from (long after they had become 
infectious); the Company agents had the same knowledge and acted on it. But no one had any 
understanding of the rationale of quarantine [emphasis added];” see DeVoto, Wide Missouri, 296-297. 
Clearly, neither Chittenden nor DeVoto accuse the American Fur Company of “premeditated Indian 
genocide;” indeed, DeVoto, in particular, forcefully argues against such a historiographical “recriminatory 
approach.” Dollar also claims the credit for uncovering “evidence overlooked by Chittenden and DeVoto 
and the recriminating historians who have followed them” and exposing the legend of the “purloined 
blanket” which supposedly first introduced smallpox into the Arikara village. But Dollar’s claim is without 
merit, for here too, upon closer examination, DeVoto also attributes the story of the stolen blanket to 
“rumor and folklore created by the epidemic.” And while Chittenden does include the theft of the blanket in 
his narrative, he is too cautious to attribute the spread of the disease to so simple a causal relationship; 
indeed, even Dollar concedes that “there may have been a stolen blanket purloined from a deckhand when 
the steamboat docked at Fort Clark,” but, more emphatically than Chittenden, insists that “this blanket 
could hardly have been the primary means whereby the disease came among the Mandan;” see Dollar, 
“High Plains Smallpox Epidemic,” 32-34; Chittenden, American Fur Trade, II: 614; DeVoto, Wide 
Missouri, 295.     
366 Hanson, “An Interesting Reference,” 2.  
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Council Bluffs, the “mulatto” deckhand manifested the unmistakable advanced symptoms 
of smallpox, and several other unfortunate victims also displayed at least the initial 
symptoms of the disease. It was here that three Arikara women boarded the St. Peter’s for 
passage upriver to join their tribe, which had only recently settled with the Mandans and 
Hidatsas living in the vicinity of Fort Clark.
367
  
Two weeks after leaving Fort Leavenworth the crew and passengers of the St. Peter’s 
found themselves waiting impatiently at the mouth of the Niobrara River for the waters of 
the Missouri to raise enough to permit further progress upriver.
368
 There, Pratte wrote a 
letter to his cousin, Pierre Chouteau, Jr., disclosing that even by 29 May smallpox was 
raging among those aboard the vessel; an independent trader named Narcisse Leclerc 
passed by the St. Peter’s and bore the letter to St. Louis. The letter provides a revealing 
glimpse of both the unpredictable nature of Missouri River navigation and the enormous 
variety of supplies and trade goods required to sustain the upper Missouri fur trade during 
that period; in fact, Pratte devotes most of the letter to these subjects.
369
 Ominously, 
                                                             
367 Dollar, “High Plains Smallpox Epidemic,” 20. This  article is an exacting and thoroughly-researched 
account that, unlike other narratives of the epidemic, incorporates “assistance [in] the form of comments 
and suggestions” from a medical professional, in this case, Karl H. Wegner, M.D., at the time of writing, 
chairman of the department of pathology, University of Medical School at Vermillion, and director of the 
Laboratory of Clinical Medicine in Sioux Falls, South Dakota and, subsequently, dean of the School of 
Medicine, University of South Dakota. Dollar also consulted no fewer than eight professional medical 
references for “the clinical manifestations of smallpox.” The author’s primary research focused on what, at 
the time of writing, were “newly available source documents”: Letters Received by the Office of Indian 
Affairs, 1824-80, Microcopy No. 234, National Archives Microfilm Publications, (Washington: The 
National Archives, 1966); more specifically, those records of the Upper Missouri Agency, 1824-74, roll 
884, 1836-51.  
368 In period fur trade accounts, the Niobrara River appears as Eau qui Court, its mouth as “Running 
Water.”   
369 For example, Pratte writes: “To start with, the water left us at Beausoleil Island and since then I have 
done nothing but portage. Then I was obliged to wait for water at the Omahas, two other times between 
there and the Vermillion [River] and one other time at 10 or 12 miles above that river; having grounded the 
Barge with 160 bars of lead, and 8 or 10 axes, our wheel arms and Bucket planks [parts for steamboat 
paddle wheels]. The water came up a little, but has fallen since dinner. I do not believe I will be able to 
make it to the Little Missouri with this set-up.” And even prevented from continuing upriver, Pratte 
pursued the business of the fur trade: “I wanted to follow my cousin’s instructions to buy the [fur] packs of 
Mr. Leclerc but that’s not something he wanted to do. Following the same instructions I did not deliver Mr. 
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however, he also adds three sentences that, while illuminating, barely hint at the 
widespread devastation that the epidemic would soon wreak among the unsuspecting 
Indians: “As an added blessing I have smallpox on board. We buried this morning Vital 
Papin, and have 8 new cases, two since yesterday. I do not know where this will end 
[emphasis added].” It would, in fact, end with the near-total annihilation of the Mandans. 
That tribe suffered a loss rate of over ninety percent, leaving fewer than one hundred 
survivors out of a tribe that had previously numbered roughly sixteen hundred 
individuals. The total number of dead among the other Missouri River tribes, including 
the Blackfoot, Crows, Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras, exceeded 15,000 souls.
370
   
By the time the boat reached the Sioux agency on 5 June, all three women exhibited 
the advanced symptoms of smallpox, and it was here, too, that Pilcher disembarked to 
begin distributing annuity goods to the various bands of Yankton and Santee Sioux 
gathered there. In only twenty-five days, smallpox had spread rapidly among those Sioux 
encamped at the agency and forced entire bands to scatter. Pilcher thereafter warned all 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Dixon his goods and I plan to leave the balance of the outfit at the Little Missouri; articles to be left include 
1 pr. Cart wheels, 1 Medicine chest, 1 demijohn of vinegar, 1 cast iron kettle, 4 pigs or 285 lbs. of lead, 1 
box tea 13#, 2 Boxes tobacco, 700 lbs. powder, 2 Bbls. Flour, 1 Bbl. Pork, 2 scythes & snaths, Box No. 8, 
Bale No. 380, 1 Box Sugar. He should be going down to St. Louis but he intended to leave the packs at the 
Vermillion in charge of Mr. Labruyere, and that I will pick them up when I go down.”  Bernard Pratte, Jr. 
to Pierre Chouteau, Jr., Running Water, 29 May 1837, Museum of the Fur Trade Collections, Chadron, 
Nebraska; quoted in Hanson, “An Interesting Reference,” 4.   
370 The estimate of a greater-than- ninety-percent casualty rate among the Mandans is from DeVoto, Across 
the Wide Missouri, 287; and on p. 295 in the same volume, DeVoto, citing an unspecified report by the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, gives a figure of 17,200 dead for the Mandans, Arikaras, Hidatsas, Sioux, 
Assiniboins, and Blackfoot; the estimate of 15,000 dead between the Missouri River tribes listed above is 
from Chittenden, American Fur Trade, II: 619, who credits David D. Mitchell, first a clerk and later a 
partner in the Upper Missouri Outfit, with the figure; In Hanson, “An Interesting Reference,” 3, the author 
writes: “Before the disease ran its course, ten out of twelve Indians living around Fort Union were dead. It 
killed at least 700 Blackfeet, 800 Assiniboines, 2,500 Pawnees, and an unknown number of Lakota, 
Dakota, Nakota, and Canadian Indians;” unfortunately, he fails to specify his source. Each of these 
estimates clearly indicates a depopulation of the Missouri River Indians of staggering proportions; and one 
that would have far-reaching geopolitical consequences for the survivors. 
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Sioux bands, including the Tetons, not to trade at any posts on the Missouri that 
summer.
371
  
The St. Peter’s stopped at Fort Pierre on the sixth or seventh of June and took aboard 
one Jacob Halsey, formerly in command there, but now recently ordered to take charge at 
Fort Union. In what was but the beginning of a series of tragic events for all the Indians 
of the Missouri River valley from the Council Bluffs to the Blackfoot country, Halsey 
arrived at Fort Union already in the incubation stage of the disease, having contracted it 
from someone heading upriver on board the St. Peter’s. Fortunately for Fort Union’s new 
bourgeois, he became only mildly sick due to the smallpox vaccination he had received 
somewhat earlier in life. Unfortunately, however, for thousands of Indians even the mild 
variety transmits the disease in its most virulent form.
372
  
Following the arrival of the St. Peter’s and its deadly cargo at Fort Union, but 
tragically unaware of this immutable medical fact, American Fur Company clerk, Charles 
Larpenteur and several others eventually took what they believed to be positive steps to 
avert a catastrophe. Larpenteur himself depicts their efforts in his Personal Narrative: 
After my return from the Canoe camp nothing worthy of remark took place 
until the arrival of the steamer, late in June. The mirth usual on such occasions 
was not of long duration, for immediately on the landing of the boat we 
learned that smallpox was on board. Mr. J. Halsey, the gentleman who was to 
take charge this summer, had the disease, of which several of the hands had 
died; but it had subsided, and this was the only case on board. Our only 
apprehensions were that the disease might spread among the Indians, for Mr. 
Halsey had been vaccinated and soon recovered. Prompt measures were 
adopted to prevent an epidemic. As we had no vaccine matter we decided to 
inoculate with the smallpox itself; and after the systems of those who were to 
                                                             
371 Ibid., 20-21; Sunder, Joshua Pilcher, 123-124. For an overview of the various Indian agencies in the 
upper Missouri country during this time period, see Chester L. Guthrie and Leo L. Gerald, “Upper Missouri 
Agency: An Account of Indian Administration on the Frontier,” Pacific Historical Review 10 (March 
1941): 47-56. 
372 Ibid., 21-22. 
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be inoculated had been prepared according to Dr. Thomas’ medical book, the 
operation was performed upon about 30 Indian squaws and a few white men. 
This was done with the view to have it all over and everything cleaned up 
before any Indians should come in, on their fall trade, which commenced early 
in September.
373
 
 
Tragically, the results of their efforts were ineffective; Larpenteur continues: 
 
The smallpox matter should have been taken from a healthy person; but, 
unfortunately, Mr. Halsey was not sound, and the operation proved fatal to 
most of our patients. About 15 days afterward there was such a stench in the 
fort that it could be smelt at the distance of 300 yards. It was awful—the scene 
in the fort, where some went crazy, and others were half eaten up by maggots 
before they died; yet singular to say, not a single bad expression was ever 
uttered by a sick Indian. Many died, and those who recovered were so much 
disfigured that one could scarcely recognize them.
374
  
 
III 
Despite the severity of the smallpox epidemic of 1837 on the sedentary Indians 
of the upper Missouri, most of the nomads—with the unfortunate exception of the 
Blackfoot and Assiniboins, in particular—escaped the worst ravages of the disease. 
The Western Sioux, in particular the Brules, Oglalas, and Minneconjous, appear to 
have done so by scattering to the south and west of their previous ranges and 
reestablishing a year-round presence on the plains surrounding the Platte River 
valley. Sioux winter counts for the years beginning with and immediately following 
the epidemic confirm this migration and, by omission, reflect the relatively minor 
effects of the smallpox outbreak on the Western Sioux. For example, for the critical 
                                                             
373 Larpenteur, Forty Years a Fur Trader, 131-132. For an outstanding analysis of the American Fur 
Company’s efforts to stop the spread of the epidemic, see David L. Ferch, “Fighting the Smallpox 
Epidemic of 1837-38: The Response of the American Fur Company Traders,” Museum of the Fur Trade 
Quarterly 19 (Winter 1983):2-7; David L. Ferch, “Fighting the Smallpox Epidemic of 1837-38: The 
Response of the American Fur Company Traders (Conclusion),” Museum of the Fur Trade Quarterly 20 
(Spring 1984): 4-9. 
374 Ibid., 132-133. 
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year 1837-38, the winter counts of American Horse, Cloud Shield, No Ears, Short 
Man, and Iron Crow all record the killing of Paints-His Cheeks-Red (alternately 
translated as “Paints the Lower Half of His Face Red”) and his family by the 
Pawnees on the North Platte, an event that foreshadowed the bitter warfare between 
that tribe and the Western Sioux—principally the Brules and Oglalas—that 
developed as a result of the latter’s permanent occupation of the Platte River 
valley.
375
 And the impact of the epidemic on the Tetons seems to have been so 
slight that the 1837-38 winter counts of the Flame, Lone Dog, and the Swan all tell 
only of a relatively colorless event—a successful hunt during which the Sioux 
killed over one hundred elk.
376
  
But if the winter counts are silent regarding the smallpox outbreak of 1837 on the 
upper Missouri, for the next ten years they do tell part of the story of the Tetons’ 
conquest of the north-central plains by recording the ever-accelerating pace of intertribal 
warfare between the Teton Sioux and the Pawnees, Snakes [Shoshones], Crows, 
Arapahos, and Flatheads.
377
 For instance, the winter counts of American Horse and Cloud 
Shield for 1839-39 document the efforts of Spotted Horse and Crazy Dog, respectively, 
                                                             
375 Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 139; Walker, Lakota Society, 138-139; Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 47-50; 
here Hyde relates how  the Medicine Arrow fight between the Cheyennes and the Pawnees—a fight in 
which the latter tribe captured the Cheyenne’s four sacred medicine arrows—attracted the notice of the 
Tetons who, from that time on, became increasingly involved in war with the Pawnees, a war that would, 
by the 1870s, drive them from their hunting grounds on the Platte and Loup Rivers in Nebraska  to Indian 
Territory in present-day Oklahoma. Also according to Hyde, the “Brulés appear to have played the leading 
part in attacks on the Pawnee earth-lodge villages, while the Oglalas, after they moved to the Platte, 
devoted much of their attention to harrying the Pawnees when they came westward into the plains on their 
semi-annual buffalo hunts.”  An account of the Medicine Arrow fight is in George Bird Grinnell, The 
Fighting Cheyennes (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 72-73. For an award-winning account 
of the Pawnee exodus and that tribe’s struggle with the Sioux, see Wishart, An Unspeakable Sadness; see 
also, George E. Hyde, The Pawnee Indians [1954], reprint, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974.  
376 Ibid., 117. 
377 For two outstanding treatments of intertribal warfare on the Great Plains, see John C. Ewers, “Intertribal 
Warfare As the Precursor of Indian-White Warfare on the Northern Great Plains,” Western Historical 
Quarterly 6 (October 1975): 397-410; Colin G. Calloway, “The Inter-Tribal Balance of Power on the Great 
Plains, 1760-1850, Journal of American Studies 16 (April 1982): 25-47. 
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to raise war parties against the Pawnees to avenge the death of Paints-His Cheeks-Red.
378
 
Also for that year, No Ears recorded that a Sioux war party, undoubtedly organized by 
one of the two men above, “went out to fight,” presumably the Pawnees. While both 
Short Man and Iron Crow credit the war party with retrieving stolen Oglala horses, and 
although Battiste Good indicated that the Oglalas “killed one hundred Pawnees,” 
imminent starvation apparently forced the Sioux to eat many of the captured horses.
379
 
For the eventful year 1839-40, The Flame recounted the killing of twenty lodges of 
Arapahos; Lone Dog, the killing by the Sioux of an entire village of Snake [Shoshone] 
Indians; The Swan, that a band under Minneconjou chief, The Hard, killed seven lodges 
of Arapahos; American Horse, that the Shoshones killed Left Hand Big Nose, an Oglala 
                                                             
378 Ibid., 139-140; here, based upon information obtained from his Indian informants, Mallery describes the 
elaborate Teton rituals associated with organizing a war party: “When a warrior desires to make up a war 
party he visits his friends and offers them a filled pipe as an invitation to follow him, and those who are 
willing to go accept the invitation by lighting and smoking it. Any man whose courage has been proved 
may become the leader of a war party. He fixes the day for his departure and states where he will camp the 
first night, naming some place not far off. The morning on which he starts, and before leaving the village, 
he invokes the aid of the sun, his guardian by day, and often, to propitiate him, secretly vows to undergo 
penance, or offer a sacrifice on his return. He rides off alone, carrying his pipe in his bare hand, with the 
bowl carefully tied to the stem to prevent it slipping off. If the bowl should at any time accidentally fall to 
the ground, he considers it an evil omen, and immediately returns to the village, and nothing could induce 
him to proceed, as he thinks only misfortune would attend him if he did. Sometimes he ties eagle or hawk 
plumes to the stem of his pipe, and, after quitting the village, repairs to the top of some hill and makes an 
offering of them to the sun, taking them from his pipe and tying them to a pole, which he erects in a pile of 
stones. Those who intend to follow him usually join him at the first camp, equipped for the expedition; but 
often there are some who do not join him until he has gone further on. He eats nothing before leaving the 
village, nor as long as the sun is up; but breaks his fast at his first camp, after the sun sets. The next 
morning he begins another fast, to be continued until sunset. He counts his party, saddles his horse, names 
some place six or seven miles ahead, where he says he will halt for awhile, and again rides off alone with 
his pipe in his hand. After awhile the party follow [sic] him in single file. When they have reached his 
halting place he tells them to dismount and let their horses graze. They all then seat themselves on the 
ground on the left of the leader, forming a semicircle facing the sun. The leader fills his pipe, all bow their 
heads, and, pointing the stem of the pipe upward, he prays to the sun, asking that they may find an 
abundance of game, that dead shots may be made, so that their ammunition will not be wasted, but reserved 
for their enemies; that they may easily find their enemies and kill them; that they may be preserved from 
wounds and death. He makes his petition four times, then lights his pipe, after sending a few whiffs of 
smoke skyward  as incense to the sun, hands the pipe to his neighbor, who smokes and passes it on to the 
next. It is passed from one to another, toward the left, until all have smoked, the leader refilling it as often 
as necessary. They then proceed to their next camp, where probably others join them. The same programme 
is carried out for three or four days before the party is prepared for action.” 
379 Walker, Lakota Society, 139; Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 49-50. 
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warrior; and Cloud Shield, that the Sioux killed a Crow man and woman found on the 
trail.
380
 In pictographs that suggest the Tetons’ growing presence in the Rocky 
Mountains, both American Horse and Cloud Shield depict the stealing of horses from 
neighboring mountain tribes in 1840-41: two hundred horses from the Flat Heads in the 
case of the former, and one hundred from the Snakes [Shoshones] in the case of the 
latter.
381
 For that same year, the winter counts of The Flame, Lone Dog, and The Swan all 
tell of the Sioux making peace with the Cheyennes, a political development fraught with 
enormous import for the history of the north-central plains throughout the 1850s, 1860s, 
and 1870s. The Flame even identifies the principal negotiators of this foreign-policy 
coup: Lone Horn, a Sioux, and Red Arm, a Cheyenne.
382
 The Flame, Lone Dog, and The 
Swan all preserve the theft by a Minneconjou warrior of many Crow horses in 1841-42; 
the latter two even provide the number of horses stolen: nineteen.
383
 According to the 
winter counts, 1842-43 was a particularly bloody year: No Ears portrays Feather Earring 
killing an enemy horse herder; Iron Crow records that “four lodges came home 
victorious;” The Flame reports that a Minneconjou chief tried to make war; Lone Dog 
claims that One Feather organized a large war party to go against the Crows; The Swan 
illustrates Feather-in the- Ear making a feast to convince young men to join his war party; 
American Horse recounts the death of Feather Ear Rings in a fight with the Shoshones in 
which they suffered four lodges killed by the Sioux; and Cloud Shield illustrates Lone 
Feather reciting his prayers and taking to the war path to avenge the death of some of his 
                                                             
380 Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 117, 140; here White Cow Killer, in an apparent contradiction, calls 
this year “Large-war-party-hungry-eat-Pawnee-horses winter;” i.e., referring to the event attributed to 
1838-39 in most winter counts. 
381 Ibid., 140. 
382 Ibid., 118; Hyde does not specifically mention this event, although he writes of the “Sioux and their 
allies,” presumably the Cheyennes, in the years after 1840; see Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 50.  
383 Ibid. 
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relatives.
384
 The year 1843-44 may have been instrumental in reinforcing the Sioux-
Cheyenne alliance forged three years earlier as both American Horse and Cloud Shield 
depict the Oglalas and Brulés recapturing one of the medicine arrows taken by the 
Pawnees and returning it to the Cheyennes.
385
 For the year 1844-45, American Horse 
records the killing of Male Crow by a Shoshone, while Cloud Shield represents Crazy 
Horse [father of the famous warrior who would defeat Lieutenant Colonel George 
Armstrong Custer and units of the Seventh Cavalry at the Little Big Horn in June 1876] 
saying his prayers and going on the war path; No Ears reports the killing of He Crow by 
the enemy; Iron Crow tells of the enemy killing thirty Oglalas. In their winter counts, 
both American Horse and Cloud Shield ascribe this event to 1845-46 and name White 
Buffalo Bull [White Bull] as one of those killed.
386
 Several winter counts record still 
more deaths for 1846-47: No Ears relates how “One with white testicles was killed;” 
Short Man tells of the stabbing of Crow Eagle; and Iron Crow depicts the murder of Tall 
Pine.
387
 In the aggregate, these Sioux winter counts portray a dynamic and aggressive 
people acquiring by force some of the richest buffalo ranges on the Great Plains, the 
prime habitat of a seemingly inexhaustible and renewable resource base—herds of 
                                                             
384 Walker, Lakota Society, 140; Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 118, 141; here White Cow Killer terms it 
“Crane’s-son-killed winter.”  
385 Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 141; White Cow Killer labels it “The Great-medicine-arrow-comes-in-
winter;” Battiste Good calls it “Brought-home-the-magic-arrow-winter.” Hyde disputes the veracity of the 
winter counts in the following passage: “The statement in the Brulé winter counts that their tribe recaptured 
the medicine arrows from the Pawnees is incorrect. Captain L. H. North of the Pawnee Scouts tells me that 
the old Skidis [Pawnees] always said that their chiefs gave two of the medicine arrows to the Yanktons at a 
peace council and the Yanktons traded or gave these arrows to the Brulés;” Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 47. 
Nevertheless, the winter counts are probably accurate as Sioux-Pawnee relations had become so poisoned 
by the 1870s that, conceivably, the older Pawnee chiefs would have resisted conceding any battlefield 
victories to their hated Brulé and Oglala enemies; see also Hyde, The Pawnee Indians; Wishart, An 
Unspeakable Sadness.  
386 Mallery, Dakota Winter Counts, 141; here White Cow Killer calls it “White-Buffalo-Bull-killed-by-the-
Crows-winter,” apparently agreeing with Iron Crow as to the correct year; Walker, Lakota Society, 140.  
387 Walker, Lakota Society, 140; it is worth noting that the incidents associated with this year may have 
been the result of the intratribal strife caused by the promiscuous distribution of alcohol among the Western 
Sioux throughout the 1840s, not intertribal warfare. 
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buffalo estimated in the millions—that would allow the Teton Sioux to dominate trade on 
the north-central plains and thereby assure themselves of an uninterrupted supply of 
Euro-American trade goods.
388
 
IV 
The implementation of the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail in 1837 combined with the 
year-round occupation of the Platte River valley by several of the westernmost Sioux 
bands to position the Tetons for their eventual conquest of the north-central plains. 
Although Fort Pierre remained their principal trade outlet, Fort Laramie gained steadily 
in importance throughout the 1840s. Additionally, many bands of the northernmost 
Lakotas had ready access to Fort Union, yet another major trade depot founded by 
Kenneth McKenzie in 1829 at the mouth of the Yellowstone River. At all three forts, at a 
number of smaller posts, and at numerous wintering places, American fur traders 
conducted a profitable trade with the Tetons, who thereby received an astonishing variety 
of both practical and luxury trade items in exchange for their average annual output of 
tens of thousands of buffalo robes.
389
  
                                                             
388 For estimates of the total number of buffalo that the Great Plains could support, see McHugh, Time of 
the Buffalo, 16-17(30 million); Flores, “Bison Ecology,” 471 (28-30 million); Isenberg, Destruction of the 
Bison, 25 (27 million). 
389 Schuler, Fort Pierre, 115-120; Hanson, Metal Weapons, Tools, and Ornaments of the Teton Dakota 
Indians, 8; here Hanson unravels the intricate geographical relationship between the various forts and 
posts—not all of them under the control of the American Fur Company—that serviced the Teton trade: 
“Two major fur trade centers and a minor one grew up in Teton country. In present-day central South 
Dakota, a series of posts—Forts Lookout, George, defiance, Tecumseh, and Pierre—were built, abandoned, 
and rebuilt. The most important of these was Fort Pierre [my italics]. It was the eastern terminus of the 
traders’ road to the second major center in present eastern Wyoming. There the traders established Forts 
William, John (commonly called Fort Laramie), Bernard, Platte, and several smaller houses. Fort Laramie 
emerged as the principal trading post, but the Chouteau firm abandoned it in 1849 and reestablished the 
western depot near modern Scottsbluff, Nebraska, naming it Fort John. The minor trade center (minor not 
because of its volume but because of its only occasional use by the northern Tetons) was on the Missouri’s 
Big bend. These were Forts Lisa, William, Clark, Berthold, and Union. Fort Union evolved as the main 
trading post and depot in this area.” 
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By 1840, throughout their vast domain, the Teton Sioux were never more than a short 
distance from a trader and his supply of goods. Even a partial list of the Tetons’ preferred 
trade goods includes the following: Northwest trade guns, gunpowder, powder horns, 
flints, knives, battle axes, tomahawks, lances, colored blankets, tobacco, coffee, sugar, 
salt, pepper, metal awls and scrapers, metal arrow points, cloth and ready-made clothing, 
needles, beads, buttons, combs, mirrors, and vermillion. Indeed, even this abbreviated list 
of both practical and luxury Euro-American trade goods that the Sioux had been adapting 
to their culture dating back to their first contacts with white traders along the upper 
Mississippi River in the late seventeenth century suggests a degree of increasing 
dependence upon those items. But the consistent acquisition and utilization of those 
goods by the Lakotas depended upon a time-consuming and labor-intensive system 
designed to procure, process, and transport thousands of buffalo robes, first to the forts, 
posts, and winter camps of the traders and then on to domestic and overseas markets 
anchored by New York City and London, respectively. It was a system that had changed 
dramatically in the opening decades of the nineteenth century with the adaptation of the 
horse to Lakota political economy. 
Throughout most of the eighteenth century the Teton Sioux, though already skilled 
buffalo hunters, were afoot, and the forms of their political economy arose from that 
condition. Indeed, they were some of the last Indians of the high plains to acquire 
horses—Hyde places the approximate time of that acquisition within the last decades of 
that century.
390
 Anthropologist Allen M. Klein captures the essence of this pedestrian, yet 
nomadic, lifestyle:  
                                                             
390 Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 21. 
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Before the horse and hide trade, Plains life was closer to the margins. Life on 
foot mitigated [sic] against overland travel, hence extensive contact of any 
means. Subsistence, while sufficient, was precarious. Buffalo hunting was 
fraught with difficulties, failing as much as it succeeded. The economy was 
geared for use (i.e. consumption) [emphasis added].
391
 
 
Still other characteristics of the Tetons’ eighteenth-century relations of production 
included the following: cooperative hunting on a large scale, collective ownership of the 
harvested bison, an elaborate and relatively non-gendered division of labor, minimal 
material dependency between family groups, and equal distribution of wealth.
392
 
All of these features except the first, i.e., cooperative hunting, derived from it, 
particularly the technique known as the “pound method.”393 Impounding involved driving 
the animals into an enclosure where the hunters could kill them at will. The labor 
required for this type of hunt required the services of every able-bodied man and woman 
in camps that tended to concentrate relatively large numbers of Indians. That 
concentration intensified band associations as well as fostered tribal practices such as the 
                                                             
391 Alan M. Klein, “The Political Economy of Gender: A 19th Century Plains Indian Case Study,” in The 
Hidden Half, eds. Patricia Albers and Beatrice Medicine (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 
1983), 147. 
392 Ibid., 150-152. 
393 Ibid., 150. See also Frank G. Roe, The North American Buffalo (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1951), 637. In Ewers, Teton Dakota Ethnology and History, the author describes several other buffalo-
hunting methods practiced by Plains Indians before their acquisition of horses including the following: 
simply stalking the animals on foot; hunting them on snowshoes in the winter—especially when buffalo 
floundered in deep snowdrifts; burning the grass surrounding a buffalo herd, which thus prevented its 
escape and often caused the death of every animal in it; and, finally, driving buffalo over steep cliffs, once 
again usually killing every animal in the herd. Klein may have neglected to mention these other pedestrian 
hunting techniques as they tend not to support his Marxist interpretation of “Production-Distribution-
Exchange-Consumption;” see Klein, “The Political Economy of Gender,” 159; Alan M. Klein, “Political 
Economy of the Buffalo Hide Trade: Race and Class on the Plains,” in The Political Economy of North 
American Indians, ed. John H. Moore (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 133-160; and Alan 
M. Klein, “Plains Economic Analysis: The Marxist Complement,” in Anthropology on the Great Plains, ed. 
W. R. Wood and M. Liberty (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980. For a study that rejects “the 
applicability of conceptual categories [e.g., Marxist political economy] relevant for one social context—
19th century industrial capitalism—to the analysis of others [e.g., nineteenth-century Plains Indian political 
economy],” see David Nugent, “Property Relations, Production Relations, and Inequality: Anthropology, 
Political Economy, and the Blackfeet,” Ethnologist 20 (May 1993): 336-362. 
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Sun Dance. As the collective nature of these hunts thus encouraged communal, rather 
than individual, relations of labor, production, and distribution, Klein concludes: 
The essentially equal distribution of the product of the hunt among families 
made dependency between them less likely. Each was assured an equal share 
of meat and hides from which most other manufactures resulted. Further 
exchange of raw materials reflected individuals’ or families’ desires over and 
above what was needed for basic provisioning. Inequalities of wealth between 
households and individuals tended to be minimal; first because of the limited 
sources of wealth, and secondly, because [eighteenth-century] Plains society 
was governed by production-for-use. The latter placed political and economic 
emphasis on group consumption rather than the creation of surplus for 
increased individual wealth. Wealth differences tended to be leveled out, via 
“big man” giveaways which was the only route to prestige, and which further 
underscored the egalitarian structure of early Plains society.
394
   
 
The acquisition of horses by the Western Sioux in the final decades of the eighteenth 
century, coupled with the almost simultaneous penetration of the American fur trade—
specifically, the bison robe trade—into the upper Missouri country, effected a revolution 
in both the Tetons’ political economy and in the structure of their society.395  Horses 
greatly expanded the physical, material, and cultural parameters within which the Indians 
had previously lived. For instance, horses made possible swifter travel with much heavier 
loads than previously thought possible, and over vastly longer distances. As a 
commodity, horses offered a new form of wealth on a par with “bridewealth, fines, and 
trade goods,” and as a new “technological factor” in the Indians’ world, horses greatly 
increased the efficiency with which the Indians could harvest buffalo. And locked in a 
symbiotic relationship with mounted Indian hunters that persisted for decades, “[t]he 
                                                             
394 Ibid., 151-152. 
395 For a study of the effects of the fur trade on another powerful Plains Indian confederacy, see Oscar 
Lewis, The Effects of White Contact Upon Blackfoot Culture, With Special Reference To The Role Of The 
Fur Trade, ed. A. Irving Hallowell, Centennial Anniversary Publication VI, The American Ethnological 
Society (New York: J. J. Augustin Publisher, 1942). 
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buffalo hide trade seemed to grow in direct proportion to the changes wrought by the 
horse in the hunt. That these two were well suited to one another is evident in the changes 
they jointly were able to effect.”396  
Mounted Teton Sioux hunters pursued the bison in high-speed chases armed with 
either bows and arrows, ten-to-fourteen foot lances, or flintlock muzzle-loading guns, 
typically Northwest fusils. The Indians generally preferred to use a three-foot bow with 
either flint- or metal-tipped arrows because they were lighter, easier to handle, and more 
reliable than guns. A skilled hunter could fire anywhere from five to seven arrows in the 
same amount of time it took to reload a muzzle-loading trade gun.
397
 But whichever 
weapon they used, the hunters, stripped to breech cloth and moccasins, rode out on lesser 
horses, switching to specially-trained ponies covered with a light robe or blanket only 
after sighting buffalo. Mounted on these swift buffalo runners, the hunters closed in 
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approaching from the right side and aimed arrow, lance, or bullet for the heart, just below 
the right shoulder.  
Plains Indian women performed the work of tanning the hides—an arduous task at 
once both labor- and time-intensive. After they had skinned the buffalo where they lay 
(see n. 34 above) and packed both the meat and hides back to camp, the real work of 
tanning could begin. First, the women stretched the skin on the ground, hair side down, 
and staked the corners; each woman tanner dressed several skins at once. Next, in a 
process depicted by European traveler Maximilian, Prince of Wied for the Teton Sioux of 
1834, the tanners scraped the hides clean of all fat, flesh, and muscular tissue using a 
bone or metal tool fitted with iron teeth and a wrist strap attached to the handle which 
facilitated scraping. After leaving the fleshed hides to cure in the sun for a number of 
days, the women scraped them again to a uniform thickness, this time using a tool 
resembling an adze with a bone or metal blade attached with rawhide to a wooden or 
antler handle. For those hides intended for tipi covers and liners, parfleches, and other 
articles, the women turned them over, removed the hair, and scraped both sides. The 
tanners then rubbed a noxious blend of cooked deer or buffalo brains, liver, fats, and even 
red grass into the skin, using their hands and smooth stones. Next, they stretched the 
hides out on either wooden frames or again on the ground and stripped all of the excess 
brains and moisture from them with an edged tool shaped like a hoe. Once the hides had 
dried, the women smoothed them out with a graining tool made of either buffalo bone or 
iron. Finally, they rendered the hides soft and pliable by drawing them over a smooth log 
or rawhide cord. To further enhance the value of their robes, the women sometimes 
painted them in colorful geometric patterns. As the whole process consumed anywhere 
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from three to ten days, most of the women could reasonable expect only to tan anywhere 
from eighteen to twenty hides in a single season; their finished products, however, 
particularly those of the Sioux, were of extraordinarily high quality. So skillfully tanned 
were Teton robes and hides that they could withstand months of storage without rotting—
one of the many factors that contributed to the Tetons’ emergence as Fort Tecumseh’s 
major trading partner.
398
 
In the brief introduction to his discussion of nineteenth-century Plains Indian relations 
of production, Klein states that “[t]he buffalo hide trade seemed to grow in direct 
proportion to the changes wrought by the horse in the [buffalo] hunt. That these two were 
very well suited to one another is evident in the changes they jointly were able to 
effect.”399 The changes to which Klein refers appear to have been, in his view, largely 
negative. And while conceding that Euro-American trade goods contributed to an 
“overall prosperity,” he insists that it “concealed an erosion of women’s position through 
her being increasingly circumscribed to a few tasks related to processing [e.g., buffalo 
robes and hides] and domestic production. On the other hand, men were increasingly free 
to pursue wealth.”400 
In a process that accelerated in the 1820s, the buffalo robe and hide trade radically 
transformed Teton relations of production—particularly those between the sexes—as the 
Western Sioux reconfigured their political economy away from one structured merely for 
subsistence to one committed to mounted buffalo hunting and surplus production for 
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trade. As with the century before it, nineteenth-century relations of production derived 
from Teton buffalo hunts, although now they had become highly individualized rather 
than collective. Mounted hunters could now run down the animals they desired and kill 
them with individually-patterned arrows that marked the carcasses as the hunters’ own. 
So efficient was the mounted chase that it became necessary to prevent individual hunters 
acting alone from prematurely dispersing the herds and thereby ruining the hunt for all. 
Individual property rights supplanted collective ownership—and thus overturned 
eighteenth-century relations of distribution—as hunters now claimed the tongue, the 
choicest cuts of meat, and the hides of carcasses identified by their distinctive arrows. 
And although nineteenth-century mounted buffalo hunts still generally involved a 
considerable number of hunters, this was so primarily because the mobility provided by 
horses made possible large concentrations of tribesmen and not out of any need for 
increased efficiency.
401
 
Individualized mounted buffalo hunting considerably altered Teton gendered relations 
of production and distribution. As women no longer participated in the hunt—although 
the remainder of their responsibilities still mirrored those of the eighteenth century—they 
now began to join horses and buffalo hides as sources of wealth. Men assumed the role of 
“procurers,” while women became “processors.” And while the time required to tan 
buffalo hides for exchange added greatly to a woman’s burdens, hunting buffalo from 
horses made it possible for a single hunter to keep at least two women busy tanning 
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hides, a relation of production that encouraged polygyny. Thus, although the Teton Sioux 
of this period highly valued a woman’s labor, her relative position within their political 
economy declined as men with ability accumulated wealth in the form of “horse to 
buffalo to wives to trade goods,” a relation of distribution that clearly favored younger 
and more highly skilled hunters in the competition for wives to process hides for trade.
402
 
The nineteenth-century robe and hide trade also resulted in the decline, relative to that 
of men, of a woman’s ability to control valued commodities. Although men and women 
continued individually to own tools, household goods, and personal items, men owned all 
of the prized war horses and buffalo runners, while women possessed only the least-
valued pack horses. Women might own hides for domestic use once the men had 
relinquished them, but robes and hides intended for trade remained an unchallenged male 
prerogative. And even though a woman both made and theoretically owned her own tipi, 
a man’s penalty for unsanctioned buffalo hunting often included the forfeiture of his 
horses, weapons, and lodge [emphasis added]. Clearly, men’s private property rights 
displaced those of women.”403 
Finally, Klein explains how the increase in material prosperity made possible by the 
buffalo robe and hide trade both concealed the gender reconfiguration of nineteenth-
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century Plains Indian societies and, for the Teton Sioux, became the single most 
important factor in creating their illusions of independence:  
The loss of much of women’s position (in the hunt, property relations, and 
control over goods) is masked by the general rise in [productivity] in the 
hunting-raiding sector of society. The horse clearly brought about a revolution 
in transportation, hunting, and raiding. The entire society prospered from the 
increased trade that came about as new forms of production (internal) and 
trade (external) merged. If women occupied a more circumspect role in 
production it was while enjoying the new prosperity. Hunting was now more 
assured. Metal pots, knives and axes had obvious advantages over stone and 
pottery. Iron arrowheads were infinitely better than stone counterparts. Guns 
were superior weapons of war. And the host of cosmetic products provided 
welcome relief in the world of self-preservation and fashion. However, the 
continued enjoyment of these goods demanded the shift to an economy geared 
for exchange, which in turn assumed dependency on foreign trade [my 
italics].
404
 
 
V 
 
American Horse, Cloud Shield, and Iron Crow all record in their respective winter 
counts for the year 1841-42 a drunken brawl during which an Oglala chief named Smoke 
killed Bull Bear—that venerable chief who had led the Kiyuksas to the Platte River 
valley from the Black Hills country in 1834—in the former’s camp on Chugwater Creek, 
a tributary of Laramie Fork located southeast of and a few miles below Fort Laramie.
405
 
Bull Bear’s leadership style had always been overtly tyrannical: he brooked no opposition 
to his wishes, often enforcing this rule at the point of his knife; he took any girl who 
pleased him for his wife, without making the traditional payment to their parents; and he 
tolerated no rivals to his chieftainship. Apparently, some traders persuaded “that plump 
and jovial chieftain,” Smoke, to challenge Bull Bear for supremacy among the Oglalas. 
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Outraged at the former’s audacity, Bull Bear killed Smoke’s favorite horse and thereby 
considered the matter closed. Although Smoke declined to make much of the incident at 
the time, he and his supporters, a group that included the young Red Cloud, merely bided 
their time. Their opportunity for revenge came after some American Fur Company men 
traded liquor in the camp, and Smoke’s warriors set Bull Bear’s followers to drinking. A 
vicious argument between the two groups soon broke out during which Bull Bear, 
charging from his lodge to put a stop to the quarrel, died instantly from a bullet fired by 
Red Cloud. Before it was all over, Red Cloud’s brother, Yellow Lodge, and six warriors 
were dead, and many others lay wounded.
406
 
In the wake of Bull Bear’s murder on the Chugwater, the Kiyuksas broke away from 
the rest of the tribe, accompanied only by Red Water’s band of True Oglalas. With the 
tribe now split irrevocably into two factions, Bull Bear’s followers—known from that 
time on as the Bear People—gradually drifted southeast to occupy the country in present-
day Kansas and Nebraska between the Platte and Smoky Hill Rivers. While the bands 
under Smoke—the Smoke People—headed northward, away from Fort Laramie, to reside 
thereafter near the headwaters of Powder River in present-day Wyoming. Although 
earlier the Oglalas had put forward a warrior named Whirlwind to succeed Bull Bear as 
chief, once the tribe split, Whirlwind led only his own band, the Kiyuksas. The other 
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bands each were led by their own chiefs and acted independently of the others. This deep 
rift among the Oglalas persisted for decades, surviving long after the entire tribe had 
settled on the reservation.
407
   
The 1841 murder of Bull Bear by his fellow tribesmen, despite its profound impact on 
the future of the Oglalas, represented but a single episode in a much greater problem for 
the Teton Sioux and the American fur trade of the 1840s: the liquor trade. George Catlin 
had identified the problem in the 1830s and had received only the ridicule and censure of 
his hosts, the American Fur Company, for his efforts. The abuse of liquor as an item of 
exchange in the Fort Laramie region resulted largely from but a single imperative: the 
traders’ need to crush their opposition.  
Until 1840, the traders at Fort Laramie enjoyed a monopoly on trade in the North 
Platte region; but then in the fall of 1840 or spring of 1841, a trader by the name of 
Lancaster P. Lupton built Fort Platte roughly three-fourths of a mile above the mouth of 
the Laramie River to compete directly with the American Fur Company.
408
 Lupton built 
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Fort Platte of adobe on the right bank of the North Platte directly in the path of the 
Oregon Trail by way of South Pass. Employed by Lupton at Independence, Missouri to 
carry supplies to Fort Platte, upon his arrival there, Rufus Sage observed both its strategic 
location and the traders’ bitter rivalry:  
[Fort Platte] is situated in the immediate vicinity of the Oglallia and Brulé 
divisions of the Sioux nation, and but little remote from the Cheyennes and 
Arapaho tribes. One mile south of it, upon the Laramie, is Fort John [Fort 
Laramie], a station of the American fur company. Between these two posts a 
strong opposition is maintained in regard to the business of the country, little 
to the credit of either . . . .
409
  
 
 And among the men employed at the fort, Sage soon observed some of the collateral 
damage that resulted from the unrestricted importation of liquor into Indian country: 
The night of our arrival at Fort Platte was the signal for a grand jollification to 
all hands, (with two or three exceptions,) who soon got most gloriously drunk, 
and such an illustration of the beauties of harmony as was then perpetrated, 
would have rivaled bedlam itself, or even the famous council chamber beyond 
the Styx. Yelling, screeching, firing, shouting, fighting, swearing, drinking, 
and such like performances, were kept up without intermission—and woe to 
the poor fellow who looked for repose that night—he might as well have 
thought of sleeping with a thousand cannon bellowing at his ears. The scene 
was prolonged till near sundown the next day, and several made their egress 
from this beastly carousal, minus shirts and coats—with swollen eyes, bloody 
noses, and empty pockets—the latter circumstance will be easily understood 
upon the mere mention of the fact that liquor, in this country, is sold for four 
dollars per pint.
410
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With the fur traders having thus provided a free lesson in debauchery and over-
indulgence, two nearby camps of Indians presently found themselves in drunken 
imitation, if not exceeding the example, of their white benefactors. According to Sage, 
the American Fur Company men even drugged the alcohol they dispensed with the object 
of securing the Indian trade solely to themselves. An unfortunate incident, however, soon 
transformed the Indians’ revelry into contrition and their goodwill into bitter 
recriminations directed at the traders who had distributed the liquor. A Brulé chief named 
Susu-ceicha, drunk and riding from Fort Laramie to Fort Platte at break-neck speed, did 
exactly that when he fell from his horse and died. Then, soon after a rather elaborate 
burial ceremony that included securing the chief’s body to a scaffold followed by the 
ritual slaying of his horse, the Sioux struck their lodges and moved off, depriving each 
rival company of its trading partners.
411
  
In responding to this apparent commercial setback, the traders at both Forts Laramie 
and Platte prepared for the winter season by outfitting pack trains loaded with relatively 
small quantities of trade goods—including, of course, alcohol—for transport to the 
scattered winter camps of the Indians. The traders at Fort Platte also dispatched 
somewhat larger shipments to Fort Lupton on the South Platte and to the White River 
country in present-day South Dakota. A trader at Fort Laramie by the name of Francois 
Xavier Matthieu noted the inclusion of liquor in his outfit: “They furnished me with 
goods, man, and horses, and all that was necessary. They generally gave us some alcohol 
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in ten gallon casks, one on each side of a pack animal [emphasis added]; blankets, 
tobacco, vermillion and beads; very little powder and lead.
412
 
But then in the late summer of 1842, the United States government took steps to stop 
the liquor trade in Indian country, the first of which was the appointment by T. Hartley 
Crawford, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, of Andrew Drips, experienced American Fur 
Company trader, as Indian agent for the Indian tribes on the upper Missouri.
413
 In his 
correspondence with Drips, Crawford had explicitly stated:  
The principal object in making this appointment is to insure the most effectual 
means of preventing the introduction of ardent spirits into the Indian country 
[.]You are fully authorized by the law regulating trade and intercourse to eject 
all who go into the Indian country . . . to sell whiskey . . . . I can not too 
strongly impress upon you the importance of the duty imposed on you. The 
prevention of the use of strong drink has almost been considered the one thing 
needful to insure the prosperity of the Indian race and its advancement in 
civilization. The use of it has tended more to the demoralization of the Indians 
than all other causes combined, and if by your exertions the abominable traffic 
can be prevented, even in a partial degree, you will deserve, as you will 
receive, the thanks of the Government and the blessings of the Indians.
414
  
 
There is little reason to doubt either Crawford’s sincerity with regard to his position on 
the liquor traffic or that Drips would receive “the blessings of the Indians.” The Sioux, in 
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particular, supported an end to the illicit trade in alcohol and questioned the government’s 
unwillingness to send troops to enforce its prohibition.
415
 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, David Dawson Mitchell, informed Drips that his 
first responsibility was to clear the Sioux country of alcohol by inspecting all of the 
trading posts along the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail:  
You will therefore proceed as rapidly and as quietly as possible to Fort Pierre, 
near the mouth of Teton River; this is the principal depot for all goods 
intended for trade in the Sioux country. Here it will be necessary to make an 
immediate and thorough search for whiskey, taking care to avail yourself of 
all the information that can be obtained, both from free whites and well-
disposed Indians. When nothing more remains to be done at this point, it will 
be well to push across the country to Laramie’s fork of the River Platte, taking 
the small trading houses that are generally established along the Black Hills in 
your way. On the Platte you will, in all probability, find quantities of liquor 
brought in from Santa Fe; with these violators of all law, who have neither the 
privileges of a license nor citizenship, I would deal in a very severe manner, 
and if physical force be necessary, I doubt not but that it will be cheerfully 
furnished by the American traders. When the whole of the Sioux country has 
been well scoured, your next move should be to Fort Clark at the Mandan 
villages.
416
 
 
Following his inspections of the traders at the Mandan, “Arrickera” [Arikara], and Gros 
Ventre [Hidatsa], villages, Mitchell directed Drips to Fort Union at the mouth of the 
Yellowstone and then on to the Blackfoot post [Fort McKenzie] at the mouth of the 
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“Marie” [Marias] River, after which Mitchell expected “reports, accounts, &c.” 
forwarded to his office.
417
 
The government’s bid to eliminate the liquor traffic in Indian country fared poorly. 
The next summer Mitchell expressed his disappointment that Drips had not done more to 
suppress the whiskey trade: “I am free to confess that in my opinion [emphasis in the 
original] still more could have been accomplished. You state positively that there was 
whiskey trade in the country, at several points. Now it occurs to me that you might, and 
ought to have obtained positive [emphasis in the original] proof of the fact; such as 
would have justified a revocation of the offender’s license [emphasis in the original].” 418 
It was around this time, too, that an unscrupulous trader by the name of John Richard first 
surfaced on the Platte selling whiskey obtained from Santa Fe to the Indians encamped 
near Fort Laramie.
419
 And in the summer of 1842, one of the worst perpetrators of the 
illegal trade in whiskey, the “Union Fur Company,” built Fort George twenty miles 
below Fort Pierre on the Missouri and began to expand its operations into the 
Yellowstone and Bighorn valleys.
420
 By the spring of 1843, Drips was complaining to 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, D. D. Mitchell, about that firm’s blatant disregard for 
the agent’s authority:  
                                                             
417 Ibid. 
418 D. D. Mitchell, Office Superintendent Indian Affairs U. S., to Maj. A. Drips, U. S.Ind. Agt., July 25, 
1843, DeLand, ed., Fort Tecumseh and Fort Pierre Journal and Letter Books, 179; also in this letter, 
Mitchell advised Drips that he should have taken even more drastic action by confiscating all of the 
offending traders’ goods and expelling them from the Indian country. 
419 American Fur Company trader Honoré Picotte informed Drips in a letter dated 30 April 1843 that 
Richard had indeed sold “a quantity of spirituous liquor” to the Tetons at the forks of the Cheyenne River, 
that there had been much loss of life as a result, and that Richard denied trading in alcohol; unfortunately 
for the Western Sioux, Richard would continue to wreak havoc in their camps with his liquor trafficking for 
many years; see H. Picotte, Fort Pierre, to Maj. Andrew Drips, U. S. Indian Agt., 30th April, 1843, DeLand, 
ed., “Fort Tecumseh and Fort Pierre Journal and Letter Books,” 181; see also Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 52; 
Sunder, 49. Mari Sandoz includes a poignant description of Richard’s trading practices and of the 
devastation they caused among the Oglalas in the mid 1850s in Sandoz, Crazy Horse, 48-54.    
420 Sunder, Fur Trade of the Upper Missouri, 40.  
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“Mr. Ebbit [John A. N. Ebbetts, Union Fur Company partner] has on several 
instances interposed with me, by counseling the Indians contrary to the views 
and wishes of the Government, by stating to them that I was not an agent of 
Government and that he (Ebbit) had a right to give or sell to them as much 
liquor as he pleased, and on a recent visit of his to his trading posts in the 
interior the whites and Indians have been drinking and quarreling.
421
  
 
The Union Fur Company later abandoned the upper Missouri fur trade, a circumstance 
due primarily to intense business pressure applied by  the American Fur Company, not 
because of the government’s prohibition of and its agent’s campaign against illicit liquor 
trafficking. 
Mitchell’s ill-concealed disappointment at his agent’s inability to curtail the liquor 
trade in Indian country led Drips to request assistance. In the same letter to his superior in 
which he had vented his frustration over Ebbetts’s trade practices, Drips wrote: “I would 
recommend the appointment of a sub-agent for the upper part of the Missouri River to 
range from the Arikaras up as far as the Blackfoots [sic] trading posts, that would enable 
me to spend my time entirely with the Sioux and keep a strict eye on these traders.”422 
Although the Superintendent of Indian Affairs initially assigned Joseph Varnum 
Hamilton, an experienced trader who had first-hand knowledge of the whiskey trade, as 
special sub-agent, within three months of his appointment, Mitchell had relieved 
Hamilton of his duties. Drips continued to pursue the illegal liquor traffickers throughout 
1844 and beyond, but with little success.
423
 But by the mid-1840s, a very different type of 
threat to the independence of the Western Sioux was emerging in the Platte River valley, 
a threat infinitely more ominous in its implications for the Teton Sioux and the American 
                                                             
421 Andrew Drips, Ind. Agt., Fort Pierre, to Maj. D. D. Mitchell, Supt. Indian Affairs, St. Louis, April 4, 
1843, DeLand, ed., “Fort Tecumseh and Fort Pierre Journal and Letter Books,” 191-192. 
422 Ibid. 
423 Sunder, Fur Trade of the Upper Missouri, 69-72. 
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fur trade than the mere consumption of illicit spirits: the increasing number of emigrant 
trains threading their way along the Oregon Trail.     
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 “A COLLISION OF CULTURES: 
 EMIGRANTS IN THR PLATTE RIVER VALLEY, 
 THE SALE OF FORT LARAMIE, 
  “THE GREAT TREATY COUNCIL OF 1851,” 
 AND 
 THE GRATTAN AFFAIR, 
 1846-1854” 
 
 
I 
The buffalo robe and hide trade between the Teton Sioux and American fur traders 
peaked in the mid-1840s, as it continued to provide the Sioux with enormous quantities 
of Euro-American trade goods that both eased their daily lives and made possible the 
maximum extension of their range and military power by the 1850s. At the height of their 
power, they dominated the north-central plains from the Rocky Mountain Front east to 
the Missouri, and from the Platte River valley north to the Yellowstone. The Tetons’ 
strategically-located domain also provided access to the Southwest, Great Lakes, and 
Canadian plains trading networks—commercial opportunities that, considered together, 
lay beyond the reach of most other plains tribes.  
By the mid-1840s, however, Teton bands that to a greater or lesser degree permanently 
occupied the Platte River country had begun to appreciate the danger inherent in Fort 
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Laramie—one of the most important components of their commercial network—laying 
astride the Oregon Trail, the route used by ever-increasing numbers of white emigrants 
making their way to the Pacific Northwest. That route, as it threaded its way up the Platte 
River valley, and with ready access to Fort Laramie itself, perhaps inevitably brought two 
cultures with irreconcilable world-views into first incredulous, then aggrieved, and, 
finally, violent contact. But, as with so many other developments throughout the trans-
Mississippi West during the opening decades of the nineteenth century, it was the 
trappers and traders of the American fur trade who first drove wheeled vehicles across the 
plains.  
By the time of the Fort Laramie Treaty Conference of 1851, the Teton Sioux had 
reached the peak of their political power. Three years earlier, the United States 
government, in tacit recognition of that power and seeking to safeguard white emigrants 
traveling through Sioux lands, had first built Fort Kearny on the south bank of the Platte 
River in what is now the state of Nebraska. The government had then purchased Fort 
Laramie the year after from Pierre Chouteau, Jr. and Company, the name to which 
Chouteau had changed Pratte, Chouteau and Company after the elder Pratte died in 1839. 
For five years following the sale of Fort Laramie to the United States Army, veteran 
fur trader James Bordeaux occupied an unstockaded trading post located roughly eight 
miles downriver from the fort along the Oregon Trail, a site that a succession of traders 
had used since 1837. Bordeaux had first entered the fur trade in 1830 as a hunter for the 
Upper Missouri Outfit. But from that humble beginning, his career progressed over the 
years until, by 1842 at the latest, Bordeaux was acting bourgeois at Fort Laramie, a 
position that he filled admirably until the sale of the fort to the army in 1849. Then thrust 
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unexpectedly into the role of independent entrepreneur, Bordeaux continued to conduct a 
lively and profitable business with the same bands of Brules and Oglalas that had 
frequented the Platte River valley since the mid-1830s, a connection which served to 
stabilize Teton Sioux trade relations in the region that might otherwise have swiftly 
deteriorated.  
But then in the summer of 1854, a tragic confrontation involving a group of Mormon 
emigrants and the bands of Sioux camped along the Oregon Trail adjacent to Fort 
Laramie ushered in more than two decades of intermittent warfare between the 
Americans and Tetons. As a wagon train of Mormons passed the Lakotas camped near 
the fort, a cow fled from its owner, who, afraid to enter the Indian camps, left it behind. A 
Minneconjou visitor to the Oglalas saw the cow abandoned by its owner and, seizing the 
opportunity for some meat, shot the animal on the spot. The aggrieved settler soon 
complained of the incident to the commander of Fort Laramie’s small garrison, a 
Lieutenant Fleming, who, somewhat reluctantly, detailed twenty-nine men under Second 
Lieutenant J. L. Grattan to the Sioux camps. Once there, Grattan unwisely attempted to 
arrest the Minneconjou warrior accused of killing the cow. In the fight that followed, 
Chief Brave Bear of the Brules and all of the troopers died. As the Indians subsequently 
fled the Platte River valley for the surrounding plains to escape the retribution of the 
whites, the Indians’ collective awakening to their reliance on readily-accessible Euro-
American trade goods exposed their illusions of independence. 
II 
The first wagons to make the trek along a route that wound its way westward from St 
Louis, up the North Platte, and on to the mountains—ten wagons pulled by five mules 
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each and two Dearborn carriages, each pulled by a single mule—started for the 1830 
rendezvous on 10 April of that year under the able leadership of William Sublette. While 
William Ashley had hauled a wagon across part of what is now the state of Nebraska in 
1824, and a company of forty-six trappers hired by Ashley and under the direction of 
James Bruffee and Hiram Scott had taken a four-pounder cannon mounted on wheels—
the first wheeled vehicle to traverse South Pass—to the 1827 rendezvous just south of 
Bear Lake in the Wasatch Range, Sublette’s caravan was the first to include wagons 
traveling on at least a portion of the future Oregon Trail.
424
  
But the honor of taking the first wagons through South Pass fell to Captain Louis 
Eulalie de Bonneville, an 1815 graduate of the United States military academy at West 
Point who, some fifteen years later, was contemplating his own entry into the American 
fur trade—along with his share of its supposed profits. After securing a two-year leave of 
absence from the army and the financial backing of investors, Bonneville equipped an 
expedition—complete with loaded wagons—and departed Fort Osage on 1 May 1832. He 
headed, by way of South Pass and the Green River country for the mountain rendezvous 
held that year at Pierre’s Hole, a magnificent setting near Jackson Lake in what is now 
northwestern Wyoming. His party arrived there intact on the 27
th
 of July, in company 
with Lucien Fontenelle and the American Fur Company caravan, already two weeks late 
for the rendezvous.
425
 
                                                             
424 Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 294; Gowans, Rocky Mountain Rendezvous, 56; David Dary, The 
Oregon Trail: An American Saga (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 55.  
425 Ibid., 1: 398; Ibid., 66; Ibid. Of course, no account of the American fur trade is complete without a 
contemporary description of the mountain rendezvous held each summer from 1825-1840. And trapper Joe 
Meek’s sketch of the 1832 Bacchanal at Pierre’s Hole—arguably the largest, most picturesque, and most 
eventful rendezvous of them all—is certainly one of the most colorful: “All the parties were now safely in. 
The lonely mountain valley was populous with the different camps. The Rocky Mountain and American 
companies had their separate camps; Wyeth had his; a company of free trappers, fifteen in number, led by a 
man named Sinclair, from Arkansas, had the fourth; the Nez Perces and Flatheads, the allies of the Rocky 
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Both parties soon left Pierre’s Hole for the Green River country, struck the river at the 
mouth of Piney Creek, and began to work their way upriver to camp. Later that fall, 
Bonneville, fearing Indians, erected a temporary structure—immodestly christening it 
“Fort Bonneville”—a short distance from Green River near its confluence with Horse 
Creek. Built at an elevation of 7,000 feet, amused trappers could not resist calling it 
“Bonneville’s Folly” and “Fort Nonsense,” both because of its poor construction and the 
severe winters that prevailed in its area.
426
 Bonneville eventually spent three years in the 
mountains pursuing his phantom riches, but, unable to compete with the more seasoned 
fur companies and free trappers, he abandoned the trade in 1835 only to discover that the 
army had dropped him from its rolls for exceeding his authorized leave of absence. And 
although his encounter with the American fur trade had been largely unsuccessful, 
Bonneville could at least claim he had shown that loaded wagons could successfully 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Mountain company, and the friends of the whites, had their lodges along all the streams; so that altogether 
there could not have been less than one thousand souls, and two or three thousand horses and mules 
gathered in this place. ‘When the pie was opened then the birds began to sing.’ When Captain Sublette’s 
goods were opened and distributed among the trappers and Indians, then began the usual gay carousal; and 
the ‘fast young men’ of the mountains outvied each other in all manner of mad pranks. In the beginning of 
their spree many feats of horsemanship and personal strength were exhibited, which were regarded with 
admiring wonder by the sober and inexperienced New Englanders under Mr. Wyeth’s command. And as 
nothing stimulated the vanity of the mountainmen like an audience of this sort, the feats they performed 
were apt to astonish themselves. In exhibitions of the kind, the free trappers took the lead, and usually 
carried off the palm, like the privileged class that they were. But the horse-racing, fine-riding, wrestling, 
and all the manlier sports, soon degenerated into the baser exhibitions of a ‘crazy drunk’ condition. The 
vessel in which the trapper received and carried about his supply of alcohol was one of the small camp 
kettles. ‘Passing around’ this clumsy goblet very freely, it was not long before a goodly number were in the 
condition just named, and ready for any mad freak whatever. It is reported by several of the mountainmen 
that on the occasion of one of these ‘frolics,’ one of their number seized a kettle of alcohol, and poured it 
over the head of a tall, lank, redheaded fellow, repeating as he did so the baptismal ceremony. No sooner 
had he concluded than another man with a lighted stick, touched him with the blaze, when in an instant he 
was enveloped in flames. Luckily some of the company had sense enough to perceive his danger, and 
began beating him with pack-saddles to put out the blaze. But between the burning and the beating, the 
unhappy wretch nearly lost his life, and never recovered from his baptism by fire;” quoted in Frances Fuller 
Victor, The River of the West: The Adventures of Joe Meek, 2 vols., Classics of the Fur Trade Series, ed. 
Winfred Blevins (1870; reprint, Missoula, MT: Mountain Press Publishing, 1983), I: 110-111.  
426 Gowans, however, comments that Bonneville had, in fact, sited his fort in a strategic location as the 
trappers held six of the next eight rendezvous near the fort’s location.  
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navigate South Pass. And shortly after he sold his story to celebrated author Washington 
Irving for $1000, the army restored his commission in the spring of 1836.
427
  
Missionaries on their way to Oregon country were soon accompanying the trappers as 
they followed the North Platte to the Sweetwater River and then through South Pass to 
the annual summer rendezvous. The first to do so was a thirty-two-year-old Methodist 
missionary named Jason Lee, who, attended by his nephew, Daniel Lee, Cyrus Shepard, 
and two assistants, attached himself to Nathaniel Wyeth’s second expedition to the 
mountains. Wyeth’s personnel consisted of himself; William Sublette’s younger brother, 
Milton; Jason Lee and his party; two naturalists, Thomas Nuttal and Kirk Townshend; 75 
other men; and 250 horses, all bound for the 1834 rendezvous on Ham’s Fork of Green 
River.
428
  
                                                             
427 Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 398-399; Gowans, Rocky Mountain Rendezvous, 66; Dary, Oregon 
Trail, 55; of course, the classic account of Bonneville’s three years in the mountains is Edgeley W. Todd, 
ed. The Adventures of Captain Bonneville U.S.A. in the Rocky Mountains and the Far West, by Washington 
Irving, with an introduction by Edgeley W. Todd (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961).  
428 Ibid., I: 446-448; Ibid., 104; Dary Oregon Trail, 56-59; here Dary includes Daniel Lee’s fascinating 
account of a mountain-bound trapper’s caravan on the move: “The whole party numbered between fifty and 
sixty men, all mounted on horses or mules, and armed with rifles. Most of them each had a powder-horn or 
a flask, a large leathern pouch for bullets hung at his side, and buckled close to his body with a leathern belt 
in which hung a scabbard of the same material bearing a “scalping knife,” that savage weapon whose very 
name is a terror. The mules and horses altogether were over one hundred and fifty. Nearly one-third were 
for the men, and about two-thirds carried packs, each man leading two of them . . . . Our encampments 
were generally near some stream of water, where there was good grass for our animals; and our tents, eight 
in number, were pitched in a circular form, enclosing a space large enough to contain all our horses and 
mules, fastened to pickets. These are sticks more than a foot long and two inches wide, one for every horse 
or mule, They were driven into the ground, and are designed to prevent the escape of the animals in case of 
any sudden attempt of the Indians to frighten them away. A regular guard was kept up, and relieved every 
four hours during the night; and when the horses were without the camp feeding, morning and evening, a 
watch was set near them . . . . We generally traveled about twenty miles a day, halting  near noon to bait 
and take dinner, and encamping early to give our animals time to fill themselves without the camp before 
dusk, when they were all brought within, where they remained till morning; then the cry, ‘Turn out!’ was 
heard from Captain Wyeth. Soon the horses were seen without, and the breakfast fires before the tents. 
Each of the eight messes into which the company was divided, embraced from five to eight persons. Fried 
bacon and dough fried in the fat, with tea or coffee made our meal; around which we sat on the ground in 
good Indian style, and braced up our craving stomachs for the toils of the day. Each mess now prepared to 
move: tents were struck, packs and saddles put in order. ‘Catch up!’ cried Captain Wyeth, and the whole 
camp was instantly in motion to gather the animals, pack up, and away.” 
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Wyeth and his party left Independence, Missouri on 28 April 1834, passed through 
South Pass on 14 June, and arrived at the rendezvous five days later. A Canadian trapper 
died there in a fall from his horse, after which Jason Lee held the first Protestant funeral 
service west of the Rocky Mountains. Wyeth meanwhile discovered that the trappers who 
had contracted to buy his considerable supply of trade goods abruptly, and without 
explanation, refused to honor the agreement.
429
 Discouraged but not defeated, on 3 July, 
Wyeth departed Ham’s Fork with 41 men, including the missionaries, 126 horses, and 
most of his trade goods and headed for the Snake River country. The expedition reached 
the Snake on 14 July, and it was there, two days later, that Wyeth commenced building 
Fort Hall at the junction of the Snake and Portneuf Rivers. Conceived as a post where he 
could exchange his large supply of trade goods to both Indians and white trappers, Fort 
Hall was the first permanent American establishment west of the Continental Divide, 
despite the fact that Wyeth sold it to the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1836. And it was 
from there that Jason Lee and the other missionaries set out with some Hudson’s Bay 
Company traders for Fort Vancouver in the Oregon country and arrived there on 15 
September 1834.
430
  
Jason Lee had already established his mission along the east bank of the Willamette 
River near the site of present-day Salem, Oregon, by the time Dr. Marcus Whitman, a 
practicing physician and elder of the Presbyterian Church, and the Reverend Samuel 
Parker, pastor of various Presbyterian and Congregational churches and a teacher at New 
                                                             
429 Chittenden claims that Milton Sublette’s older brother William, having arrived at the rendezvous with 
his own large quantity of trade goods in advance of Wyeth, had induced the members of the Rocky 
Mountain Fur Company, and those of its successor, Fitzpatrick, Sublette, and Bridger, not to honor their 
contract with Wyeth who apparently said he would “roll a stone into their garden which they would never 
be able to get out;” see Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 448-449.  
430 Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1: 448-450; Gowans, Rocky Mountain Rendezvous, 104-109; Dary, 
Oregon Trail, 58-61; see also Osborne Russell, Journal of a Trapper [1914 and 1921], ed. Aubrey L. 
Haines (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1955; reprint, Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1986), 1-5. 
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York’s prestigious Ithaca Academy, journeyed to the Oregon country in search of a 
location for their own mission.
431
 Leaving St. Louis in the spring of 1835, the two 
missionaries accompanied the American Fur Company supply train led by Lucien 
Fontenelle all the way to that year’s rendezvous on Green River. Once there, Dr. 
Whitman removed two arrowheads lodged in the bodies of two of the participants: one of 
the points had lodged in the back of mountain man Jim Bridger during a fight with the 
Blackfoot Indians, and the legendary trapper had stoically endured it for three years; 
another hunter had carried the second point in his shoulder for two-and-a-half years.
432
 
Whitman and Parker also used the opportunity provided by the rendezvous to speak with 
some Nez Perce and Flathead Indians camped there. Believing that among those tribes 
the two missionaries had uncovered a “promising field for missionary labor,” Whitman 
resolved to go back east to “obtain associates to come out with him next year . . . and 
establish a mission among these people, and by so doing, save at least a year, in bringing 
the gospel among them.”433 
The following year, Dr. Whitman, his new bride, the former Narcissa Prentiss; a 
second missionary couple, Henry and Eliza Spalding; and William H. Gray accompanied 
an American Fur Company caravan led by Thomas Fitzpatrick and destined for the 1836 
                                                             
431 Dary, Oregon Trail, 61. The American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions sent Whitman and 
Parker to the Northwest in 1835 to investigate the possibility of establishing a mission among the Nez 
Perce and Flathead Indians; see Gowans, Rocky Mountain Rendezvous, 121.  
432 Of course, the details of Jim Bridger’s life, career, and historical legacy appear in so many primary 
documents and scholarly accounts of the history of the American West that even a partial list of those 
sources would overwhelm the reader. But for the classic biography of the legendary westerner whose 
experiences spanned the years from Henry and Ashley’s first forays into the mountains in the early 1820s 
to the final subjugation of the plains Indians in the late 1870s see Stanley Vestal [Walter Stanley 
Campbell], Jim Bridger: Mountain Man (William Morrow, 1955; Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1970).    
433 Gowans, Rocky Mountain Rendezvous, 121-123; Samuel Parker, Journal of an Exploring Tour Beyond 
the Rocky Mountains (Ithaca, NY: Mack, Andrus, & Woodruff, Printers, 1840).   
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Green River rendezvous.
434
 There, the missionaries arranged to make the trip to Walla 
Walla in Oregon country in the company of two Hudson’s Bay Company trappers—a 
fortuitous development that saved the missionary party from first having to return back 
east before proceeding on to Oregon. Although the American Fur Company men had 
transferred their trade goods from wagons to pack animals at Fort Laramie, the 
missionaries retained both their freight wagon and light wagon, which they subsequently 
converted into a two-wheeled cart at Fort Hall, for the entire trek to Fort Boise.
435
 
Although the Whitmans and their associates were not the first to establish religious 
missions in the Pacific Northwest, they had nevertheless conclusively demonstrated the 
feasibility of driving loaded wagons the length of the Oregon Trail.  
III  
As scholars LeRoy R. Hafen and Francis Marion Young have concisely observed: 
“The trapper had opened the trails to the Rocky Mountains. The Missionary had followed 
his paths to carry the white man’s religion to the Indian. The homesteader was next in 
line.”436 Indeed, as early as 1829, an energetic New England school teacher named Hall J. 
Kelley had established the American Society for Encouraging the Settlement of Oregon 
Territory at Boston. Nine years later, a second group of eager promoters published The 
                                                             
434 Ibid., 130. Because the American Board of Foreign Missionaries preferred married missionaries—
undoubtedly perceiving marriage as a bulwark against the temptations of native women—upon his return 
east, Whitman called on Narcissa Prentiss, an unmarried woman whose application the board had denied, 
and wed her following a brief courtship. Their marriage being more in the nature of an arrangement or 
partnership rather than a romantic coupling, it nevertheless offered them the opportunity to pursue 
missionary work together; see Robert V. Hine & John Mack Faragher, The American West: A New 
Interpretive History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 184-185.  
435 Ibid., 142-144. The Oregon settlement founded in 1836 by the Whitmans also became the scene of their 
deaths eleven years later. In a process repeated for hundreds of years throughout the Americas from the 
sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, Euro-American emigration into the Oregon country had brought with 
it a deadly epidemic, in this case, measles; and by the mid-1840s, it had devastated the Cayuse tribe, 
particularly the children. In an act of vengeance for the loss of so many of their tribe to that dreadful 
disease, a group of Cayuse men burst into the Whitman mission on a cold morning in November 1847 and 
slaughtered twelve whites, including the Whitmans.; see Hine & Faragher, American West, 185.  
436 Hafen and Young, Fort Laramie, 95.  
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Oregonian and Indians’ Advocate in Massachusetts to encourage settlement there. 
Emigration societies emerged soon thereafter in Missouri, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, 
Illinois, and Indiana.
437
  
The first emigrant train to Oregon left the Missouri settlements in the spring of 1841 
with approximately eighty homesteaders and missionaries under the direction of seasoned 
trapper and trader, Thomas Fitzpatrick. Although the missionaries carried their 
belongings in mule-drawn Red River carts, the settlers used covered wagons pulled by 
teams of horses or oxen. And while the missionaries headed west primarily to spread the 
word of God, other conditions motivated the emigrants to head west: the desire to escape 
the worst effects of the financial panic of 1837, the opportunity to acquire cheap land, 
and the wish by the poorest of their number to achieve social equality in a new setting. 
Perhaps unaware to all but the most self-analytical among them was simply the need to 
be a part of “the very momentum of the westward movement.”438 
                                                             
437 Ibid. 
438 Ibid., 96; while this quote belongs to Hafen and Young, what they are implicitly referring to is the larger 
idea expressed by the phrase first coined by nineteenth-century journalist, John L. O’Sullivan—“manifest 
destiny.” Scholar Robert W. Johannsen elegantly captures the relationship between that overarching 
concept and the thousands of white homesteaders who traveled the Oregon Trail throughout the 1840s: 
“Although destiny and mission have a pedigree that predates the nation itself, it was not until the early 
nineteenth century that profound changes in American life were combined with the idealism of the nation’s 
revolutionary beginnings and with currents of European Romanticism to produce a popular romantic 
nationalism that gave new meaning to the idea of progress. Fundamental to the feelings of national 
superiority generated by romantic nationalism was the conviction that American territorial expansion was 
inevitable, that the nation’s providential destiny—its Manifest Destiny—decreed an extension of the ideals 
of its founding charter throughout the entire continent. The notion was all the more credible because 
American settlers, traders, and missionaries were already on the move to far distant areas of North 
America. John L. O’Sullivan’s first uses of the phrase Manifest Destiny were in response to population 
movements that were already underway in Texas and the Oregon Country. Thus, Manifest Destiny became 
and has remained virtually synonymous with territorial expansion;” see Sam W. Haynes and Christopher 
Morris, eds. Manifest Destiny and Empire: American Antebellum Expansionism, Walter Prescott Webb 
Memorial Lectures, no. 31 (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1997), pg. #s? The 1845 
article in which O’Sullivan first used the words, “manifest destiny,” clearly expressed his indignation over 
the resistance of Great Britain and France to the annexation of Texas by the United States. According to 
O’Sullivan, those nations were attempting to constrict American policy “in a spirit of hostile interference 
against us, for the avowed object of thwarting our policy and hampering our power, limiting our greatness 
and checking the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for 
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Even before leaving Missouri, the first emigrant party had set a precedent for those 
that followed by hiring a veteran mountain man to guide them; along the way, it 
established a second with its halt at the forts on the Platte. After long weeks on the trail, 
Forts Laramie and Platte provided the weary home seekers the opportunity to repair 
equipment, restock supplies, and rest weary animals; the layover also afforded most of 
them their first sight of the forts’ inhabitants.  
Cleric Joseph Williams set an unfortunate third precedent with his self-righteous 
disdain of the trappers and their secular lifestyle:  
Here is a mixture of people, some white, some half breeds, some French. Here 
is plenty of talk about their damnation, but none about their salvation; and I 
thought about the words of David, ‘Woe is me that I sojourn in Mesech, that I 
dwelt in the tents of Kedar’ . . . I tried to preach twice to these people, but 
with little effect. Some of them said they had not heard preaching for twelve 
years.
439
 
 
But not all emigrants shared Williams’s prejudices. The following year, former 
Oregon missionary, Dr. Elijah White, organized a second wagon train of roughly 112 
homesteaders in eighteen wagons which left Independence, Missouri, on 16 May 1842 
accompanied by Lansford W. Hastings, a self-aggrandizing lawyer and promoter of 
westward expansion, who noted that it departed “all as one man, united in interest, united 
in feeling, we were, en route, for the long desired El Dorado of the West.”440 Hastings 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the free development of our yearly multiplying millions;” see John L. O’Sullivan, “Annexation,” 
Democratic Review 17 (July and August 1845): 5-10, quotation, 5; quoted in Haynes and Morris, eds., 
Manifest Destiny and Empire, 9. 
439 Joseph Williams, Narrative of a Tour from the State of Indiana to the Oregon Territory, in the Years 
1841-2 (Cincinnati, OH: J. B. Wilson, 1843), 38-39; quoted in Hafen and Young, Fort Laramie, 98.  
440 Lansford W. Hastings, The Emigrant’s Guide to Oregon and California: Containing Scenes and 
Incidents of a Party of Oregon Emigrants; A Description of Oregon; Scenes and Incidents of a Party of 
California Emigrants; A Description of California; With a Description of the Different Routes to Those 
Countries; and All Necessary Information Relative to the Equipment, Supplies, and the Method of 
Traveling (1932; reprint, Santa Barbara, CA: The Narrative Press, 2001), 5; Hafen and Young, Fort 
Laramie, 98-99.  
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later expressed a more charitable view of the fur traders than had Joseph Williams the 
year before:  
In a very few days, we met a company of traders from Fort Larimie [sic], on 
their way to the States, with their returns of furs and buffalo robes, which they 
had accumulated during the previous year. These furs and robes were 
transported in wagons, drawn by oxen. This meeting afforded a very favorable 
opportunity for forwarding letters to the States, of which many of the party 
were happy to avail themselves.
441
 
 
And about the men working at the two forts on the Platte, Hastings remembered: “Upon 
arriving at Forts Larimie [Laramie] and John [Platte], we were received in a very kind 
and friendly manner by the gentlemen of those forts, who extended every attention to us, 
while we remained in their vicinity.”442 Hastings also clearly appreciated at least one 
mountain man’s extensive knowledge of the West:  
Leaving these forts, we had traveled but a few miles, when we met a company 
of trappers and traders from Fort Hall, on their way to the States, among 
whom was a Mr. Fitzpateric [Thomas Fitzpatrick], who joined our party, as a 
guide, and traveled with us, as such, to Green river. From this gentleman’s 
long residence in the great western prairies, and the Rocky mountains, he is 
eminently qualified as a guide, of which fact, we were fully convinced, from 
the many advantages of which we derived from his valuable services.
443
 
 
The migration of 1843 dwarfed those of the previous two years. According to the 
results of a census taken on the Big Blue and reported in the 29 July 1843 issue of Niles 
Register, that year’s wagon train contained 121 wagons, 698 oxen, 296 horses, 973 cattle, 
and a party of 1,000 emigrants comprising 260 men, 130 women, and 610 children—a 
ratio of roughly five children for every woman.
444
 Upon their arrival at the forts on the 
Platte, two of the men in the party took particular notice of the traders’ conflicted 
                                                             
441 Ibid., 8. 
442 Ibid., 10. 
443 Ibid., 11. 
444 Niles’ Register (Baltimore), 29 July 1843, quoted in Hafen and Young, Fort Laramie, 100.  
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relations with their Indian trading partners: “Fort Lauramie [Laramie] belongs to the 
American Fur company, and is built for a protection against the Indians. The occupants of 
the fort, who have long been there, being mostly French and having wives of the Sioux, 
do not now apprehend any danger.”445  
The pace of migration over the Oregon Trail continued to accelerate over the next two 
years. A contingent of health seekers combined with four emigrant trains in the summer 
of 1844 to swell to over 1,000 the number of persons passing through the Platte River 
valley on their way to Oregon and California. And following the example of the 1842 
train, all four of the emigrant companies hired veteran mountain men to guide them: 
Moses “Black” Harris; Elisha Stephens; Andrew W. Sublette; and Joe Walker.  
Travelers passing Forts Laramie and Platte generally observed Teton bands camped 
there. Theodore Talbot, a journalist traveling with the Fremont expedition of 1843, 
remembered seeing Indians there that summer: “In the evening [of 4 August] we forded 
the ‘La Rainee’ [Laramie] and camped near Fort John [Fort Laramie]. There were several 
lodges of ‘Brulés’ and some ‘Mine-Konjas’ [Minneconjous] also camped around the 
fort.”446 That same summer, William Clark Kennerly, member of a distinguished hunting 
party led by Scottish nobleman, Sir William Drummond Stewart, noted about thirty 
                                                             
445 Johnson and Winter, Route Across the Rocky Mountains (reprint of 1932), 14; quoted in Hafen and 
Young, Fort Laramie, 101. Here also, Johnson and Winter briefly describe the two forts on the Platte as 
they appeared at the time: “The fort [Fort Laramie] is built of dobies, (unburnt bricks). A wall of six feet in 
thickness and fifteen in height, encloses an area of one hundred and fifty feet square. Within and around the 
wall, are the buildings, constructed of the same material. These are a trading house, ware houses for storing 
goods and skins, shops and dwellings for the traders and men. In the centre, is a large open area. A portion 
of the enclosed space is cut off by a partition wall, forming a carell (enclosure), for the animals belonging 
to the fort. About one mile below Fort Lauramie [Fort Laramie], is Fort Platte; which is built of the same 
materials and in the same manner, and belongs to a private trading company.” 
446 Theodore Talbot, The Journals of Theodore Talbot, 1843and 1849-52, with the Fremont Expedition of 
1843 and with the First Military Company in Oregon Territory, 1849-1852, ed. Charles Henry Carey 
(Portland, OR: Metropolitan Press, 1931), 34; quoted in Hafen and Young, Fort Laramie, 102. 
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lodges of Sioux who had come to Fort Laramie to trade.
447
 And James Clyman, a twenty-
year veteran of the American fur trade on his way to Oregon with one of the four 
emigrant companies headed there in the summer of 1844, commented on the Indian 
presence at the forts on the Platte in his diary entry for 1 August 1844: “. . . about 4 
o’clock in the afternoon we hove in sight of the white battlements of Fort Larrimie 
[Laramie] and Fort Platte whose white walls, surrounded by a few Sioux Indian lodges, 
shewed us that human life was not extinct.” 448 
The mass migration to Oregon was not without its detractors. A letter submitted to the 
Missouri Republican in June of 1844 expressed doubts about the entire enterprise:  
By next spring the true character of the Oregon territory will begin to be 
known., but not sufficiently, I think, to deter a considerable number from 
going. But next year a year, I think, the mania will run out. [Oregon] is 
mountainous and rugged; its plains are dry and barren; nothing but rain in 
winter, nothing but sun in summer . . . . In truth, no man of information, in his 
right mind, would think of leaving such a country as this, to wander over a 
thousand miles of desert and five hundred of mountain to reach such as that. It 
is wrong in the people of St. Louis to encourage this spirit of emigration.
449
   
 
Opposition to American settlement of the Pacific Northwest represented only one 
aspect of the larger controversy surrounding national expansion that dominated the 
presidential election of 1844. While the Whigs under their nominee Henry Clay urged 
federal support for the internal improvements that would lead to widespread economic 
development, the Democrats meanwhile had nominated Tennessean James K. Polk, an 
                                                             
447 Kennerly Family Papers, MHMA, St. Louis. In addition to William Clark Kennerly, nephew of William 
Clark of the Lewis and Clark expedition, the group did indeed include several well-connected individuals: 
Jefferson Kennerly Clark, son of the famous explorer, William Sublette, one of Henry and Ashley’s 
“enterprising young men” and founder of Fort Laramie, Baptiste Charbonneau, son of Sacajawea, and 
renowned painter, Alfred Jacob Miller; see Hafen and Young, Fort Laramie, 102-103.  
448 James Clyman, Journal of a Mountain Man, ed. and with an introduction by Linda M. Hasselstrom, 
Classics of the Fur Trade Series (San Francisco: California Historical Society, 1928; reprint, Missoula, MT: 
Mountain Press Publishing, 1984), 99; quoted in Hafen and Young, Fort Laramie, 105. 
449 Quoted in Hafen and Young, Fort Laramie, 106. 
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ardent proponent of both the annexation of Texas and the occupation of Oregon. Polk’s 
narrow margin of victory in that election—he garnered only 49.6 percent of the national 
vote and thus become only the second president to secure election without a clear popular 
majority—underscored how the issue of territorial expansion had divided the nation.450 
Nevertheless, after a joint resolution of congress admitted Texas to statehood even before 
Polk assumed the presidency in March of 1845, he set out to acquire all of Oregon for the 
United States, aided immeasurably in this endeavor by the thousands of emigrants 
passing over the Oregon Trail every year since 1841.
451
   
The migration of 1845 surpassed in magnitude all those that had gone before it. 
Estimates of its wagon trains range from 3,000 to 7,000 individuals—including at least 
1,000 children—traveling in anywhere from 460 to 500 wagons. One emigrant wrote at 
the time: “Our team, cattle, and wagons stretched out in procession some three miles in 
length on the broad prairies present a grand spectacle.”452  
                                                             
450 Hine & Faragher, American West, 202. 
451 The Anglo-American Convention of 1818 had set the boundary between the Louisiana Purchase and 
Canada at the 49th parallel and allowed for joint occupation of the Oregon country by Great Britain and the 
United States. Although the activities of the Hudson’s Bay Company gave Great Britain the better claim to 
that part of Oregon that would eventually become part of the modern Canadian province of British 
Columbia, American settlement of what would become parts of the present-day states of Washington, 
Oregon, and Idaho afforded the United States the better claim to those lands south of the 49th parallel. A 
period tune printed in the St. Louis [Weekly] Reveille of 4 September 1845 titled the “Oregon Song” 
reflected the feelings of those Americans willing to acquire Oregon by force if necessary:  
 
 To the far—far off Pacific sea, 
 Will you go—will you go—dear girl, with me ? 
 By a gentle brook, in a lovely spot,  
 We’ll jump from our wagon and build our cot ! 
 
 Then hip—hurrah for the prairie life ! 
 Hip—hurrah for the mountain strife ! 
 And if rifles must crack, if we swords must draw, 
 Our country forever, hurrah ! hurrah ! 
    
452 F. G. Young, “The Oregon Trail,” The Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society, 1 (? ?), 370; St. Louis 
[Weekly] Reveille (St. Louis) 16 May 1845; St. Louis [Weekly] Reveille (St. Louis) 4 September 1845; W. 
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The company commanded by Joel Palmer arrived outside Fort Laramie on 24 June 
1845. Over the course of the next two days, the emigrants rested their stock, repaired 
their equipment, and resupplied themselves for the arduous trip to the Snake River 
country and Fort Hall. And on the afternoon of the 25
th
 each emigrant family provided 
meat, bread, coffee, and sugar as the company hosted a lavish dinner for the encamped 
Sioux. Before the meal, one of the traders interpreted as both hosts and guests delivered 
speeches urging friendship between Indians and whites after which the participants 
observed the ritual smoking of the pipe.
453
  
But despite the relatively peaceful relations between Indians and whites that then 
prevailed along the Oregon Trail, the traders at Forts Laramie and Platte welcomed their 
first contingent of American dragoons in June of 1845. The previous month, Colonel 
Stephen Watts Kearny had led five divisions of the First Regiment of United States 
Dragoons out of Fort Leavenworth with instructions “to ascertain the military resources 
of the country;—its definite geography—the strength, manners and customs, and mode of 
warfare, of the different tribes of Indians that lay in their way;—together with their 
disposition towards the whites—their method of subsistence, &c. &c.”454 Although his 
orders specified a return to Fort Leavenworth by way of the Santa Fe Trail—and by 
doing so to secure safe passage for the numerous American traders’ caravans making the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
B. Ide, “Oregon Correspondence, Bank of the Nebraska, in Jefferson Inquirer (?) 26 June 1845; quoted in 
Hafen and Young, Fort Laramie, 107.  
453 Joel Palmer, Journal of Travels Over the Rocky Mountains, to the Mouth of the Columbia River . . . 
1845 and 1846: Containing Descriptions of the Valleys of the Willamette, Umpqua, and Clamet, a General 
Description of Oregon Territory . . . a List of Necessary Outfits for Emigrants, and a Table of Distances 
from Camp to Camp Along the Route: Also . . . the Organic Laws of Oregon Territory, Tables of About 300 
Words of the Chinook Jargon . . . &c., in Reuben Gold Thwaites, Early Western Travels, XXX: 60-61; 
Hafen and Young, Fort Laramie, 108.   
454 J. Henry Carleton, The Prairie Logbooks: Dragoon Campaigns to the Pawnee Villages in 1844, and to 
the Rocky Mountains in 1845, ed. and with an introduction by Louis Pelzer (Chicago: Caxton Club, 1943; 
reprint, Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1983), 157.  
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round trip from Independence, Missouri, to Santa Fe and Chihuahua—Kearny’s primary 
mission was twofold: to protect the emigrants working their way west that summer along 
the Oregon Trail, and to overawe the Indians in their path with the military power of the 
United States. For these purposes, Kearny’s column included 250 well-armed dragoons, 
two mountain howitzers, seventeen wagons loaded with supplies, twenty-five steers, and 
fifty head of sheep.
455
 
With the arrival of the dragoons in the Platte River valley, the traders at the two rival 
posts competed with each for the privilege of hosting the troopers. Although they camped 
nearer Fort Laramie because of the rich grass in its vicinity, Kearny even-handedly chose 
to council with the 1200 Sioux camped near Fort Platte. Accompanied by two-thirds of 
his officers, a guard detachment, the two howitzers, and their crews, Kearny met with the 
Indians, seven-eighths of whom were Brulés, at a site between the two forts on the 
morning of 16 June. Snowflakes fell from the sky as the council leaders seated 
themselves on chairs and benches contributed by the men from Fort Platte and arranged 
on a carpet of buffalo robes; the rest of the Indians watched seated in a great semi-circle 
on the ground. Nearby, the Indians had raised three flags, two with the stars and stripes of 
the Republic and a third flag of Indian design that contained two crossed bands denoting 
the winds placed between a cluster of stars above and clasped hands below.
456
 
Kearny opened the proceedings by shaking hands with the most important headmen. 
He then addressed the chiefs by choosing words that seemed almost to foreshadow 
further trouble for the Sioux from home seekers using the Oregon Trail. Lieutenant J. 
                                                             
455 S. W. Kearny, “Report of a Summer Campaign to the Rocky Mountains,” etc., in Sen. Ex. Docs., cong. 
29, sess. I, no. I, 210-213;  Carleton, Prairie Logbooks, 157; Hafen and Young, Fort Laramie, 109-110. 
456 Carleton, Prairie Logbooks, 247-248; Hafen and Young, Fort Laramie, 110.  
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Henry Carleton later recorded the “substance” of that part of Kearny’s message 
demanding safe passage for the emigrants:  
Sioux: I am glad to meet you. Through your Chiefs I have shaken hands with 
all of you. Your great father has learned much of his red children, and has sent 
me with a handful of braves to visit you. I am opening a road for your white 
brethren. They are now following after me, and are journeying to the other 
side of the great mountains. They take with them their women, their children, 
and their cattle. They all go to bury their bones there, and never to return. You 
must not disturb them in their persons, or molest their property; neither must 
you on any account obstruct the road which I have now opened for them. 
Should you do so, your great father would be angry with you, and cause you 
to be punished.
457
 
 
Carleton also recorded the “substance” of Kearny’s admonition to the chiefs to refrain 
from trading for alcoholic spirits and to destroy them wherever and whenever found: 
You have many enemies about you;—but fire-water is the greatest of them all. 
I learn that some bad white men bring it here from New Mexico, and sell it to 
you. Open your ears now, and listen to me. It is contrary to the wishes of your 
great father that it should be brought here; and I advise you, whenever you 
find it in your country—no matter in whose possession—to spill it all upon 
the ground. The earth may drink it without injury, but you cannot.
458
  
 
Kearny, understandably, if a bit disingenuously, had been careful to attribute the source 
of the liquor trade among the Sioux to unscrupulous traders plying the Santa Fe Trail 
rather than to the buffalo robe and hide trade conducted at either Fort Laramie or Fort 
Platte.  
Then, according to Carleton, Kearny added: “Your great father is the friend of his red 
children, and will continue to be so as long as you behave yourselves properly. He did not 
direct me to bring you presents, but he has sent you a few things that you may remember 
what I have said.” Of course, the “presents” Kearny distributed were precisely the kinds 
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of Euro-American trade goods that the Tetons had gradually become dependent upon for 
their very survival as buffalo-hunting nomads: red and green blankets, scarlet and blue 
cloth, looking glasses, knives, beads, and tobacco. If the American government had 
served notice, through Kearny, that in the future it intended to manipulate Sioux behavior 
through the distribution of gifts, Bull Tail, principal chief at the council, seemed to accept 
and even welcome the new status quo in his brief reply, as Carleton later remembered it, 
to Kearney:  
My father: what you have told my people is right, and it pleases me. I know 
now if they are good to their white brethren, they will be well treated in 
return; and will find that such presents as those they are about to receive, will 
often come [emphasis added]. Now I have found a father: my people will no 
longer think of dying—but will live. They will long remember the words you 
have spoken to them; and as you have said, so, always shall they do.
459
 
 
IV 
Despite the feelings of goodwill Kearny and Bull Tail expressed at the council, 
relations between the Sioux and the emigrants soon began noticeably to deteriorate. The 
Tetons had gradually awakened to the uncomfortable reality that there were, in fact, 
many more whites than the Indians had believed possible. For decades they had accepted 
the fur traders in their midst because they were few in number and, in the Indians’ 
estimation, but little inferior to themselves. Then the spectacle of hundreds of emigrants 
passing by their encampments every summer for the last five years had strained the 
Lakotas’ ability to comprehend such multitudes. Finally, the appearance of the dragoons 
had utterly terrified the Sioux, as they realized that the mounted troopers could easily 
                                                             
459 Ibid. For another first-hand account of this council, see Philip St. George Cooke, Scenes and Adventures 
in the Army, or, Romance of Military Life, The Far Western Frontier (Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston, 
1857; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1973). 
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reach the most distant corners of the Tetons’ domain.460 As tensions between Indians and 
whites in the Platte River valley continued to escalate throughout the summer of 1846, 
Fort Laramie entered upon its final three years as a privately-owned trading post.  
Francis Parkman visited Fort Laramie during the summer of 1846 and, in addition to 
providing a detailed description of the fort, recorded his observations of the interaction 
between the traders, emigrants, and Sioux. As the owners of Fort Platte had recently 
abandoned it, Parkman accurately observed that “Fort Laramie . . . well-nigh 
monopolizes the Indian trade of this region. Here its officials rule with an absolute sway; 
the arm of the United States has little force; for when we were there, the extreme outposts 
of her troops were about seven hundred miles to the eastward.” And until 1846 there 
seemed to be scant reason to station a garrison any closer for, as Parkman observed at 
Fort Laramie: “Though men are frequently killed in the neighborhood, no apprehensions 
are felt of any general designs of hostility from the Indians.”461  
                                                             
460 Ibid., 250. 
461 Parkman, The Oregon Trail, 95-96. George Hyde argues that the emigrants did indeed have legitimate 
grievances against the fur-company men: “The emigrants on the Platte were annoying enough to the Sioux 
and their neighbors, but the natural feeling of the Indians against them seems to have been greatly increased 
by the talk of many of the traders, who blamed the emigrants for all the ills from which they and the 
Indians suffered. As the emigrant road touched the buffalo range along the Platte for only one hundred 
miles, the traders’ talk of the slaughtering of game by the emigrants was absurd. These men either had not 
the brains or the honesty to observe that the dwindling away of the great herds had begun long before the 
first emigrant trains appeared on the Platte. The traders themselves were largely to blame for the reckless 
killing-off of the buffalo.” As evidence for his assertion, Hyde recounts a buffalo hunt described by the 
artist George Catlin who “in 1832 saw a herd of 1,500 of these animals slaughtered by Indians near Fort 
Pierre on the Upper Missouri because a trader wanted a boat-load of salted tongues to ship to the St. Louis 
market. Catlin states that only the tongues were taken, the rest of the meat and the skins being left for the 
wolves. These foolish Indians received only liquor in exchange for the tongues;” see Hyde, Red Cloud’s 
Folk, 61. And having witnessed the hunt for himself, Catlin later wrote with great clarity and prescience 
about two of the most deleterious effects of the American fur trade on the Plains Indians—alcohol abuse 
and environmental degradation: “This profligate waste of the lives of these noble and useful animals, when 
from all that I could learn, not a skin or a pound of the meat (except the tongues), was brought in, fully 
supports me in the seemingly extravagant predictions that I have made as to their extinction, which I am 
certain is near at hand. In the above extravagant instance, at a season when their skins were without fur and 
not worth taking off, and their camp was so well-stocked with fresh and dried meat, that they had no 
occasion for using the flesh, there is a fair exhibition of the improvident character of the savage, and also of 
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But Parkman also noted that the emigrants did not share in this freedom from 
“apprehensions,” as they regarded the American Fur Company men themselves with 
suspicion and the Indians with a mixture of fear and confusion—attitudes that both 
groups reciprocated and that, someday, would likely result in tragedy. As he later 
remembered: “The emigrants felt a violent prejudice against the French Indians, as they 
called the trappers and traders. They thought, and with some reason, that these men bore 
them no goodwill. Many of them were firmly persuaded that the French were instigating 
the Indians to attack and cut them off.”462  
In The Oregon Trail, Parkman had advised his readers to present, “in the presence of 
the Indians, a bold bearing, self-confident yet vigilant, and you will find them tolerably 
safe neighbors;” predictably, however, the “timorous mood of the emigrants [as he saw 
it] . . . exposed them to real danger.” As Parkman went on to explain:  
The Dahcotah [Sioux] saw clearly enough the perturbation of the emigrants, 
and instantly availed themselves of it. [The Indians] became extremely 
insolent and exacting in their demands. It has become an established custom 
with them to go to the camp of every party, as it arrives in succession at the 
fort, and demand a feast. Smoke’s village had come with this express design, 
having made several days’ journey with no other object than that of enjoying a 
cup of coffee and two or three biscuits. So the “feast” was demanded, and the 
emigrants dared not refuse it [emphasis added].
463
 
 
Throughout the remainder of his visit to the fort, Parkman bore witness to, in his 
estimation, a recurring cycle of extortion: 
With each emigrant party that arrived at Fort Laramie this scene was renewed; 
and every day the Indians grew more rapacious and presumptuous. One 
evening they broke in pieces, out of mere wantonness, the cups from which 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
his recklessness in catering for his appetite, so long as the present inducements are held out to him in his 
country for its gratification;” see Catlin, North American Indians, 259-260. 
462 Ibid., 102. 
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they had been feasted; and this so exasperated the emigrants that many of 
them seized their rifles and could scarcely be restrained from firing on the 
insolent mob of Indians. Before we left the country this dangerous spirit on 
the part of the Dahcotah had mounted to a yet higher pitch. They began 
openly to threaten the emigrants with destruction, and actually fired upon one 
or two parties of them.
464
   
 
Parkman then went on to recommend his solution to the escalating level of violence: 
“A military force and military law are urgently called for in that perilous region; and 
unless troops are speedily stationed at Fort Laramie, or elsewhere in the neighborhood, 
both emigrants and other travelers will be exposed to most imminent risks.”465 The 
United States government would soon heed Parkman’s advice. 
                                                             
464 Ibid., 103-104. Parkman, of course, inevitably viewed the interaction between emigrants and Indians 
from the vantage point of a privileged, well-educated, Anglo-American male “on a tour of curiosity and 
amusement.” For their part, the Teton Sioux initially responded to the ever-intensifying invasion of their 
homeland throughout the 1840s and 1850s by white emigrants with a mixture of bewilderment and hostility 
and subsequently expressed their feelings toward them in a manner consistent with their culture—their 
feelings of utter helplessness would come later. In her biography of Crazy Horse, author Mari Sandoz 
faithfully captured the Indians’ dilemma regarding the emigrants in her unique idiom: “From the first there 
had been a white man’s road past the fort, and once in a while even soldiers came riding on it, their swords 
bright in the sun. But they had always gone on, and there was plenty of water and grass and buffalo for all. 
So the trail had started, with just a little stream of white men coming through, and the Indian lifted his hand 
in welcome and went out to smoke and watch this lengthening village of the whites that moved past him 
day after day all summer, always headed in the same direction. He wondered that he never saw them come 
back, yet they must be the same ones each year, for there could not be that many people on all the earth. At 
first he wondered at the women and children too, for he had long thought of the whites as only men, 
although he had heard stories of the families that had been seen, the women with the pale, sick skins and 
the break-in-two bodies, the young ones pale too, with hair light and soft as the flying seed of the 
cottonwood that tickles the nose in summer. Even when there were quite a few on the trail the Indian had 
let the whites use his trader town while he sat with his pipe and blanket looking on as they bought perhaps a 
handful of gunpowder or the last cup of flour for a sick woman, or had their footsore oxen shod at three 
dollars a shoe. Often they left more wagons behind with the many already standing dead as old bones 
around the fort because the animals that were to pull them over the far mountains had been worn out. 
Puffing at his long-stemmed pipe of stone the Indian had watched all these things and found them very new 
and strange. But soon the little stream of whites grew into a great river, wider than a gun could shoot 
across, and the grass and the buffalo got so used up that the Indian ponies were poor far into sundance time 
and the hunters had to travel many days, sometimes clear to the Crow country, for a kettle of fresh meat. 
There was uneasiness about this, and much talk at the councils. The younger chiefs and warriors from up 
on the Cheyenne River or down in the Smoky Hill country and other places back from the white man’s road 
were angry at the things they saw happening. And when the trader chiefs like Conquering Bear and Bull 
Tail and old Smoke made strong talk for continued peace with the people on the trail, the others called 
them Loaf About the Forts and said they had sold their tongues to the white man for his sugar and coffee 
and whiskey; see Sandoz, Crazy Horse, 3-4. 
465 Parkman, The Oregon Trail, 104. 
216 
 
Emigrant activity along the Oregon Trail in the summer of 1846 did not, however, 
interfere with Oglala plans to move against the Crows and Shoshones. The season before, 
the Shoshones had killed Male Crow, son of an Oglala chief, The Whirlwind, who, after 
dismissing the Shoshone peace offering of his son’s scalp, then sent a war pipe as far 
away as the Missouri River to induce other Teton bands to join his campaign against their 
hated enemies. Although two villages of Minneconjous from the Cheyenne River country 
did, in fact, respond to The Whirlwind’s summons, James Bordeaux meanwhile had 
convinced the chief to abandon his war. Old Smoke’s Oglalas and some Cheyennes 
eventually gathered at Fort Laramie—3,000 people camped in 600 lodges—to prepare for 
the Snake country expedition. This large village soon dwindled to roughly 1250 souls in 
250 lodges who scoured the country looking for any Snakes or whites to kill. Before their 
war was over, the Oglalas had lost a chief, White Buffalo Bull, and thirty other warriors 
to the Crows and Snakes.
466
 
A new factor motivated one group of emigrants to navigate the Platte River valley on 
their way west past Fort Laramie in the spring of 1847—religion.467 The hostility of their 
“gentile” neighbors had forced the Mormons from their Mississippi River home at 
Nauvoo, Illinois, across Iowa, and then into winter quarters on the banks of the Missouri 
River in 1846. Safe temporarily from the relentless persecution of mainstream 
Protestants, Mormon leader, Brigham Young, had prepared a “blueprint for action” that 
outlined the personnel, route, and preparations necessary for an advance pioneer 
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company to depart no later than 15 March 1847. The company was to follow the route 
popularized by explorer John C. Fremont that led up the North Platte to Fort Laramie, 
crossed over to the Sweetwater River, and continued on through South Pass and beyond. 
Anxious to reestablish the First Presidency in their new home beyond the Rocky 
Mountains, Young’s Pioneer Band, comprised of 143 men, three women, and two 
children in 72 wagons at last set out from their Winter Quarters on 14 April 1847.
468
 
After nearly six weeks on the trail, the Mormons had journeyed as far west as 
Chimney Rock, and it was in its vicinity that they encountered the first Teton Sioux any 
of the emigrants had seen. Their journalist, William Clayton, counted a group of “thirty-
five in number, about half squaws and children.”469 In his journal, Clayton described a 
people who had achieved an unprecedented level of prosperity through their 
uninterrupted access to Euro-American trade goods:  
They are all well dressed and very noble looking, some having good clean 
blankets, others nice robes artfully ornamented with beads and paintings. All 
had many ornaments on their clothing and ears, some had nice painted shells 
suspended from the ear. All appeared to be well armed with muskets. Their 
moccasins were indeed clean and beautiful. One had a pair of moccasins of a 
clear white ornamented with beads, etc. They fit very tight to the foot. For 
cleanness and neatness, they will vie with the most tasteful whites [emphasis 
added].
470
 
 
Several members of the Pioneer Band echoed Clayton’s description of the rich 
appearance of the Tetons, perhaps comparing them to the impoverished band of Pawnees 
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that the Mormons had encountered several weeks earlier. Erastus Snow, for instance, 
wrote that some of the Sioux “had fur caps and cloth coats, others had cloth pants and 
shirts, and the rest were neatly dressed in skins ornamented with beads, feathers, paints, 
etc. and they were by all odds the most cleanly, orderly, and best appearing of any 
Indians we have seen west of the Missouri River.”471 Impressed by the beauty of their 
women, Norton Jacob, using a pejorative term for indigenous females, observed that 
“some of their squaws are pretty brunettes.”472 And judging by an entry in his journal, 
Horace K. Whitney also viewed the Indians favorably: “There were some very fine 
looking men and women among them.”473 
Undoubtedly influenced by the emigrants’ favorable first impressions of the Sioux, 
the Mormons’ two-day encounter with their visitors proceeded smoothly. Their chief, a 
man named Owashtecha [Brave Bear], had first approached the Pioneer Band carrying an 
American flag and wearing around his neck a medal with “Pierre Chouteau Jr. and Co. 
Upper Missouri Outfit” inscribed on one side and “Brave Bear” etched on the reverse. 
The Mormons then returned their guests’ expressions of goodwill with a tour of the 
Mormon camp, gifts of tobacco, food, and other presents, a feast later that evening that 
included the ritual smoking of the pipe; and, for Brave Bear, an entertaining look at the 
moon through a telescope and a special tent for him and his wife to spend the night. The 
next morning, perhaps emboldened by the Mormons’ unexpected generosity, a Sioux 
chief named Washteha requested and received from clerk Thomas Bullock a “written 
paper” to show other whites using the Oregon Trail. Bullock’s subsequent “character 
                                                             
471 Journal of Erastus Snow, 24 May 1847, Latter Day Saints Church Archives, Latter Day Saints Church 
Historical Department, Salt Lake City, UT (hereafter, LDS Church Archives) quoted in Bennett, We’ll Find 
the Place, 152. 
472
 Journal of Norton Jacob, 25 May 1847, LDS Church Archives; quoted in ibid. 
473
 Journal of Horace K. Whitney, 25 May 1847, LDS Church Archives; quoted in ibid. 
219 
 
reference” of Washteha included all thirty-five Sioux in the clerk’s favorable assessment 
of their behavior: “This is to certify that Washteha of the Dacohtah tribe of Indians, with 
O Wash te cha the principal chief, and thirty-three other men, women, and children, 
visited our camp on the 24
th
 and 25
th
 May 1847, behaved themselves civilly and 
peaceably; we gave them bread. They were very friendly to us, and the best behaved 
Indians we have yet seen. W Richards—Thomas Bullock, scribe.”474 But relations 
between the Sioux in the Platte River valley and Mormons on the Oregon Trail would not 
for long remain as cordial as those described by Bullock. 
The scale of westward emigration in 1847 surpassed all previous years. One estimate 
of the traffic on the Oregon Trail that summer calculates the number of emigrants at 
approximately 6,500 souls traveling in 1,300 wagons.
475
 And for all of them, Fort 
Laramie provided the opportunity to rest, repair equipment, and resupply themselves for 
the long journey ahead.  
The Mormon emigration of 1848 dominated traffic on the Oregon Trail that year. 
While approximately 4,000 Latter-day Saints trekked to the Salt Lake valley, 1,700 went 
on to Oregon, and 150 made it to California. So accustomed had the Mormons become to 
stopping at Fort Laramie that their leader, Brigham Young, declared it the point of 
transfer for freight carried in wagons from Missouri onto wagons dispatched from the 
Salt Lake valley. As each caravan then returned from the fort to its starting point, draft 
animals that had become acclimated either to the lowlands of Missouri or to the high 
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mountain air of the Great Basin thus avoided exposure to an unfamiliar climate.
476
 But 
notwithstanding its unrivalled utility for emigrants navigating the Oregon Trail, the end 
of Fort Laramie’s career as a private trading post was near.  
The firm of Pierre Chouteau, Jr. and Company restructured itself in the summer of 
1848 by assigning nearly half of its stock in equal distributions of one share each to five 
partners in the field: Alexander Culbertson, James Kipp, William Laidlaw, Frederick 
LaBoue, and Andrew Drips. As part of the reorganization, the company named 
Culbertson as head of the Western Department and Upper Missouri Outfit, while Drips 
received instructions to assume control of operations at Fort Laramie.
477
 Throughout the 
winter of 1848-49, Drips performed his duties efficiently and collected enough robes and 
furs to warrant a request for sufficient horses and mules from Fort Pierre to transport the 
season’s returns over the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail to the Missouri River and from 
there to St. Louis.
478
  
In the spring of 1849, Drips left Fort Laramie for St. Louis and placed Bruce Husband 
in charge of reconditioning the fort in anticipation of its projected sale to the government. 
Husband later informed Drips of his progress in a letter written toward the end of May: 
“After you left we were dull enough for a few days, until Robinson arrived from Mo. 
When I set him and Burke at whitewashing the rooms, repairing the chimneys etc. We 
had just got through this most necessary job when the first emigration parties arrived, 
keeping Burke and in fact all of us employed crossing their wagons, etc. etc.”479 
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Husband’s letter also reflects his company’s neglect of Fort Laramie’s heretofore 
lucrative trade with emigrants on the Oregon Trail: “It is a great pity you left no robes 
here as I could sell inferior robes very freely to emigrants at 3 and 4 dollars each; as it is, 
no robes, no blacksmith to work, and no oxen or horses (all of which would be more than 
ordinarily profitable) to make anything out of the emigration except ferryage, which last 
will cease when Laramie falls.”480 Husband then closes his letter with a proposal to enter 
into a partnership with Drips after the sale of the fort: “I would write you more fully, but 
there is nothing of very great interest only this (a fortune in two or three years can be 
made by taking seven or eight thousand dollars worth of good serviceable merchandise 
into Salt Lake valley next autumn or even next spring). If you think of anything like this 
or would feel inclined to assist me therein, I am on hand certainly.”481 
The purchase of Fort Laramie by the United States government in June of 1849 
furthered the implementation of its policy to safeguard emigrants using the Oregon Trail, 
a policy first articulated more than three years earlier. As early as 2 December 1845, 
President James K. Polk had formulated a plan for their protection: “I recommend that a 
suitable number of stockades and block house forts be erected along the usual route 
between our frontier settlement on the Missouri and the Rocky mountains, and that an 
adequate force of mounted riflemen be raised to guard and protect [the emigrants] on 
their journey.”482 Then, on 30 December 1845, Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton 
introduced a bill based on the president’s suggestions; Representative Jacob Brinkerhoff 
introduced a comparable bill in the House of Representatives the following day. And on 
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19 May 1846, Congress passed “An Act to provide for raising a regiment of Mounted 
Riflemen, and for establishing military stations on the route to Oregon.”483  
The army moved swiftly to implement the provisions of the act. Although the 
Mexican War had temporarily interrupted the government’s plan to construct a series of 
“stockades and block house forts” along the Oregon Trail, in 1848 a battalion of nearly 
five hundred men called the Missouri Mounted Volunteers built Fort Kearny on the Platte 
River three miles from the head of Grand Island.
484
 Army officers had also questioned 
veteran trapper and trader, Thomas Fitzpatrick, for information regarding suitable 
locations to build additional forts, Fitzpatrick consequently recommended placing forts 
near Forts Laramie and Hall, in the valleys of the Platte and Snake Rivers, respectively, 
by the Big Bend of the Arkansas, and close to Fort Bent along the Santa Fe Trail. In 
referring specifically to Fort Laramie, Fitzpatrick wrote in a letter to the army: “My 
opinion is that a post at or in the vicinity of Laramie is much wanted. It would be nearly 
in the vicinity of the buffalo range, where all the most formidable Indian tribes are fast 
approaching, and near where there will eventually (as the game decreases) be a great 
struggle for the ascendancy.” 485 The army accepted his recommendation. 
On 9 April 1849, General David E. Twiggs issued the following orders:  
“There will be a post established at or near Fort Laramie. Its garrison will 
consist of companies A and E, Mounted Riflemen, and company G, 6
th
 
infantry, under the command of Maj. W. F. Sanderson, Mounted Riflemen . . . 
. Major Sanderson will leave Fort Leavenworth by the 10
th
 of may, with 
company E, Mounted Riflemen (rationed for two months), and such quarter 
master’s stores (tools, etc.) as may be necessary until the arrival of the 
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remainder of his command, and will proceed to locate a post in the vicinity of 
Fort Laramie, agreeably to the special instructions that will be given him.” 486 
 
Major Sanderson first arrived at Fort Laramie on 16 June 1849. In a report to his 
superior written nine days later, he explained:  
I have, accompanied by Lieutenant Woodbury of the engineer department, 
made a thorough reconnaissance of the country in the neighborhood of [Fort 
Laramie] . . . . [It] was found to be the most eligible for a military post, and 
was purchased at my request, on the 26
th
 instant by Lieutenant Woodbury, at a 
cost of four thousand dollars from Mr. Bruce Husband, agent of the American 
Fur company, who was duly authorized to dispose of the same for that 
amount.
487
 
 
Although the army had acquired Fort Laramie upon the recommendation of 
Thomas Fitzpatrick, his years in the West, combined with his recent appointment as 
Indian agent for the upper Platte and the Arkansas had convinced him that merely 
establishing a series of military posts along the Oregon Trail would not, in itself, 
ensure peace in the region. Toward that end, he conceived the idea of a great 
council at which the government could negotiate peace-keeping treaties with the 
more important plains tribes. Fitzpatrick believed that without large enough 
garrisons the military posts—especially Fort Laramie—would not be able to 
withstand an Indian attack. And the Indians would have a legitimate grievance for 
doing so as the money allocated for the purchase of the fort had not bought the land 
upon which it stood. That site still belonged primarily to the Sioux, but also to the 
Cheyennes, and Arapahos.
488
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V 
The years immediately following the sale of Fort Laramie to the army were eventful 
ones for the Teton Sioux of the Platte River valley. Thousands of gold-seekers headed 
west for the new gold fields in California in the summer of 1848 and joined the ever-
increasing throng of Oregon- and California-bound emigrants and Mormons traveling the 
Oregon Trail. Additionally, an outbreak of Asiatic cholera in the East sent even more 
whites eager to escape the ravages of the disease to the westward migration. 
Unfortunately for the Indians in its path, however, the steamboats that transported so 
many of the emigrants to the upper Missouri also brought the plague. Several winter 
counts for 1849-50 record its effects: that of American Horse claims that “many died of 
the cramps,” that of White Cow Killer terms 1849-50 as “The people had the cramps 
winter,” while those of No Ears and Iron Crow label that year simply as “Cramps” and 
“Convulsions,” respectively.489 
A deadly epidemic of smallpox erupted in the Indian camps in 1850. For that year, 
Cloud Shield’s winter count explains that “Many died of the smallpox;” White Cow 
Killer calls it “All-the-time-sick-with-the-big-smallpox-winter;” No Ears, Short Man, and 
Iron Crow all describe the year simply as “Smallpox.” To minimize its impact, the Sioux 
temporarily moved north of the Platte while the Cheyennes and Arapahos fled south.
490
  
In September of 1851, nearly 10,000 Indians gathered at Horse Creek to visit with old 
friends—and enemies—and for feasting, gift-giving, and treaty-making. Sioux winter 
counts record this highly significant event. But whereas The Flame, Lone Dog, and The 
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Swan all refer to the winter of 1851-52 as the year the Sioux made peace with the 
Crows—an allusion to the Laramie Peace Conference of 1851, the winter counts of 
American Horse, Cloud Shield, No Ears, Short Man, and Iron Crow all reflect the 
substantial distribution of annuity goods dispensed at Fort Laramie that year as a 
condition of the treaty-making at Horse Creek. White Cow Killer explicitly calls 1851-52 
as “Large-issue-of-goods-on-the-Platte-River-winter.491  
The goods to which White Cow Killer refers were hardly an altruistic gift from a 
generous United States.  In fact, their annual distribution to the Sioux and other tribes 
served American interests in three very important ways: (1) because annuities would—
theoretically—compensate the Indians for disrupting the buffalo herds along the Oregon 
Trail, the government could thus eliminate the rationale—i.e., control of the shrinking 
buffalo ranges—for the intertribal warfare that both threatened the safety of white 
emigrants and disrupted trade; (2) as the payments had essentially bribed the tribes to 
agree to live within discrete boundaries, they could be held accountable for any 
infractions of the peace within their territory; and (3) by dispensing—or withholding—
annuities, the Americans could, at last, directly influence tribal politics.
492
  
Consumerism had at last trapped the Teton Sioux in an accelerating cycle of 
dependency.  Euro-American trade goods had first irrevocably transformed their 
economy from one of communal subsistence to one of individual surplus production for 
exchange. And once trade goods had become such an integral part of Teton life and 
culture that they could not survive without them, it required little effort on the part of 
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United States government officials to manipulate Sioux intertribal politics through the 
“free” distribution of annuity goods. Thus, although Richard White claims that “the 
whole conference can be interpreted as a major triumph for the Tetons” and that “[i]n a 
sense, the Fort Laramie Treaty marked the height of Sioux political power,” it would 
require the passing of but three years to expose both the transitory nature of that political 
power and their illusions of economic independence.
493
 
The unexpected confrontation that shattered the peace between the Teton Sioux and 
the United States government occurred along the Oregon Trail near Fort Laramie in the 
summer of 1854. As wagonloads of Mormons slowly wound their way past the bands of 
Teton Sioux camped in the vicinity of the fort to receive their annuities, a lame cow 
suddenly bolted from the Mormon caravan and into the Indian camp, after which a 
Minneconjou visitor to the Oglalas named Straight Foretop shot the distressed animal for 
meat. The cow’s owner, loath to enter the ring of tipis, had abandoned it only to report 
the incident later to a Lieutenant Fleming, commander of Fort Laramie’s small garrison. 
Despite an offer from Chief Brave Bear of the Brules to make restitution to the aggrieved 
owner of the cow, the inexperienced Fleming ordered his subordinate, Second Lieutenant 
J. L. Grattan, and twenty-nine men and one howitzer to the Sioux camps to take the 
Minneconjou offender into custody.
494
  
Grattan, even more ignorant of Indians than his superior and feeling little but 
contempt for their fighting ability, arrived at the Sioux camps, unwisely attempted to take 
Straight Foretop into custody, and set off decades of warfare between the Teton Sioux 
and the United States army.  For as Straight Foretop resisted arrest, a fight ensued in 
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which Brave Bear and all of the troopers perished—the chief only after enduring hours of 
agony. As the Indians subsequently fled the Platte River valley for the relative safety of 
the nearby plains to escape the inevitable retribution of the soldiers, the Tetons, became 
painfully aware of their reliance on readily-accessible Euro-American trade goods, an 
awareness that finally exposed their illusions of independence.
495
  
Perhaps Mari Sandoz best captured the shock experienced by the Sioux as they dealt 
with this new reality: 
These were times of changing things, unsettled and hard, some of the older 
people were saying when they saw a winter away from the whites of the Shell 
[Platte] River ahead of them. It would be the first one since the Oglalas 
followed Bull Bear southward from the Black Hills country to his traders 
twenty years before, the first winter without white men and their goods 
somewhere in the Lakota country in the memory of the oldest among them. 
But now it seemed certain that the soldier chiefs were very angry and would 
not let the Indians come back to the Holy Road [Oregon Trail] or let the 
traders bring their packs and wagons to the camps. When they thought of this 
it seemed very hard, for they had forgotten how to live without trader goods, 
not only for eating and wear, but even the arrows and spears would fail them 
without iron for the points.
496
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The nineteenth-century history of the Teton Sioux is indeed a study of contradictions. 
While their attitude toward the members of the Corps of Discovery had prompted 
William Clark to call them “the vilest miscreants of the savage race,” Manuel Lisa had 
found them to be firm allies of the United States during the War of 1812, and, in 1823, 
they had even fought alongside Colonel Henry Leavenworth’s Missouri Legion against 
the Arikaras. But it had been the establishment of Fort Laramie in 1834 that subsequently 
tied the Western Sioux to the Americans in a symbiotic trade relationship that secured the 
peace between them for the next twenty years. 
It was the permanent occupation of the Platte River valley by the Sioux in the years 
after the founding of Fort Laramie that both enabled them to dominate the north-central 
plains. In the end, the scholarly debate outlined in the introduction to this study over who 
followed whom to the Platte settled nothing. And the discovery that the Tetons had been 
there seasonally—even before Sublette and Campbell built their trading post at the mouth 
of the Laramie River—while interesting, misses the essential point that it was the Tetons’ 
wholesale submersion in the buffalo robe trade in the two decades after 1834 that tied 
them irrevocably to Euro-American consumerism and eventually compromised their 
ability to maintain their political and economic independence.     
229 
 
Business between the Tetons and American fur traders peaked throughout the 1840s 
and provided the Sioux with enormous quantities of trade goods that both eased their 
daily lives and made possible the maximum extension of their range and military power 
throughout the 1850s. At the height of that power, they controlled the north-central plains 
from the Rocky Mountain Front to the Missouri and from the Platte River valley to the 
Yellowstone. Their domain thus afforded them access to the Southwest, Great Lakes, and 
Canadian plains trading networks. But beginning in the 1840s, the most important road 
used by non-trading white emigrants—the Oregon Trail—neatly bisected Sioux hunting 
grounds along the Platte River valley.
497
 
By the time of the Fort Laramie Peace Conference of 1851, the Tetons’ military, 
political, and economic power reached its zenith. The United States government had 
acknowledged that power by building Fort Kearney in 1848 and purchasing Fort Laramie 
from Pierre Chouteau, Jr. and Company the following year. With these initiatives, 
therefore, the army had accepted a permanent and active role on the plains west of the 
Missouri. Stationed to protect white emigrants traveling the Oregon Trail, the garrisons 
attached to the forts along the trail soon proved inadequate   
For five years following the sale of Fort Laramie to the United States Army, veteran 
fur trader James Bordeaux occupied an unstockaded trading post at a site roughly eight 
miles downriver from the fort along the Oregon Trail that a succession of traders had 
used since 1837. As an independent entrepreneur, Bordeaux pursued a lucrative trade 
with the same bands of Brules and Oglalas that had frequented the Platte River valley 
                                                             
497 Hanson, Weapons, Tools, and Ornaments, 9. 
230 
 
since the mid-1830s, thus normalizing Teton Sioux trade relations there that might 
otherwise have rapidly deteriorated.
498
 
Then an incident  in the summer of 1854 between the United States army and bands 
of Sioux camped along the Oregon Trail adjacent to Fort Laramie brought the Tetons into 
direct conflict with the Americans. That summer, as a train of Mormon emigrants passed 
several bands of Sioux awaiting the distribution of annuities promised them at the treaty 
council of 1851, an old cow fled from its owner. Afraid to enter the Indian camps, he left 
the animal behind; shortly thereafter, a Minneconjou warrior visiting the Oglalas killed it 
for its meat and hide.  The owner later complained of the incident to Fort Laramie’s 
commander, who somewhat reluctantly ordered Second-Lieutenant J. L. Grattan to 
investigate the disturbance. As he approached the Indian camps, accompanied by twenty-
nine men and a howitzer, Grattan arrogantly demanded that the Sioux surrender the 
Minneconjou. They refused. In the fight that followed, Chief Brave Bear of the Brules 
and all of the troopers died.
499
  
The aftermath of the “Grattan affair” exposed the degree to which the Western Sioux 
had become dependent on Euro-American trade goods. After venting their anger at the 
white survivors of the uneven fight, the Tetons scattered to escape the army’s certain 
wrath. Some bands headed for the buffalo ranges north of the Platte, while still others 
turned south.
500
  
                                                             
498 White, “The Winning of the West,” 340; Schuler, Fort Pierre, 132; Hanson, “James Bordeaux,” 6. 
499 George Hyde points out that Grattan, young and impulsive, educated at West Point, believed that the 
government had stationed the troops at Fort Laramie to suppress the Sioux rather than merely observe them 
and keep the peace; Grattan’s youthful enthusiasm coupled with his contempt for the Indians cost him his 
life; see Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 72-75.   
500 Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk, 76; Sandoz, Crazy Horse, 35-39. 
231 
 
The army did, in fact, dispatch a punitive expedition under General William S. 
Harney to punish the Sioux. Before Harney concluded his campaign, his soldiers 
destroyed Little Thunder’s camp of Brules on Blue Water Creek. It had made no 
difference to Harney that Little Thunder always counseled peace with the whites. 
Following his victory on the Blue Water, Harney marched his troops to Fort Pierre 
without incident, where, in the spring of 1856, he forced the Sioux to accept a treaty that 
appointed new chiefs and restricted trade. But while the Indians generally ignored the 
treaty—even the Senate refused to ratify it—its repercussions effectively destroyed the 
intricate trade network anchored by Forts Laramie and Pierre and the trail that linked 
them.
501
    
The general disruption of the Sioux trade caused by Harney’s campaign to force the 
southwestern most Tetons away from the Oregon Trail persuaded Pierre Chouteau, Jr. 
and Company to sell Fort Pierre to the army that same year. Although its freighters 
continued to use the Fort Pierre-Fort Laramie Trail, by 1855, the Tetons had lost the 
services of their two most important trading establishments. Suddenly, the Euro-
American trade goods they had come to depend on for so many years were no longer 
readily accessible. 
In the years after the sale of Fort Pierre, the buffalo robe and hide trade continued, 
albeit in an altered form and often with dire consequences for the Indians. In Crazy 
Horse, Mari Sandoz relates an encounter between an unscrupulous trader named John 
Richard and a band of Oglalas in the wake of the Grattan fight. Richard and his men had 
come to the Indians’ camp with “the usual Richard goods: blue cloth and Mexican 
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blankets on top, whiskey kegs underneath. [The whiskey] was forbidden by the soldiers, 
but none would try to catch them just now, and the traders had to make a living some 
way, they said. There would be no bringing robes to the Platte for a long, long time 
[emphasis added].” 502 At first, the Sioux had hoped that Bordeaux had brought their 
annuity goods, but it was, instead, only Richard, with his easy credit and deadly cargo. 
The next day, following a night of drunken excesses that included the murder of one 
Oglala warrior by another, Sandoz writes that “there was one orderly place in the 
morning village, the Richard wagons and the lodges beside them filled now with the 
goods the Indians had taken from the stone houses after [Brave] Bear was shot. And out 
on the hillside was a big herd of horses and mules no longer watched by the Indian 
herders but by Richard’s men.”503 The Indians’ dependence on Euro-American trade 
goods was complete.
504
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its most extreme, the process rendered the Indians utterly superfluous—a population without control over 
resources, sustained in poverty by payments controlled by the larger society, and subject to increasing 
pressure to lose their group identity and disappear;” see Richard White, The Roots of Dependency: 
Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1983), xix. Scholar Pekka Hamalainen, however, in his recent study of the 
Comanches, challenges White’s “linear reading of Indian-white relations” by “questioning some of the 
most basic assumptions about indigenous peoples, colonialism, and historical change.” Significantly, 
Hamalainen’s work focuses on the Comanches in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a time 
when the “Comanches adjusted their traditions, behaviors, and even beliefs to accommodate the arrival of 
Europeans and their technologies, but [later] turned the tables on Europe’s colonial expansion by refusing 
to change.” Yet even Hamalainen concedes that the Comanches suffered the same fate as North America’s 
other indigenous peoples by the late nineteenth century; see Pekka Hamalainen, The Comanche Empire 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 1-17. For a purely theoretical treatment of dependency, see Jay 
Gurian, “The Importance of Dependency in Native American-White Contact,” American Indian Quarterly 
3 (Spring 1977): 16-36.   
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